Administrative Monopoly Research Articles

Analyzing the Influencing Factors of Marine Fishery Market Power by Using the ISM Model

Wu, C.; Tan, L.; Han, J., and Liu, Z., 2020. Analyzing the influencing factors of marine fishery market power by using the ISM model. In: Gong, D.; Zhang, M., and Liu, R. (eds.), Advances in Coastal Research: Engineering, Industry, Economy, and Sustainable Development. Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue No. 106, pp. 161–165. Coconut Creek (Florida), ISSN 0749-0208.This paper analyzes the main factors that influence the marine fishery market power and establishes the interpretive structural modeling (ISM) model to obtain a five-layer staircase structure of these factors. This paper also analyzes the factors using MICMAC and draws conclusions. First, technological innovation is one of the ultimate risk factors, which should be considered as intervention factor and used to produce specific control strategy. Second, entry barriers, industrial support policies, and administrative monopoly systems are the most fundamental factors, which are strongly driven and weakly dependent but have a higher influence on other factors. Third, natural resources and sociometric resource factors have less influence on marine fishery market power.

Governance Innovation Issues on World Heritage Sites: A Case Study Of Lijiang Old Town, China

Considering Chinese constitutional framework today, local governments play an important role in management of World Heritage Sites. Traditional governance of organizational, institutional, and economic natures is a practical reflection of efficiency-orientated incentives. Owing to over-emphasis on technological and instrumental rationality, local governments are prone to dilemmas and legitimation crises such as lack of public responsibility, low governing efficiency, administrative monopoly and prominent social issues. Therefore, we propose a paradigm shift pertaining to the traditional model of public administration which requires governance innovations and theoretical breakthroughs.

“Leaky Bucket” of Kazakhstan’s Power Grid: Losses and Inefficient Distribution of Electric Power

This paper aims to determine and explain the main factors for power losses (the so-called “leaky bucket” effect) in Kazakhstan and the reasons for inefficient energy distribution within the country. Energy efficiency in Kazakhstan is much lower compared to more economically developed countries. The differences between energy efficiency in various regions of Kazakhstan are also significant. This article explores the impact of administrative monopoly tariffs on the regional energy efficiency, based on a national study conducted in Kazakhstan in 2017. The purpose of the study was to identify the administrative barriers and their impact on the sustainability of enterprise development. What hinders the distribution of energy resources among different regions is artificial barriers in the energy market and the administrative tariff monopoly for electric power. This leads to the inefficient distribution of resources throughout the country. In addition, it is difficult to leverage low distribution efficiency in the absence of a market. The authors attempt to prove that the magnitude of administrative barriers directly affects the efficiency and competitiveness of business, as well as the final prices of goods and services for the end consumer.

The proposals for improvement of the state enterprise «Informational judicial systems» economic activity regarding the UJITS development in Ukraine

Problem setting. Basing on the possibility of lockdown prolongation or repetition in Ukraine, it is important to quicken the development and implementation of the Unified Judicial Informational and Telecommunication System (UJITS) in Ukraine, the delayed launch of which has created numerous obstacles for the proper administration of justice and access to it in the context of social distancing. One of the main factors intensifying this process is the improvement of economic activity of the UJITS developer – the state enterprise “Informational Judicial Systems”. Analysis of recent researches and publications. Some general aspects of the research can be found in the scientific works of O. Bryntsev, I. Izarova, N. Loginova, N. Kushakova-Kostytska, O. Shamrai, O. Bernazyuk, M. Hetmantsev and others. Target of research is to provide proposals for improving the economic activity of the state enterprise “Informational Judicial Systems” on the development of the Unified Judicial Informational and Telecommunication System in Ukraine. Article’s main body. Judging by systematic analysis of the regulatory regulation of this state enterprise, the author concludes that there are signs of “administrative monopoly” in the implementation of the state order on the development of UJITS. The paper proposes two organizationally-legal directions of accelerating the development of the UJITS. The first one is the State Enterprise “Informational Judicial Systems” economic activity intensification and modernization. The second one is changing the method of execution of the state order on the development of the UJITS. The last proposal, which correlates to the requirements of current legislation, provides for the involvement to the implementation of the state order other enterprises specializing on the development, implementation and maintenance of information systems and IT companies on a competitive basis. Conclusions and prospects for the development. It is concluded that the introduction of partial or systemic competitive principles in the implementation of the state order on the UJITS development will enhance the activities of the state enterprise “Informational Judicial Systems”, improve the skills and professionalism of its specialists, polish up management efficiency and make its activity more transparent. In perspective it is appropriate to compare advantages and disadvantages of mentioned directions.

