Administrative Violations Research Articles

Russian Legal Culture Before and After Communism: Criminal Justice, Politics, and the Public Sphere. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 39 by Frances Nethercott (review)

reviews 779 and 'official' satire intheEastern Bloc;thesimilarities anddifferences between jokestoldunderStalinism andthosetoldunderNazism;and thephenomenon of Communist leaderswho themselves wereavid tellers ofanti-Communist jokes.The result is a highly original approachto a topicthathas had itsfair shareofattention overtheyears(theworks ofEmilDraitser and BruceAdams cometomind,and evenpartsofMartinAmis'sKobathe Dread: Laughter andthe Twenty Million, London,2002),butwhichhas notbeen attempted on sucha scale,or in suchan engaging narrative style. Lewis'ssourcesintesting hishypotheses aremanyand varied,and include a collection of40+ jokebookspublished from the1930son,mostly byémigrés, numerous'official'periodicalpublicationsfromthe Communistperiod, interviews withjoke-tellers, joke scholars,and even history-makers such as Lech Walesa,and eventhedreamshe himself had whileworking on the projectand recalledconversations withhis East German girlfriend, who helped sparkhis enthusiasm forthe project.The introspective natureof Lewis'sdescription ofhisworkadds a dimension tothebookthatwillappeal specifically toan audienceofBritish and American readerswhoalso grewup during whatnowseemslikea faraway dream,theCold War. Despite the relatively modesttitleand focuson anonymousoral jokes, Hammer andTickle alsooffers analyses (andmanyexamples) ofsatirical cartoons and publishedhumour,as well as interviews withprofessional cartoonists and comedians.Mostoriginally, thebookalso givesdetailedaccountsofcircumstances surrounding specific arrests for joke-telling during theCommunist period,includingofficial reports,interviews with those arrestedor their relatives, and (ofcourse)theoffending jokes themselves. The book is a follow-up to Lewis's 2006 documentary filmHammer and Tickle, broadcast on BBC 4, and an excellent idea itwasindeedtosupplement thefilm witha written account.The decisionallowedtheauthornotonlyto includemanymorejokesthanhe was able to do in a feature-length film, but also to devoteenoughwordstowhatis,after all,a verbalphenomenon. UCL SSEES Seth Graham Nethercott,Frances. RussianLegal Culture Before andAfter Communism: Criminal Justicei Politics, andthe PublicSphere. BASEES /Routledge Series on Russian andEastEuropeanStudies, 39. Routledge, LondonandNewYork,2007. xiii+ 199pp. Notes.Selectbibliography. Index.£85.00. The bookunderreviewis an unusualcombination ofthehistory ofRussian criminal justiceand theories ofcrimeand punishment, thelatterexamined mostly through thewritings ofV. S. Solov'ev,V. Spasovich,K. Kavelin,A. F. Koni, K. Arsen 'ev, N. Tagantsev,and otherleadingRussianswho wrote mostly between1864and 1917.These materials are treated primarily as intellectualhistory rather thanlegalhistory, and theauthoris morecomfortable and fluent withthatdimension thansheis withthelaw. 780 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO Chapter1 is devotedto the'Fathersand sonsoflegalreform'; Chapter2 to 'Reforming criminal law (1864-1903)';Chapter3 to 'Theorizing crimeand punishment' (a rather odd use of'theorizing'); Chapter4 entirely to 'Solov'ev as a philosopher oflaw'; Chapter5 to'Criminal justiceintheage ofrevolution (1900-1917)';and then a majorjump in time to the finalChapter 6 on 'Rehabilitating law: criminaljustice aftercommunism',followedby an 'Afterword: post-Soviet legalculture and pre-revolutionary models'. For a juristitis decidedly odd to readthatthe'drafting ofnewlegislation wasmoreofa theoretical exercise' thantheintellectual endeavours ofRussian law reformers in theirroleas 'teachers'and 'enlighteners'. On thecontrary, drafting legislation is thetruelaboratory whereone seeksto translate theory intopreceptand preceptintopractice. The bodyoflegaldoctrinal writings is indeedcollectively 'a canon [sic]ofnationaljuridicalliterature' (p. 2); what elsewoulditbe butourlegacy,suchas itis,to future generations. It should comeas no surprise that'someoftheseworks havebeenresurrected as classics ofpre-revolutionary legalculture serving as modelsto emulatein endeavours to overcomea moreproximate Sovietlegacy'(p. 2).Actually, theyare rather morethansurvivals ofan earlierlegal culture, and theyare not 'modelsto emulate'.Theyweresuppressed orforgotten during theSovietera,and their revival is as muchdue to their practical relevanceto themodernlaw reform agendaas itis to makingavailablea bodyoflearning ofintrinsic interest. Whether itisconvincing tojump,as thisworkdoes,from theliberalreform movement inRussiafrom 1864to 1917tothelateperestroika and post-Soviet reform era withouta discussionof what transpired in betweenmustbe doubted.There is an implication thatSoviettheoriesand experiencewith criminal justiceare an aberration thatfalloutsidethetwoperiodsaddressed here.On thecontrary, whathappenedinSovietcriminal theory (especially A. N. Traininand A. la. Vyshinskii) also mustbe read againstthethinking of thepre-1917 era,notleastbecausea numberoftheprotagonists weretrained byorwerecolleaguesoftheleadingpre-revolutionary reform writers. Andthe perestroika players(therewere many othersbesides those identified by Nethercott) werelikewise a productoftheSovietera. The contemporary portionofthebookis marredbytheauthor'sinability toidentify someoftheprotagonists correctly: thus, 'Vasily'instead ofVladimir N. Kudriavtsev, and Sofia G. 'Kelinga' is misnamedthroughout instead of Kelina (pp. 133,135,139, 150,178,179,196). There is confusion about 'decriminalization' (the movementof lesser crimes to the categoryof administrative violations) andthereduction inthenumber ofcrimes for whose commission capital punishment mightbe assigned.Abolishingthe death penalty is notdecriminalization. Without detracting fromSakharov'scontributiontoreforms inperestroika Russia,itis extreme tocallthe1993Russian Constitution 'thebrainchild ofAndreiSakharovbefore hisuntimely deathin December1989'(p. 136).The phrase'protiv lichnosti' in theCriminalCode has to do withcrimesagainsttheperson,and notnecessarily 'involving loss oflife'(p. 136).The CriminalCode was not 'ratified' in 1996 (parliaments ratify treaties, butnotlaws)and was not'officially enacted'inJanuary 1997(it REVIEWS 781 entered intoforce on 1January 1997).Itisrather surprising...

