Adverse Financial Shocks Research Articles

Global Financial Interconnectedness: A Non-Linear Assessment of the Uncertainty Channel

The role of uncertainty in the global economy is now widely recognized by policy-makers but its effects on the international financial system are less understood. In this paper we assess the impact of uncertainty fluctuations on the interconnectedness within the international system of equity prices. In this respect, we extend the measure of connectedness put forward by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) by allowing for non-linear effects through the estimation of a non-linear Threshold VAR model whose regimes depend on the level on uncertainty. Results clearly show that high uncertainty tends to generate more connectedness among equity indexes of a set of advanced and emerging countries. From an economic policy point of view, this result suggests that in the presence of high uncertainty, an adverse financial shock in a specific country is likely to propagate more widely and more strongly to the whole financial system. This result advocates for a close real-time monitoring of uncertainty measures.

Slow Post-Financial Crisis Recovery and Monetary Policy

Post-financial crisis recoveries tend to be slow and be accompanied by slowdowns in TFP and permanent losses in GDP. To prevent them, how should monetary policy be conducted? We address this issue by developing a model with endogenous TFP growth in which an adverse financial shock can induce a slow recovery. In the model, a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a strong response to output, and the welfare gain from output stabilization is much larger than when TFP expands exogenously. Moreover, inflation stabilization results in a sizable welfare loss, while nominal GDP stabilization works well, albeit causing high interest-rate volatility.

Slow Post-financial Crisis Recovery and Monetary Policy

Post-financial crisis recoveries tend to be slow and accompanied by slowdowns in total factor productivity (TFP) and permanent losses in GDP. To prevent them, how should monetary policy be conducted? We address this issue by developing a model with endogenous TFP growth in which an adverse financial shock can induce a slow recovery. In the model, a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a strong response to output, and the welfare gain from output stabilization is much larger than when TFP expands exogenously. Moreover, inflation stabilization results in a sizable welfare loss, while nominal GDP stabilization works well, albeit causing high interest rate volatility. (JEL E12, E23, E32, E43, E44, E52, G01)

Firm Entry and Financial Shocks

This article shows that firm entry dynamics are an important part of the propagation of financial shocks to the real macroeconomy. A VAR documents empirically that adverse financial shocks are associated with significant declines in both new firm creation and equity values. A DSGE business cycle model combining endogenous firm entry and financial frictions, where firms have a choice of financing entry through debt or equity, can explain these facts. The model implies that adjustment in firm numbers can moderate the impact of financial shocks on aggregate output, as it buffers the equity value and financial stance of surviving firms.

The post-crisis slump in the Euro Area and the US: Evidence from an estimated three-region DSGE model

The global financial crisis (2008–09) led to a sharp contraction in both Euro Area (EA) and US real activity, and was followed by a long-lasting slump. However, the post-crisis adjustment in the EA and the US shows striking differences—in particular, the EA slump has been markedly more protracted. We estimate a three-region (EA, US and Rest of World) New Keynesian DSGE model (using quarterly data for 1999–2014) to quantify the drivers of the divergent EA and US adjustment paths. Our results suggest that financial shocks were key drivers of the 2008–09 Great Recession, for both the EA and the US. The post-2009 slump in the EA mainly reflects a combination of adverse aggregate demand and supply shocks, in particular lower productivity growth, and persistent adverse shocks to capital investment, linked to the continuing poor health of the EA financial system. Adverse financial shocks were less persistent for the US. The financial shocks identified by the model are consistent with observed performance indicators of the EA and US banking systems.

The Post-Crisis Slump in the Euro Area and the US: Evidence from an Estimated Three-Region DSGE Model

The global financial crisis (2008-09) led to a sharp contraction in both Euro Area (EA) and US real activity, and was followed by a long-lasting slump. However, the post-crisis adjustment in the EA and the US shows striking differences -- in particular, the EA slump has been markedly more protracted. We estimate a three-region (EA, US and Rest of World) New Keynesian DSGE model (using quarterly data for 1999-2014) to quantify the drivers of the divergent EA and US adjustment paths. Our results suggest that financial shocks were key drivers of the 2008-09 Great Recession, for both the EA and the US. The post-2009 slump in the EA mainly reflects a combination of adverse aggregate demand and supply shocks, in particular lower productivity growth, and persistent adverse shocks to capital investment, linked to the continuing poor health of the EA financial system. Adverse financial shocks were less persistent for the US. The financial shocks identified by the model are consistent with observed performance indicators of the EA and US banking systems.

The Post-Crisis Slump in the Euro Area and the US: Evidence from an Estimated Three-Region DSGE Model

The global financial crisis (2008-09) led to a sharp contraction in both Euro Area (EA) and US real activity, and was followed by a long-lasting slump. However, the post-crisis adjustment in the EA and the US shows striking differences—in particular, the EA slump has been markedly more protracted. We estimate a three-region (EA, US and Rest of World) New Keynesian DSGE model (using quarterly data for 1999-2014) to quantify the drivers of the divergent EA and US adjustment paths. Our results suggest that financial shocks were key drivers of the 2008-09 Great Recession, for both the EA and the US. The post-2009 slump in the EA mainly reflects a combination of adverse aggregate demand and supply shocks, in particular lower productivity growth, and persistent adverse shocks to capital investment, linked to the continuing poor health of the EA financial system. Adverse financial shocks were less persistent for the US. The financial shocks identified by the model are consistent with observed performance indicators of the EA and US banking systems.

