Adaptation Finance Research Articles

Adaptation funding

Adaptation funding

Distributive justice in global climate finance – Recipients’ climate vulnerability and the allocation of climate funds

The ‘climate justice’ lens is increasingly being used in framing discussions and debates on global climate finance. A variant of such justice – distributive justice – emphasises recipient countries’ vulnerability to be an important consideration in funding allocation. The extent to which this principle is pursued in practice has been of widespread and ongoing concerns. Empirical evidence in this regard however remains inadequate and methodologically weak. This research examined the effect of recipients’ climate vulnerability on the allocation of climate funds by controlling for other commonly-identified determinants. A dynamic panel regression method based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) was used on a longitudinal dataset, containing approved funds for more than 100,000 projects covering three areas of climate action (mitigation, adaptation, and overlap) in 133 countries over two decades (2000–2018). Findings indicated a non-significant effect of recipients’ vulnerability on mitigation funding, but significant positive effects on adaptation and overlap fundings. ‘Most vulnerable’ countries were likely to receive higher amounts of these two types of funding than the ‘least vulnerable’ countries. All these provided evidence of distributive justice. However, the relationship between vulnerability and funding was parabolic, suggesting ‘moderately vulnerable’ countries likely to receive more funding than the ‘most vulnerable’ countries. Whilst, for mitigation funding, this observation was not a reason for concern, for adaptation and overlap fundings this was not in complete harmony with distributive justice. Paradoxically, countries with better investment readiness were likely to receive more adaptation and overlap funds. In discordance with distributive justice, countries within the Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions, despite their higher climatic vulnerabilities, were likely to receive significantly less adaptation and overlap fundings. Effects of vulnerability were persistent, and past funding had significant effects on current funding. These, coupled with the impact of readiness, suggested a probable Low Funding Trap for the world’s most vulnerable countries. The overarching conclusion is that, although positive changes have occurred since the 2015 Paris Agreement, considerable challenges to distributive justice remain. Significant data and methodological challenges encountered in the research and their implications are also discussed.

Correction to: Mobilizing private adaptation finance: lessons learned from the green climate fund

Correction to: Mobilizing private adaptation finance: lessons learned from the green climate fund

Understanding public support for international climate adaptation payments: Evidence from a choice experiment

While the importance of climate change adaptation is not in doubt, adaptation funding in developing countries remains scarce. Therefore, climate finance institutions and national decision-makers face difficult trade-offs when allocating funds. While not a substitute for expert judgement, we argue that understanding how the public thinks could play a role in building support. Using a representative sample of the UK population, we use a discrete choice experiment to explore in particular the way in which distributional considerations drive respondent decisions in two dimensions: (a) among recipients of adaptation finance in recipient developing countries, and (b) among those who contribute to this finance (via taxation). We categorise our results as follows. First, respondents show strong distributional preferences for funds to reach the poorest individuals, supporting adoption of egalitarian policy mandates among climate adaptation funds. Secondly, respondents prefer an ‘ability-to-pay’ approach over the ‘polluter-pays-principle’ as a way of funding. Thirdly, our results suggest that a focus on communicating future benefits to UK residents can increase policy support. Overall, however, our findings also reveal that public support for global climate adaptation payments is insufficient. Yet we provide means of understanding how to allocate all-too-scarce funds and how to increase support for adaptation finance.

Does funds-based adaptation finance reach the most vulnerable countries?

The evolving architecture of global climate change adaptation finance is shifting towards fund mechanisms with competitive application and allocation principles. At the same time, prioritization of the most vulnerable countries is a key goal within this emerging architecture. The paper analyses whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF), by far the largest climate change fund, has so far delivered on its promise to prioritize the most vulnerable countries. For our analysis, we consider the USD 2.5 billion GCF funding allocated until the end of the first mobilization phase and disaggregate it project-by-project into its mitigation and adaptation related amounts. We then analyze the adaptation flows in terms of the recipient country’s level of vulnerability and institutional capacity. We further analyze whether funds are being accessed through independent national entities or international intermediaries and whether recipient countries have developing country priority status. The results show that funds-based adaptation finance creates an ambiguous picture: On the one hand, the GCF is on track in allocating its funds largely to country groups which its statutes aim to prioritize, particularly LDCs, African countries and SIDS. At the same time, the proposal process results in the fact that many countries with the highest climate vulnerability but weak government institutions and fragile state-bureaucracies have missed out and not been able to access project funding, mostly LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries. Further, most countries have not yet been able to access project funds independently through their national entities, limiting direct access and country ownership – the strengthening of which is a major goal of the fund. The findings suggest that simplified approval tracks need to be strengthened in the emerging climate finance architecture so that populations in countries with the lowest institutional capacity but highest vulnerability are not being left behind in the long-run.