White Sea Canal: the experience of ensuring transportation safety under the conditions of the first confessional agreements of the Moscovian State of the XVI-XVII centuries

The subject of this article is the problems associated with ensuring transportation safety n the Moscovian State of the XVI-XVII centuries. The author examines the conditions and causal links that influenced the choice of certain measures for ensuring transportation safety. Analysis is conducted on the new to the Moscovian State practice of granting administrative monopoly on ensuring transportation safety to meet the interests of the representatives of certain foreign countries and corporations. The factors substantiating the implementation of administrative monopoly are explained. The algorithm for resolving the cases associated with infringement on the security of English transports in the Moscovian State is described. The scientific novelty of this research consists in determination of noncompliance of the goals of ensuring transportation safety that were claimed in the normative documents (Charters of the Russian tsars of the XVI-XVII centuries) with the actual capabilities and practice for its provision. The conclusion is made that the guarantees of the English sea transportation indicated in the charters of Moscovian tsars should be viewed merely as the declaration of good intentions, rather than factual help. The comparative legal analysis of archival documents allows establishing the fact the English kings interpreted charters of the Moscovian tsars on their own behalf, granting the English nationals the rights and privileges in the area of transportation safety.

The Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities vs. Administrative Agencies: It’s Time to Reconstruct Their Relationship when Dealing with Administrative Monopoly in China

The Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities vs. Administrative Agencies: It’s Time to Reconstruct Their Relationship when Dealing with Administrative Monopoly in China

SOCIAL JUSTICE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE CONCEPT OF DEFECTIVE DEMOCRACIES OF WOLFGANG MERKEL

Problem setting. Social justice is determined by the attitude of the state towards those who contribute to its strengthening and recovery. High power is here the main arbiter. Therefore, the government should create a system for the search for talented people who can bring benefits to the state and provide them with a decent livelihood through the implementation of the principle of social justice. The greatest hopes here are based on democracy, which, according to Merkel’s definition, may not only be effective, but also defective. Therefore, the assessment of its ability to ensure the principle of social justice reveals a wide research space for scientists of different directions, especially political scientists and sociologists.Recent research and publications analysis. Comprehensive systematic study of the problem of social justice is contained in works by L. Boltansky, L. Teveno, K. Sabbay, M. Sandel, M. Woltser, V. Argunova, I. Gavrilova, I. Devyatko, O. Sapelkina, T. Shipunova. It is these studies, along with works R. A. Dahl («Democracy and Its Critics», 1989), L. Diamond («The End of the Third Wave and the Global Future of Democracy», 1996), R. Dworkin («Constitutionalism and Democracy», 1995) were used by Merkel in developing the concept of defective democracies.The рaper objective was analysis of the causes and consequences of the deformation of the principle of social justice in conditions of defective democracy.Paper main body. In political science, social justice is defined as perfect integrity and is associated with a balance between equality and freedom. At the same time, the requirements for social justice are growing and exacerbated by the spread of social and legal inequality, exploitation, the dominance of administrative and bureaucratic methods of governance, limiting politicalfreedoms, orienting social policies to service and enriching the ruling classes of society. The vast majority of researchers in this phenomenon determine that social justice is an inherentfeature ofdemocracy, although the existence ofdemocratic institutions does not always guarantee the implementation of the principle ofsocial justice. The conducted research showed: 1) democracy, as a political regime, implies the possibility ofdeformation ofany parameter characterizing the ways and mechanisms of the realization of power in society; 2) «defect» of democracy is determined by the presence of shortcomings or limitations of institutional mechanisms created by the constitutional and legal democratic system for the realization of democratic practices of domination.It is noted that the main signs of defective democracy are corruption, ineffective courts, weak civil self-organization, incapable groups of interests and party systems, underdeveloped administrative infrastructure and controversial monopoly of the state for the exercise of political power.The analysis carried out in the article allowed to reach the following conclusions of the research. The mechanisms of action of the principle of social justice in Ukraine are destroying such defects of its democracy: imperfection of the functional separation of the actions of branches of power and their real independence; defects of party construction in a multi-party system; corrupt power; «damage» of the constitutional and legal principles and partial neutralization of the mechanisms of containment ofpower; the establishment and institutionalization of nonformal practices and rules of the political game, the displacement of formal political institutions by informal; the state’s inability to overcome the economic and political problems of the pre-democratic phase of development; domination of paternalistic practices in socio-political and socio-economic relations.