Prescribing Buprenorphine May Trigger Random Federal Audit

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Government NewsFull AccessPrescribing Buprenorphine May Trigger Random Federal AuditMark MoranMark MoranSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:1 Jan 2010https://doi.org/10.1176/pn.45.1.psychnews_45_1_012AbstractPhysicians who administer, dispense, or prescribe Schedule III substances, including buprenorphine, may be required to submit to random audits as a part of routine surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Agency.The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has recently sent letters to psychiatrists and other physicians who are registered with the DEA stating that it will be conducting on-site, unannounced inspections under the authority of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).The inspections are intended to ensure compliance with recordkeeping, security, and other requirements for administering, dispensing, or prescribing controlled substances under the CSA, according to the government agency.Jennifer Tassler, J.D., deputy director for regulatory affairs in APA's Department of Government Relations (DGR), said that technically inspections can be conducted for any scheduled narcotic, but that the DEA initiative is focused on buprenorphine.Tassler told Psychiatric News that DGR has been in contact with the agency and that the DEA has said the inspections are routine and not intended to intimidate or harass physicians or their patients.DGR provided the following information about what to expect and how to alert APA if there is a problem: •. The inspector should present his or her DEA credentials and a “Notice of Inspection” to explain the process of the audit and the physician's rights. Physicians have the right to refuse to consent to the inspection and insist that the DEA obtain an administrative warrant. Members who believe they require legal advice should contact a local attorney.•. DEA agents will likely verify physician credentials including DEA registrations and state licensure and will ask to see three months of records. They will verify the number of patients being treated to ensure that it is in line with the limits outlined in the Drug Abuse Treatment Act of 2000.•. In the case of physicians who are dispensing or administering buprenorphine, DEA agents will likely take an inventory of the product on hand and reconcile that with the records of what was dispensed or administered. The investigator will also be checking to see that the drugs are properly secured within the facility.•. If the DEA investigator finds that there are administrative violations, he or she can issue a “Letter of Admonition” outlining the problems found in the audit. The physician then has 30 days to respond to the DEA with information about how the problem was corrected.Members who receive an on-site audit and experience any problems should contact APA staff Jennifer Tassler at (703) 907-7842 or Beatrice Eld at (703) 907-8598. ISSUES NewArchived

