Activities Of International Organizations Research Articles

Citizens, elites, and the legitimacy of global governance

Assume that a citizen wants to write a postcard to public authorities about a global governance problem. Where exactly should it be posted? Should it be sent to one of the several international organizations (IOs) formally in charge of financial stability, development, health and security? Citizens, elites, and the legitimacy of global governance demonstrates that many individuals are aware of the activities of IOs, and it explores whether they are satisfied with how these institutions address transnational problems. It is often argued that IOs are underfinanced and have little political authority, yet they are burdened with responsibilities that they can hardly manage. The book tries to identify and quantify the expectations of the final users of IOs: the citizens of the world. Its findings will be relevant for scholars and students of global governance, IOs and social movements. The novelty of the book is that it moves away from advocacy to provide fresh quantitative evidence. To do that, the authors use two coordinated surveys. The first gathered responses from a sample of respondents in five countries: Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia and the United States. The second survey, carried out by the book's authors themselves, focused on elites, which are defined as ‘people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential’ (p. 13). Using the same questionnaire as in the first survey, the authors were able to compare the perceptions of elites and those of the broader public. The book offers key insights on the share of the relevant populations that is actually aware of the existence of IOs. This question is far from trivial: while it can be assumed that the public of each nation is familiar with the actions of their national governments, it is less probable that the same level of awareness exists about IOs, especially in countries with less developed information channels.

Jam v. International Finance Corp.

In Jam v. International Finance Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (IOIA) affords international organizations (IOs) the same immunity from suit in U.S. courts that foreign governments currently enjoy under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which codifies the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) had argued that the IOIA, which grants international organizations the “‘same immunity’ from suit … ‘as is enjoyed by foreign governments’” (p. 15), should be understood to provide international organizations with absolute immunity, which it argued foreign governments enjoyed prior to the United States’ explicit adoption of the restrictive theory in 1952. Under the restrictive theory, a foreign state is immune from suit for its sovereign acts (acta jure imperii), but not for its commercial acts (acta jure gestionis). By interpreting language in the IOIA as granting the “same immunity” to international organizations as foreign governments enjoy at the time the suit is filed, the Supreme Court aligned the regime for IO immunity with that of foreign state immunity, except in cases where the IO's founding charter provides a different rule or where the executive branch has explicitly limited immunity. It remains to be seen what IO activities are deemed “commercial” under this regime and what types of transactions are found to have a sufficient nexus to the United States to fall within the FSIA's commercial-activity exception.

Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus

AbstractGiven long‐standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO's flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision‐making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.

Roles and Activities of International Organizations After the Fukushima Accident.

After the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, overseas experts and representatives of international organizations visited Japan to provide advice, technical support, and resources. Several international meetings on radiological protection and health issues have since been held in Fukushima to provide further advice. The content discussed has changed alongside local developments in health-related issues from radiation health effects and radiological protection to risk communication and psychological, public health, and social issues. The support of international organizations and experts has been valuable in implementing public health and support programs in Fukushima. The Fukushima accident showed that after a nuclear accident, authorities need to balance the risks of radiation with other health effects and develop programs to mitigate the overall effects on health (whole-health management), but there was little evidence of the importance of this at the time. Future research should examine international collaboration to assess this.

International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration

International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms “International Old Governance” (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate—including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call “Transnational New Governance” (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both “state failure”—the inadequacies of IOG—and “market failure”—the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions—we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant “orchestration deficit” that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance.

International Regulation Without International Government: Improving International Organization Performance Through Orchestration

International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and commentators assessing IO performance frequently look at the actions of those organizations in isolation and focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When commentators observe poor performance, moreover, they often call for strengthening those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms “International Old Governance” (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate – including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, orchestrated by IOs (and states), that we call “Transnational New Governance” (TNG). With proper orchestration by “the state” (including IOs), TNG can ameliorate both “state failure” – the inadequacies of IOG – and “market failure” – the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions – we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant “orchestration deficit” that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance.

Global Administrative Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law

AbstractSeveral important legal features of the contemporary practice of international organizations (IOs) are not easily accommodated in standard approaches to international organizations law. This article argues that Global Administrative Law (GAL) approaches may strengthen analysis of operational issues such as emergency actions by IOs and the human rights implications of IO activities, structural issues such as the involvement of IOs in field missions and in public-private partnerships, and normative issues concerning the production and effects of non-treaty regulatory instruments by IOs (guidelines, best practices, national policy assessments, and other documents rather amorphously analyzed under the 'soft law' rubric). In examining these activities as forms of administration (broadly understood), subject to precepts of good administration and legal standards concerning transparency, participation, reason-giving, review, and accountability, a GAL perspective provides a basis both for critique of problematic practices, and for increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of some beneficial IO activities which are contentious or currently not undertaken. GAL also responds to the proliferation and differentiation of IOs and other entities in global governance through applying legal standards to their interactions, bringing a principled 'inter-public' approach to the legal relations among global public entities. GAL provides a valuable, and thus far overly neglected, addition to the field of international institutional law.

Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?

It seems to be presumed by many that the simple multiplication of international organizations (IOs) weakens the unity and integrity of international law. There is, in reality, nothing obvious in this assumption. First, there needs to be evidence of duplication or overlaps in the various competences of IOs. Second, it needs to be proven that, in the instances in which the activities of IOs do overlap, such overlap translates into competition, divergence or conflict. Last, and most impor- tantly, rival or competing activities must be of normative significance. This essay pro- poses to address the preliminary question which, in fact, precedes and underpins all the others as regards the multiplication of IOs and international legal unity: how do IOs matter in the making of international law? IOs, we argue, are more shapers than makers of international law and their multiplication is therefore not a source of increased chaos in the international normative puzzle.