Untangling India’s Non-Traditional Security Challenge of Climate Change: Is Soft Power Diplomacy a Panacea for Anthropocentric Abuses?

India’s pursuit towards a sustainable future has been accompanied by the centrality of climate diplomacy while leveraging its soft power apparatus in spearheading global trust-building, capacity-building and managing global common resources. Irrespective of the post-COVID ramifications, India has remained the only G20 nation on track to meet its climate change mitigation commitments, as India continues to maintain an ambitious target of 450 gigawatts by 2030 for itself on renewable energy, adhering to cutting down carbon emissions by 33% by 2030, keeping its promise on global warming mitigation to below 2 degrees. Predicating its approach towards multilateral action on respect, peace, prosperity, dialogue and cooperation, India has marshalled multilateral action on climate change in the international arena, from being the founder of the International Solar Alliance, leading the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, to constituting an integral component of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’s Climate Working Group, aiming at strengthening climate actions on mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology-building capacity and climate finance. The paper problematizes climate change in international politics, focusing on India’s soft power dimension while assessing the vulnerabilities associated with climate change, emphasizing exclusively on the evolution and the emerging multifaceted dynamics of India’s climate diplomacy.

Do global risk assessments leave countries behind? How the selection of countries influences outcomes of drought risk assessments

Global drought risk assessments have been conducted with the objective of highlighting the regions or countries most at risk, and their outcomes are deemed useful to inform decisions on the implementation of risk reduction, transfer, financing, and adaptation strategies. However, by virtue of the scale of the assessment, some countries and regions experiencing negative impacts of droughts may not appear in “high” risk categories in global comparisons. This limits and potentially biases the ability of decision-makers, regional organisations, or funding mechanisms to recognise which countries under their purview should be targeted for assistance. This paper addresses this gap by comparing the outcomes of global and regional drought risk assessments for different clusters of countries of particular relevance to international climate and disaster risk policy. Results show that 50 countries changed the risk category to “high” or “very high” in their clusters compared to a lower risk category at the global level, due to the renormalisation of raw indicator values with different ranges for each cluster. The findings highlight the importance of analysing risk at multiple spatial scales to ensure no country is “left behind” in global risk and adaptation finance decisions.

COP26 AND HEALTH: SOME PROGRESS, BUT TOO SLOW AND NOT ENOUGH

COP26 AND HEALTH: SOME PROGRESS, BUT TOO SLOW AND NOT ENOUGH

Can remittances contribute to financing climate actions in developing countries? Evidence from analyses of households' climate hazard exposure and adaptation actors in SE Nigeria.

Migrant remittances are potentially significant sources of funding for climate change adaptation and resilience building in developing countries. However, very little is understood about the linkages between climate actions and remittances at the household level. It is not clear how remittances can affect households’ responses to climate change. This paper presents evidence from analyses of the associations between remittances to households, their climate hazard exposure, and adaptation actors. It uses concurrent data on international remittances receipts, three climate change related hazards (flooding, intense and irregular rainfall), and main adaptation actors (self/family, community, government, and NGOs) from over 600 households in South Eastern Nigeria. The results showed that household incidence of remittances is low (15%) while exposure to climate hazards is higher (flooding: 41.2%, intense rainfall: 47.1%, irregular rainfall: 29.9%). Nominal (contingency coefficient) associations between remittances and household climate hazard exposure and remittances and household adaptation actors were mostly moderate and insignificant. Therefore, households that received remittances and those that did not were not significantly different in terms of their exposure to climate hazard and main actors in climate adaptation. Self/families were the main actors in household climate actions. Governments and NGO actors were less prominent. The results suggest that unregulated remittances have limited impact on household climate hazard exposure and adaptive actions. However, there are indications that the contribution of remittances to financing climate adaptation may be enhanced by addressing issues with cost of remitting and remittee understanding of climate change to increase remittances volumes, incidence, and use.

Reflections on COP26: International Diplomacy, Global Justice and the Greening of Capitalism

AbstractThe UN climate conference COP26 in November 2021 concluded with the agreement of the Glasgow Climate Pact. This article examines the key elements of the pact and their significance. Explaining the structure of the 2015 Paris Agreement, it shows why the requirement for countries to return with stronger emissions reduction commitments in 2022 was in practice the most the conference could have achieved to ‘keep alive’ the goal of limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5°C. Developing countries won an increase in finance for adaptation to climate change, but their demand for developed countries to recognise ‘climate justice’ and compensate them for the loss and damage that climate change is causing was rebuffed. Noting the various sectoral commitments made at COP26 in areas such as deforestation and finance, the article argues that the underlying question posed by the conference is whether capitalism can be greened. An answer is suggested.

Climate finance and peace—tackling the climate and humanitarian crisis

Climate finance and peace—tackling the climate and humanitarian crisis

Do Invasive Mammal Eradications from Islands Support Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation?