The Representations of inhabitants of Latvia about reasons of aggressive vehicle driving

By the entrance of Latvia into the European Union the changes were made in the normative and legal basis of the country, including, these changes affected the Code of Administrative Violations of Latvia, where the Article 149.4, Part 11 had a notion of such violation like “aggressive driving” introduced. Understanding of the reasons of such behavior of drivers is an important issue in this connection. The aim of the research carried out was the survey of the representations of inhabitants of Latvia about the reasons of aggressive driving. During the investigation a method of interviewing and polling was applied. The respondents are residents of different regions of Latvia, which were described by various socially demographic criterions.During the process of research the following categories of reasons of aggressive driving in the representations of respondents were brought to light – physical condition of the driver and emotional condition of the driver at the moment of driving vehicle, characteristics connected directly with the personality of the driver, condition of environment, peculiarities of work of the traffic police, level of society culture, quality of training during the drivers’ courses, experience of the driver, etc.

Projecting Felony Intakes to the Justice System

Prison populations in this country continue to increase even during a period of decline in the crime rate. There is a need for a model that simulates how offenders are admitted, how they move in and out of the system, and how capable it is of answering “what if ” type of questions. For example, what impact would it have on the prison system population if there was a policy that would result in an increase in the parole revocation rate for administrative violations? This article presents a methodology to forecast correctional admissions. Projected admissions are derived by separately projecting felony probation placements, direct court prison commitments, and felony probation and parole revocation to prison.

Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies

On July 1, 2001, a nationwide law in Portugal took effect that decriminalized all drugs, including cocaine and heroin. Under the new legal framework, all drugs were decriminalized, not legalized. Thus, possession for personal use and usage itself are still legally prohibited, but violations of those prohibitions are deemed to be exclusively administrative violations and are removed completely from the criminal realm. Drug trafficking continues to be prosecuted as a criminal offense. While other states in the European Union have developed various forms of de facto decriminalization — whereby substances perceived to be less serious (such as cannabis) rarely lead to criminal prosecution — Portugal remains the only EU member state with a law explicitly declaring drugs to be decriminalized. Because more than seven years have now elapsed since enactment of Portugal's decriminalization system, there are ample data enabling its effects to be assessed. Notably, decriminalization has become increasingly popular in Portugal since 2001. Except for some far-right politicians, very few domestic political factions are agitating for a repeal of the 2001 law. And while there is a widespread perception that bureaucratic changes need to be made to Portugal's decriminalization framework to make it more efficient and effective, there is no real debate about whether drugs should once again be criminalized. More significantly, none of the nightmare scenarios touted by preenactment decriminalization opponents — from rampant increases in usage among the young to the transformation of Lisbon into a haven for drug tourists — has occurred. The political consensus in favor of decriminalization is unsurprising in light of the relevant empirical data. Those data indicate that decriminalization has had no adverse effect on usage rates in Portugal, which, in numerous categories, are now among the lowest in the EU, particularly when compared with states with stringent criminalization regimes. Although postdecriminalization usage rates have remained roughly the same or even decreased slightly when compared with other EU states, drug-related pathologies — such as sexually transmitted diseases and deaths due to usage — have decreased dramatically. Drug policy experts attribute those positive trends to the enhanced ability of the Portuguese government to offer treatment programs to its citizens — enhancements made possible, for numerous reasons, by decriminalization. This report will begin with an examination of the Portuguese decriminalization framework as set forth in law and in terms of how it functions in practice. Also examined is the political climate in Portugal both pre- and postdecriminalization with regard to policy, and the impetus that led that nation to adopt decriminalization. The report then assesses Portuguese policy in the context of the EU's approach to drugs. The varying legal frameworks, as well as the overall trend toward liberalization, are examined to enable a meaningful comparative assessment between Portuguese data and data from other EU states. The report also sets forth the data concerning drug-related trends in Portugal both pre- and postdecriminalization. The effects of decriminalization in Portugal are examined both in absolute terms and in comparisons with other states that continue to criminalize drugs, particularly within the EU. The data show that, judged by virtually every metric, the Portuguese decriminalization framework has been a resounding success. Within this success lie self-evident lessons that should guide policy debates around the world.

Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement

Circumstantial evidence is employed in cartel cases in all countries. The better practice is to use circumstantial evidence holistically, giving it cumulative effect, rather than on an item-by-item basis. Complicating the use of circumstantial evidence are provisions in national competition laws that variously define the nature of agreements that are subject to the law. There are two general types of circumstantial evidence: communication evidence and economic evidence. Of the two, communication evidence is considered to be the more important. Economic evidence is almost always ambiguous. It could be consistent with either agreement or independent action. Therefore it requires careful analysis. National treatment of cartels, such as whether they are prosecuted as crimes or as administrative violations, can affect the burden of proof that applies to the cases, and hence the use of circumstantial evidence. It can be difficult to convince courts to accept circumstantial evidence in cartel cases, especially where the potential liability for having violated the anti-cartel provisions of the competition law is high. There are circumstances in countries that are relatively new to anti-cartel enforcement that could affect the extent to which they rely on circumstantial evidence in their cases.

Revocation by consent: The United States Parole Commission's expedited revocation procedure

This article examines the United States Parole Commission's development and use of an expedited revocation procedure for parole violations not involving serious new felony offenses. The majority of parole revocation proceedings involve charges of administrative violations (such as alcohol abuse, drug use, or failure to report) or misdemeanor offenses, and most parolees charged with such violations admit them. When there is no dispute as to the charged violation, the sole issue is the determination of the appropriate sanction. In 1996, the commission began a pilot project designed to expedite the processing of parole violations involving administrative, misdemeanor, and lesser felony charges. Certain alleged parole violators were given the option of waiving the right to a revocation hearing, acknowledging responsibility for the charged violation, and accepting a specified revocation penalty determined by the commission on the basis of the case record. The goal was to conserve commission resources without negatively affecting the due process rights of the alleged parole violator or the integrity of the guideline system used to sanction parole violations. In 1998, the commission incorporated the expedited revocation procedure developed in the pilot project into its permanent regulations. By FY 2003, expedited revocation determinations accounted for 40 percent of all commission revocation actions. The savings generated by the expedited revocation procedure allowed the commission to devote more resources to conducting revocation hearings involving more serious and/or contested charges.