The Special Measures Taken During Administrative Monopoly Investigation in China

China’s market economy is based on state power guidance, so the administrative agencies may abuse their public power excluding or restricting market competitions that cause administrative monopoly. The special investigative measures should be taken in administrative monopoly investigation on account of its public power background. Mandatory interview with executive officers and mandatory reporting of the administrative agencies are the mainly special measures during those investigative procedures, while on-site investigations need to be avoided. Unlike ordinary measures, these two special measures are mandatory which means if the investigating authority or its chief executive rejected report or interview who will be admonished by his superior even punished by crime of dereliction. Recently the Chinese People’s Congress Standing Committee is studying how to revise the antitrust law, we suggest to add those special mandatory measures in the future Chinese Antitrust law.

Regulation in the Upstream Sector and Chinese Firm Export：The Position in the Vertical Production Supply Chain Matters

With the increasing export scale, the distribution of Chinese export industries has changed significantly. The overall export scale expansion is mainly led by the middle and downstream industries, while the upstream industry lacks obvious export advantages. At the same time, China’s overall market structure has also undergone significant changes, showing an asymmetric state of administrative monopoly in the upstream industry, market competition in the downstream industry”. Given the importance of input-output linkages between industries, China’s current market structure has motivated this study, namely, as market competition intensifies in the middle and downstream industries, does maintaining the administrative control in the upstream industry hinder the Chinese firm export? Based on the data of micro-enterprises from 1998 to 2013, this paper first estimates the production location of each industry from the perspective of vertical production supply chain, and defines the upstream administrative control based on the proportion of state-owned enterprises in the industry and the evolution trend. On this basis, based on the input-output relationship between industries, we measure the degree of the upstream administrative control that each industry faces, and then identify the impact on China’s firm export. In addition, this paper also tests the differences of its effects based on the enterprise ownership, trade pattern, industry competition degree and regional development. This paper finds that: Firstly, the upstream administrative control with state-owned enterprises does not include every industry, mainly referring to the capital-intensive industries such as coal mining washing and dressing industry, oil and natural gas mining industry, and the production and supply of electric power and heat. Secondly, with the continuous deepening of China’s market-oriented reform, the degree of the upstream administrative control decreased significantly from 1998 to 2007, but it was reversed and strengthened year by year from 2007 to 2013. Finally, since 2007, the enhancement of the upstream administrative control has significantly inhibited the export of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, and this negative impact is mainly reflected in private enterprises, ordinary trading firms, highly competitive industries and eastern regions. This paper has important policy implications: Firstly, we should lower the market entry regulation of the upstream regulated industry and the loan discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises, so as to enhance the market competition of the upstream administrative control industry. Secondly, the innovation incentive mechanism of the upstream regulated industry should be established to improve the technical content and product quality of upstream intermediate inputs, and the growth effect of export trade should be continued to exert. This paper contributes to the existing research mainly from two aspects: Firstly, the perspective based on the vertical production supply chain defines the scope of the administrative control in the upstream industry, and the indirect effects of input-output relation between industries are considered, which improves the measuring errors of the issue. Secondly, the evolution of the upstream administrative control degree is described by the Chinese industrial enterprise database from 1998 to 2013, which can evaluate the policy effects more accurately and make up for the deficiencies of the existing research.

GOVERNING CHINA’S ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLIES UNDER THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: A TEN-YEAR REVIEW (2008–2018) AND BEYOND

ABSTRACT An important focus of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) is “administrative monopolies”—government-imposed restraints on competition. Since adopting the AML in 2008, China gradually has strengthened its efforts to curb administrative monopolies. Despite notable reforms such as the creation of the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS), government restrictions remain a major obstacle to competition in China’s economy. The 2008 legislation narrowly defined what constitutes improper government intervention, adopted a permissive standard for determining when public restraints were legitimate, and relied heavily on internal administrative controls to correct infringements. This paper draws upon experience in China and abroad to enhance the ability of China’s competition authorities to challenge administrative monopolies. Suggested upgrades include augmenting the robustness of FCRS, introducing new tools to improve competition advocacy, bolstering the ability of competition authorities to initiate or join litigation to attack administrative monopolies, and narrowing the range of justifications that can immunize public restraints.

