Even with widespread adoption of automated anomaly detection in safety-critical areas, both classical and advanced machine learning models are susceptible to first-order evasion attacks that fool models at run-time (e.g. an automated firewall or an anti-virus application). Kernelized support vector machines (KSVMs) are an especially useful model because they combine a complex geometry with low run-time requirements (e.g. when compared to neural networks), acting as a run-time lower bound when compared to contemporary models (e.g. deep neural networks), to provide a cost-efficient way to measure model and attack run-time costs. To properly measure and combat adversaries, we propose a massively parallel projected gradient descent (PGD) evasion attack framework. Through theoretical examinations and experiments carried out using linearly-separable Gaussian normal data, we present (i) a massively parallel naive attack, we show that adversarial retraining is unlikely to be an effective means to combat an attacker even on linearly separable datasets, (ii) a cost effective way of evaluating models defences and attacks, and an extensible code base for doing so, (iii) an inverse relationship between adversarial robustness and benign accuracy, (iv) the lack of a general relationship between attack time and efficacy, and (v) that adversarial retraining increases compute time exponentially while failing to reliably prevent highly-confident false classifications.
Read full abstract