Chapter 25. Consideration of Cases Concerning Administrative Violations

Chapter 25. Consideration of Cases Concerning Administrative Violations

81. Concerning the Complaint of Citizens L. N. Vasil’eva, A. N. Evseev, N. P. Evseev, and L. A. Naletov about the Violation of Their Constitutional Rights by the Provision of the Second Part of Article 1467 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

81. Concerning the Complaint of Citizens L. N. Vasil’eva, A. N. Evseev, N. P. Evseev, and L. A. Naletov about the Violation of Their Constitutional Rights by the Provision of the Second Part of Article 1467 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

77. On the Complaint of Citizen Petros Mkrtievich terziian Concerning the Violation of His Constitutional Rights by the Provisions of Articles 159 and 199 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

77. On the Complaint of Citizen Petros Mkrtievich terziian Concerning the Violation of His Constitutional Rights by the Provisions of Articles 159 and 199 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

38. In the Case Concerning Verification of the Constitutionality of the Second Part of Article 266 and Point 3 of the First Part of Article 267 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR in Connection with the Complaints of Citizens E. A. Arbuzova, O. B. Kolegov, A. D. Kutyrev, R. T. Nasibulin, and V. I. Tkachuk

38. In the Case Concerning Verification of the Constitutionality of the Second Part of Article 266 and Point 3 of the First Part of Article 267 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR in Connection with the Complaints of Citizens E. A. Arbuzova, O. B. Kolegov, A. D. Kutyrev, R. T. Nasibulin, and V. I. Tkachuk

21. In the Case Concerning Verification of the Constitutionality of Article 266 of the Customs Code of the Russian Federation and the Second Part of Article 85 and Article 222 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR in Connection with the Complaints of Citizens M. M. Gagloeva and A. B. Pestriakov

21. In the Case Concerning Verification of the Constitutionality of Article 266 of the Customs Code of the Russian Federation and the Second Part of Article 85 and Article 222 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR in Connection with the Complaints of Citizens M. M. Gagloeva and A. B. Pestriakov

92. On the Inquiry of the Legislative Assembly of Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast Concerning Verification of the Constitutionality of the First Part of Article 6 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

92. On the Inquiry of the Legislative Assembly of Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast Concerning Verification of the Constitutionality of the First Part of Article 6 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

4. On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

4. On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the Code of Administrative Violations of the RSFSR

1. On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Law of the RSFSR “On the Judicial System of the RSFSR,” the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR, the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and the Code of the RSFSR on Administrative Violations of the Law

1. On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Law of the RSFSR “On the Judicial System of the RSFSR,” the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR, the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and the Code of the RSFSR on Administrative Violations of the Law

Outcomes of treatment of socially rehabilitated methadone maintenance patients in physicians' offices (medical maintenance): follow-up at three and a half to nine and a fourth years.

To determine whether selected socially rehabilitated former heroin addicts maintained on methadone can continue successful rehabilitation while maintained on methadone by primary care physicians rather than licensed clinics. This procedure has been termed "medical maintenance." Cohort study with 42-111 months of follow-up. Offices of hospital staff physicians (internists or family practitioners). The 100 patients met extensive entry criteria, including five or more years in conventional methadone maintenance treatment; stable employment or other productive activity; verifiable financial support; and no criminal involvement, use of illegal drugs, or excessive alcohol use within three or more years. Outcome measures used were retention in treatment, discharge for one of several reasons, lost medication incidents, and substance abuse. At one, two, and three years of treatment, 98, 95, and 85 patients, respectively, remained in medical maintenance. Cumulative proportional survival in treatment was 0.735 +/- 0.048 at five years and 0.562 +/- 0.084 at nine years. After 42-111 months, 72 patients remained in good standing; 15 patients had unfavorable discharges (11 for cocaine use, three for misuse of medication, and one for administrative violations); seven voluntarily withdrew from methadone in good standing (after receiving it for 9.1-24.4 years); four died; one transferred to a chronic care facility; and one voluntarily left the program. Carefully selected methadone maintenance patients in medical maintenance have a high retention rate and a low incidence of substance abuse and lost medication. Voluntary withdrawal from methadone maintenance after one or two decades is possible. The authors believe that medical maintenance should be made available to appropriate patients in other localities.

Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the Ussr and Union Republics On Administrative Violations

Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the Ussr and Union Republics On Administrative Violations