Market concentration measurement, administrative monopoly effect and efficiency improvement: empirical data from China civil aviation industry 2001-2015

ABSTRACTChina’s civil aviation transportation industry is a natural monopoly industry field, and the effect of administrative monopoly is obviously. This paper uses absolute market concentration (CRn) and relative market concentration (HHI) to quantitatively analyze the competition and monopoly degree of Chinese civil aviation transportation in 2001–2015. It is found that although the monopoly degree of Chinese civil aviation industry has declined in the time period, it still belongs to the oligopoly monopoly market. Then, this paper calculates the production efficiency of the industry by DEA method, and makes an empirical test on the relationship between the two factors using the econometric models. With taking into account the calculated results and the HHI index. Relevant research results show that the equilibrium between the existing production efficiency and the degree of administrative monopoly in China’s civil aviation transportation industry long-term stably from the time period. In order to realize the rapid development and improve the efficiency of the industry, the Chinese civil aviation transportation industry must carry out the market-oriented reform. By realizing the separation of government and enterprises, it is necessary to promote the good competition rules in order to benefit the consumers.

Governing China's Administrative Monopolies Under the Anti-Monopoly Law: A Ten-Year Review (2008-2018) and Beyond

The enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) against administrative monopolies has made some achievements in the last decade. However, prominent shortcomings, including the limited concluded cases, the inadequate expertise of competition agencies and some courts, and the ill-designed Chapter 5 of AML, still exist. Three major reasons may explain such shortcomings. First, the legislature adopted a very narrow scope of administrative monopolies. Second, the legislature introduced an improper “standard of legitimacy” into Chapter 5. Third, the legislature overstated the Chinese characteristics of these distortions, and truthfully (but improperly) authorized other administrative bodies, rather than competition agencies, to rectify them. This paper, built on China’s and international experience and the fundamental understanding of competition mechanism, first takes a strictly logical approach to devise a comprehensive solution to enhance the effectiveness of AML enforcement. This feasible solution is consisted of four interconnected pillars. Firstly, it advises the State Council to timely upgrade the Fair Competition Review System to grant larger policy review power to competition agencies. Secondly, it proposes that competition agencies need to adopt new tools to facilitate a more vigorous competition advocacy program. Thirdly, it urges the competition agencies and courts to strengthen enforcement and only accept limited government conduct defenses. It advocates that the legislature has to confirm that AML enjoys supremacy among all laws and regulations, except the Constitution Law, in regard to the regulation of the unreasonable government distortions of competition. Finally, it appeals to the legislature for partially or entirely authorizing competition agencies to litigate such government conducts in China’s intermediate courts.

Административная монополия на земли отгонного животноводства РД

Административная монополия на земли отгонного животноводства РД

Dose Administrative Monopoly Aggravate the Survival Risk of Chinese Enterprises

In June 2016, the publication of the 'Opinions of the State Council on Establishing a Fair Competition Review System during the Development of Market-oriented Review System', (hereinafter referred to as 'Fair Competition Review System'), marks a new stage of the anti-monopoly cause in China. The determination and strength of this economic restructuring is unprecedented. At the critical stage of transformation and upgrading, administrative monopoly may lead to short-term business dilemma of enterprises with high efficiency that are just found but have no growth, and the survival of enterprises with low efficiency in a market environment with distorted entry and exit mechanisms. The quantitative evaluation of the relationship between administrative monopoly and enterprise strategy choice is of great importance to the promotion of the theory and practice exploration of 'Fair Competition Review System' and the improvement of institutional environment concerning enterprise survival. But the analysis of policy effect of administrative monopoly rarely goes deep into micro-firm level, especially in the view of enterprise survival. This paper uses PSM-Cox proportional hazard model to examine the effect of administrative monopoly on enterprise survival risk and its mechanism at micro-firm level. Our results indicate that in general, administrative monopoly has positive policy impact on the survival risk of manufacturing enterprises, i.e. government intervention represented by administrative monopoly aggravates the survival risk of enterprises. Furthermore, the effects of administrative monopoly on the survival risk of heterogeneous enterprises differ somewhat:firstly, administrative monopoly does not have significant effect on the survival risk of state-owned enterprises, but has significant effect on non-state-owned enterprises; secondly, administrative monopoly has significant positive effect on the survival risk of enterprises in mid-west China, but does not have significant effect in East China; administrative monopoly is positively correlated with the survival risk of labor-intensive enterprises, but does not have significant effect on capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries. Administrative monopoly raises the survival risk of enterprises by reducing survival rate and innovation, and really results in rent-seeking activities which weaken the effect of administrative monopoly on the survival risk of enterprises to some extent. And the joint effect of these three above provides an important explanation for the foregoing study. As for supply-side structural reform, the elimination of administrative monopoly through the competition policy, can improve the resource allocation efficiency in Chinese market, thereby creating a favorable supply-side institutional environment for enterprise survival and economic development. As for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, the construction of a sound competition policy system, can strengthen the viability of non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises in mid-west China and labor-intensive enterprises, and offers systematic and mechanism support for the 'mass entrepreneurship'. The competition policy system focusing on 'Fair Competition Review System' is gradually being completed, and the development of socialist market economic system is bound to enter a new stage.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LOCAL PROTECTIONISM IN CHINA: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY ON THE SUPREME PEOPLE's COURT