Climate change represents a planetary emergency that is exacerbating the loss of native biodiversity. In response, efforts promoting climate change adaptation strategies that improve ecosystem resilience and/or mitigate climate impacts are paramount. Invasive Alien Species are a key threat to islands globally, where strategies such as preventing establishment (biosecurity), and eradication, especially invasive mammals, have proven effective for reducing native biodiversity loss and can also advance ecosystem resilience and create refugia for native species at risk from climate change. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that successful eradications may also contribute to mitigating climate change. Given the cross-sector potential for eradications to reduce climate impacts alongside native biodiversity conservation, we sought to understand when conservation managers and funders explicitly sought to use or fund the eradication of invasive mammals from islands to achieve positive climate outcomes. To provide context, we first summarized available literature of the synergistic relationship between invasive species and climate change, including case studies where invasive mammal eradications served to meet climate adaptation or mitigation solutions. Second, we conducted a systematic review of the literature and eradication-related conference proceedings to identify when these synergistic effects of climate and invasive species were explicitly addressed through eradication practices. Third, we reviewed projects from four large funding entities known to support climate change solutions and/or native biodiversity conservation efforts and identified when eradications were funded in a climate change context. The combined results of our case study summary paired with systematic reviews found that, although eradicating invasive mammals from islands is an effective climate adaptation strategy, island eradications are poorly represented within the climate change adaptation and mitigation funding framework. We believe this is a lost opportunity and encourage eradication practitioners and funders of climate change adaptation to leverage this extremely effective nature-based tool into positive conservation and climate resilience solutions.

The landscape of climate change adaptation aspirations in the US non‐profit conservation sector

AbstractDespite extensive recommendations for adapting conservation to climate change, limited knowledge exists about how practitioners aim to respond. To address this gap, we analyzed proposals for on‐the‐ground climate adaptation projects submitted by US conservation non‐profits, which play a central role in conserving biodiversity. We assessed 415 proposals submitted between 2011 and 2015 to the Wildlife Conservation Society's Climate Adaptation Fund, a US‐based fund focused solely on adaptation for wildlife and ecosystems. We evaluated the distribution of proposed projects across conservation targets, strategies, and activities, and their geographic alignment with climate impacts. Proposals most often targeted river and riparian ecosystems, fish, and birds. Attention on amphibians and invertebrates was disproportionately low relative to their climate vulnerability. Proposals commonly included efforts to restore previous structures and functions, while relatively few described facilitating change (e.g., supporting future‐adapted species). Proposal density was highest along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, geographically aligned with non‐profit density and public opinion on climate change. There was no geographic alignment between exposure and proposed responses to five of six climate threats (warming, aridity, wildfire, inland flooding, sea level rise). Our findings identify gaps in adaptation attention, and can enhance strategic resource allocation, targeted capacity building, and adaptation outcomes for conservation.

Private sector climate change adaptation of accommodation suppliers in the small island of Koh Tao, Thailand

ABSTRACT Small islands are often portrait as being among the most vulnerable tourism destinations to climate change, particularly to impacts from sea level rise. This raises the question of how, if at all, locally bound tourism stakeholders, such as accommodation suppliers, consider climate change risks and if they already invest in adaptation measures. The nature of the concepts of adaptation and adaptation finance, with a lack of universally accepted metrics for its monitoring, allow a theoretical inquiry if mobilized finance can be labeled being climate finance. Against this background, this study investigates to what extent accommodation owner-managers do recognize climate change in their strategic investment decisions. A survey with 112 respondents and in-depth interviews with 16 interviewees were conducted on Koh Tao, Thailand. The findings reveal that most businesses (private sector) already invest in adaptation, whereas it appears to be a rather reactive (unconscious) form of adaptation. This shows that the private sector has an interest in addressing business risks, including climate change. The accommodation suppliers themself, however, likely do not bother how actions that reduce their business risks in regard to natural hazards are being labeled. The findings also show that adaptation behavior of accommodation suppliers appears to be influenced by power dynamics on Koh Tao. There is a concentration of power among a few families. This can hinder a sustainable and climate risk-informed development pathway and investment decisions of individual accommodation businesses.

The adaptation finance gap can only be closed by limiting the adaptation costs

Although adaptation finance is increasing, the latest UNEP Adaptation Gap Report shows that it does not outweigh mounting adaptation costs. More funding is required, preferably for anticipatory adaptation. Closing the adaptation finance gap simultaneously requires a maximization of efforts to limit adaptation costs through ambitious mitigation and sustainable finance policies.