Financial crisis and saving–investment dynamics in the presence of cross-sectional dependence: The case of East Asia

Using the common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) technique to a set of balanced panel error correction model, we examine the effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the global financial crisis of 2008 on the behavior of saving and investment in East Asian countries. Our results show that saving and investment rates are highly dependent across countries of East Asia. This finding underlines the importance of taking into account cross-sectional dependence when analyzing saving–investment relationship. The results also indicate that the adverse financial shock of 1997 has negatively affected the short run correlation between saving and investment, but has not influenced their long run relationship. Our finding, hence, verifies the prediction of new open economy macroeconomic theories regarding the divergence of short run saving–investment from its long run trend for East Asia. Moreover, we find that the global financial crisis of 2008 has not affected the saving–investment dynamics in this region. It means that the consequences of the Asian and global financial crises for saving–investment dynamics are not the same in East Asia. One might attribute these differences to the origins of these two shocks, i.e., internal versus external to the region. These findings may have some policy implications for those countries that rely heavily on foreign investment and are subject to various internal and external financial shocks.

Business Cycle and Monetary Policy Analysis with Market Rigidities and Financial Frictions

We examine business cycle fluctuations in a dynamic macroeconomic model that incorporates a financial accelerator mechanism, borrowing constraints, and frictions on both setting prices and wages. After an adverse financial shock, the slow-adjustment process on wage cuts results in higher production marginal costs, lower firm earnings, and a subsequent reduction in equity that explains the increase in the cost of borrowing and the credit crunch. The real effects of adverse financial shocks are significantly amplified when either considering greater rigidities for price/wage setting or a low elasticity of substitution in loan production (real rigidities in the financial sector). In the monetary policy analysis, a Taylor (1983)-style rule performs slightly better when incorporating a small response coefficient to the spread between borrowing and saving interest rates.

Investissement, contraintes financières et fluctuations macroéconomiques

Résumé Cet article étudie l’influence des activités bancaires et des frictions financières dans le cadre d’un modèle de la nouvelle macroéconomie keynésienne. Ce cadre est comparé à deux modèles alternatifs déjà proposés par la littérature : le modèle canonique de la nouvelle synthèse néoclassique (Woodford [2003]) et le modèle de Goodfriend et McCallum [2007]. Les fonctions de réaction simulées à la suite d’un choc technologique montrent que l’introduction de facteurs bancaires n’a pas d’influence significative sur la réaction de variables macroéconomiques à des innovations technologiques. Par contre, en cas de choc financier, les effets apparaissent significativement plus importants que dans les modèles existants. Les simulations effectuées permettent de répliquer des phénomènes économiques d’une amplitude comparable à ceux observés dans le cadre américain lors de la crise financière de 2008.

The Labor Market Consequences of Adverse Financial Shocks

The recent financial crises, alongside a dramatic rise in unemployment on both sides of the Atlantic, suggest that financial shocks do translate into the labor markets. In this paper we first document that financial recessions amplify labor market volatility and Okun's elasticity over the business cycle. Second, we highlight a key mechanisms linking financial shocks to job destruction, presenting and solving a simple model of labor market search and endogenous finance. While finance increases job creation and net output in normal times, it also augments their aggregate response in the aftermath of a financial shock. Third, we present evidence coherent with the idea that more leveraged sectors experience larger employment volatility during financial recessions. Theoretically, the job destruction effect of finance works as follows. Leveraged firms may find them- selves in a position in which their liquidity is suddenly called back by the lender. This has direct consequences on a firm ability to run and manage e xisting jobs. As a result, firms may be obliged to shut down part of their operations and destroy existing jobs. We argue that with well developed capital markets, firms will have an incentive to rely more on liquidity, and in normal times deep capital markets lead to tight labor markets. After an adverse liquidity shock, firms that rely much on liquidity, are hit disproportionally hard. This may explain why the unemployment rate in the US during the Great Recession increased more than in European countries experiencing larger output losses. Empirically, the paper uses a variety of datasets to test the implications of the model. At first we identify crises that, just like in the model, caused a sudden reduction of liquidity to firms. Next we draw on sector-level data on employment and leverage in a number of OECD countries at quarterly frequencies to assess whether highly leveraged equilibria originate more employment adjustment under financial recessions. We find that highly leveraged sectors and periods are associated with higher employment-to-output elasticities during banking crises and this effect explains the observation of higher Okun's elasticities during financial recessions. We also argue that the effect of leverage on employment adjustment can be interpreted as a causal effect, if our identification assumptions are considered plausible. All this amounts essentially for a test of the labor demand channel of adjustment. keywords: credit squeeze,matching,leverage JEL codes: G01,J23,J63

Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Banking in a New Keynesian Model

This paper introduces both endogenous capital accumulation and deposit-in-advance requirements for investment in the banking model of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). Impulse response functions from technology and monetary shocks show some attenuation effect due to the procyclical behavior of the marginal finance cost. In addition, an adverse financial shock produces sizeable declines in output, inflation and interest rates. In the long-run analysis, we finnd the following effects of banking intermediation: (i) the stock of capital increases to take advantage of its collateral services, and (ii) consumption and labor fall in response to the finance cost attached to purchases of goods. Using the baseline calibrated model, we show how a 10 percent increase in banking efficiency would result in a permanent welfare gain equivalent to 0.3 percent of output.