This article studies the rise of judicial review of local administrative monopolies in contemporary China. Anticompetitive abuses of power by local party-states, driven by corruption, have shaken the very foundations of the country's administrative unity and market efficiency. The entrenched skepticism of the authoritarian party-state toward legal institutions notwithstanding, the Supreme People's Court in Beijing has over the past decade steadily aggrandized its own and local courts’ authority to constrain regional protectionist, collusive fiefdoms in ways unforeseen by the drafters of the landmark Anti-Monopoly Law; returning incremental but genuine benefits to the central party-state, whose tacit acquiescence in judicial empowerment has over time transformed into express approval. However, given that administrative monopoly is instinct in a Leninist polity, the central party-state and the Court should have few incentives to eradicate local protectionism once and for all. All things being equal, full-fledged, independent judicial review of administrative monopoly will not emerge in China.

The Influence of Administrative Monopoly on Economic Development——An Empirical Study Based on Vector Error Correction Model

As a unique form of China's transition economy, the impact of administrative monopoly on economic development can not be ignored. Analyzing the data from 1990 to 2015, this paper investigates the relationship between administrative monopoly and economic development based on Vector Error Correction Model (VEC)model. The results show that there is a long - term equilibrium relationship between administrative monopoly and economic development. In the long run, the administrative monopoly has obvious obstructive effect on economic development. The hardest part, as well as the emphasis in China's economic reform will be how to separate the government from state-owned enterprises and eliminate administrative monopoly.

Power supply, coal price, and economic growth in China

In this paper, we develop a coal–electricity vertical price transmission model for analyzing the relationships between power supply, coal price, and economic growth. We empirically test the model using data from 1996 to 2011. The results suggest that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between power supply, coal price, and economic growth. Power shortages represent departures from this long-run equilibrium relationship. Applying a bootstrapped Granger causality test, we find unidirectional Granger causality from power supply to economic growth and from coal price to power supply, and bidirectional Granger causality between coal price and economic growth. We also discuss policy implications suggested by these results, including monitoring coal price fluctuations, perfecting the coal–electricity price linking system, and breaking the administrative monopoly in China’s electricity market.

Evaluation and Analysis of Administrative Monopoly in China's Oil Industry

China's oil and petrochemical industry is under administrative monopoly. Administrative monopoly, according to the Unirule Institute of Economics, refers to trade monopoly from concessions granted and the monopolistic power conferred by administrative departments through administrative documents on business entities—enterprises or administrative institutions that are also engaged in profit-making activities. Administrative monopolies come in various forms, including barriers to entry, special privileges and price regulation, which lead to multi-level monopolistic powers and status. The administrative monopoly in China's oil and petrochemical industry has evolved from the previous planned economy. Although the central government has the motivation to reform state-owned enterprises to increase revenue, which has been mainly from taxation, it lacks the impetus to break the administrative monopoly. This article shows that the barriers to entry form high monopoly prices and transfer the consumer surplus into business profit, which is unfair and distorts income allocation. After analysing the forms and origins of administrative monopoly in China's oil and petrochemical industry, the article demonstrates that administrative monopoly causes distorted factor prices, compromises fair trade, reduces efficiency and causes loss of social welfare and degradation of business ethics. This article also proposes judicial, administrative and market-oriented reform solutions

Administrative Monopoly Regulation on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement

Administrative Monopoly Regulation on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement

Rothschilds' strategies in international non‐ferrous metals markets, 1830–1940

The aim of this article is to analyse the strategies employed by the Rothschilds up to 1940 to gain control and limit competition in the international non‐ferrous metals markets. It examines how they opted for inelastic demand products of highly concentrated supply which lent themselves to market control (mercury, nickel, lead, and copper and sulphur) by taking administrative monopolies (mercury from the state‐owned Almadén mines in Spain) or by controlling the leading businesses of the respective markets (Le Nickel, Peñarroya, and Rio Tinto). The article also analyses how in some cases the family was able to gain worldwide monopolies, and how in other cases they promoted collusive oligopolies with the competition in any number of forms in their quest to maintain profitability and steer well clear of any competition.