Climate Adaptation Finance in World Bank Economic Development Programs: The Challenges of Systemic Transformation via “Scaling Up”

Worldwide only about four percent of the estimated $500 billion-plus in public and private climate finance in 2017 was destined for adaptation. However, institutions like the World Bank are positioning themselves for a transformation in adaptation finance, seeking to provide substantially more adaptation finance as distinct from financial support for greenhouse gas mitigation. This article explores the recent emergence of adaptation as a higher priority and how a longer-term time horizon is necessary if a transformation in climate change governance is to occur which places greater emphasis on sustainable development goals relating to improvement of circumstances of citizens in the most climate-vulnerable nations, mostly in the Global South. The article also considers the important debate in the climate change policy literature over the extent to which funds supporting adaptation are going to lower-income nations or people, as might be anticipated given the view that the poor are more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. Data linking World Bank project funding to climate change adaptation and mitigation, derived from a keyword-matching approach, show that from 2010 to 2018, the share of climate-change-related finance devoted to adaptation in World Bank projects increased considerably. The data indicate that adaptation funding tends to be directed more to more climate-vulnerable nations and those with greater state fragility, but not to low-income countries versus high-income countries. Implications are considered for how this change might be “scaled up” to achieve a transformational status.

Equity in human adaptation-related responses: A systematic global review

Equity in human adaptation-related responses: A systematic global review

Quantifying international public finance for climate change adaptation in Africa

ABSTRACT Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, international financial assistance is expected to support African and other developing countries as they prepare for and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The impact of this finance depends on how much finance is mobilized and where it is targeted. However, there has been no comprehensive quantitative mapping of adaptation-related finance flows to African countries to date. Here we track development finance principally targeting adaptation from bilateral and multilateral funders to Africa between 2014 and 2018. We find that the amounts of finance are well below the scale of investment needed for adaptation in Africa, which is a region with high vulnerability to climate change and low adaptation capacity. Finance targeting mitigation (US$30.6 billion) was almost double that for adaptation (US$16.5 billion). The relative share of each varies greatly among African countries. More adaptation-related finance was provided as loans (57%) than grants (42%) and half the adaptation finance has targeted just two sectors: agriculture; and water supply and sanitation. Disbursement ratios for adaptation in this period are 46%, much lower than for total development finance in Africa (at 96%). These are all problematic patterns for Africa, highlighting that more adaptation finance and targeted efforts are needed to ensure that financial commitments translate into meaningful change on the ground for African communities. Key policy insights Between 2014 and 2018, adaptation-related finance committed by bilateral and multilateral funders to African countries remained well below US$5.5 billion per year, or roughly US$5 per person per year; these amounts are well below the estimates of adaptation costs in Africa. Funders have not strategically targeted support for adaptation activities towards the most vulnerable to climate change African countries. Lessons from countries that have been more successful in accessing finance point to the value of more sophisticated domestic adaptation policies and plans; of alignment with priorities of the NDC; of meeting funding requirements of specific funders; and of the strategic use of climate funds by national planners. A low adaptation finance disbursement ratio in this period in Africa (at 46%) relates to barriers impeding the full implementation of adaptation projects: low grant to loan ratio; requirements for co-financing; rigid rules of climate funds; and inadequate programming capacity within many countries.

Global evidence of constraints and limits to human adaptation

Constraints and limits to adaptation are critical to understanding the extent to which human and natural systems can successfully adapt to climate change. We conduct a systematic review of 1,682 academic studies on human adaptation responses to identify patterns in constraints and limits to adaptation for different regions, sectors, hazards, adaptation response types, and actors. Using definitions of constraints and limits provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), we find that most literature identifies constraints to adaptation but that there is limited literature focused on limits to adaptation. Central and South America and Small Islands generally report greater constraints and both hard and soft limits to adaptation. Technological, infrastructural, and ecosystem-based adaptation suggest more evidence of constraints and hard limits than other types of responses. Individuals and households face economic and socio-cultural constraints which also inhibit behavioral adaptation responses and may lead to limits. Finance, governance, institutional, and policy constraints are most prevalent globally. These findings provide early signposts for boundaries of human adaptation and are of high relevance for guiding proactive adaptation financing and governance from local to global scales.

Universal Metrics for Climate Change Adaptation Finance? A Cautionary Tale

Climate change adaptation is receiving ever more attention in the literature and in practice. Since available funds are not meeting adaptation needs, the question of how to allocate scarce resources becomes pressing. Universal adaptation metrics promise to facilitate the allocation process ex ante and the evaluation of projects ex post. Two such metrics have been proposed recently: Saved Wealth (SW), measured in terms of money, and Saved Health (SH), gauged in terms of disability adjusted life-years (DALYs). The paper analyzes this SWSH approach and shows that it is replete with unresolved conceptual and normative-ethical problems, which are exemplary for universal metrics seeking to combine concerns for equity and efficiency at once. The paper’s aim is to uncover these issues, and its conclusion is modest: universal metrics such as SW and the DALY have to be designed and used with great caution and further research is necessary.