Financial Market Shocks during the Great Depression

This study examines the effect of shocks observed in financial markets on output and employment during the Great Depression. We present three main findings. First, an adverse financial shock leads to a decline in the manufacturing sector's output and employment that peaks about 11 months afterward. Next, this shock has a much greater impact on the durables sector than the nondurables sector. Last, continuing financial market weakness in 1933 and 1934 may have restrained the recovery from the Great Depression. The findings suggest that financial market weakness contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression, and that this occurred mainly through the investment channel. In addition, we use the estimates from the Great Depression data to evaluate the effect of recent financial market disruptions.

Financial Market Shocks during the Great Depression

This study examines the effect of shocks observed in financial markets on output and employment during the Great Depression. We present three main findings. First, an adverse financial shock leads to a decline in the manufacturing sector’s output and employment that peaks about 11 months afterward. Next, this shock has a much greater impact on the durables sector than the nondurables sector. Last, continuing financial market weakness in 1933 and 1934 may have restrained the recovery from the Great Depression. The findings suggest that financial market weakness contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression, and that this occurred mainly through the investment channel. In addition, a counterfactual analysis using the estimates from the Great Depression suggests that the recent recession would have been less severe without the financial market disruptions in the fall of 2008.

Monetary Policy and the Financing of Firms

How should monetary policy respond to changes in financial conditions? We consider a simple model where firms are subject to shocks which may force them to default on their debt. Firms' assets and liabilities are nominal and predetermined. Monetary policy can therefore affect the real value of funds used to finance production. In this model, allowing for inflation volatility in response to aggregate shocks can be optimal; the optimal response to adverse financial shocks is to lower interest rates and to engineer some inflation; and the Taylor rule may implement allocations that have opposite cyclical properties to the optimal ones. (JEL G32, E31, E43, E44, E52)

Monetary Policy and the Financing of Firms

How should monetary policy respond to changes in financial conditions? In this paper we consider a simple model where firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which may force them to default on their debt. Firms’ assets and liabilities are denominated in nominal terms and predetermined when shocks occur. Monetary policy can therefore affect the real value of funds used to finance production. Furthermore, policy affects the loan and deposit rates. We find that allowing for short-term inflation volatility in response to exogenous shocks can be optimal; that the optimal response to adverse financial shocks is to lower interest rates, if not at the zero bound, and to engineer a short period of inflation; that the Taylor rule may implement allocations that have opposite cyclical properties to the optimal ones.

Financial shocks and worry about the future

Using data from the Health and Retirement Study and the Survey of Consumer Finances, we show that households that experience adverse financial shocks worry more about the adequacy of their financial resources in retirement, even after controlling for the effects of these shocks on overall wealth. We find supporting evidence that suggests that at least part of the increased worry about retirement is due to general pessimism rather than changes in an individual’s own circumstances. Specifically, experiencing idiosyncratic financial shocks is also associated with greater pessimism about the general future of the economy.

Financial Shocks and Worry about the Future

Using data from the Health and Retirement Study and the Survey of Consumer Finances, we show that households that experience adverse financial shocks worry more about the adequacy of their financial resources in retirement, even after controlling for the effects of these shocks on overall wealth. We find supporting evidence that suggests that at least part of the increased worry about retirement is due to general pessimism rather than changes in an individual's own circumstances. Specifically, experiencing idiosyncratic financial shocks is also associated with greater pessimism about the general future of the economy. Finally, we present some suggestive evidence that links the increased level of worry to reduced consumption.

Safety and Soundness and the CRA: Is There a Conflict?

Ordered probit regressions of the supervisory ratings assigned to banks point to a conflict between the credit enhancement objectives associated with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and financial safety and soundness standards. Aggressive banking strategies tend to help CRA ratings but hurt safety and soundness ratings. In addition, banks with financial problems are more likely to receive substandard CRA ratings, even though their condition may require a retrenchment from CRA objectives. Finally, there is some limited evidence to suggest that a greater focus on lending in low‐income neighborhoods helps CRA ratings but at the expense of safety and soundness.

Emerging Economies and the Financial Crises of the Late 1990s

Emerging market countries scattered across Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe were overwhelmed by financial collapse beginning in late 1994. Although the afflicted countries had widely varying economic and political structures, their crises shared the similarities of local currency collapse, plunging stock and bond markets, bad debt-ridden national banking systems, and mass exodus of foreign investors. Persuasive evidence teaches that developing economies must give strict attention to their financial liabilities in order to avoid a perilous capital structure that will magnify the effects of any adverse financial shocks.