The idea of evolution is counter intuitive for many people, because it conflicts with particular human intuitions—namely, design teleology and psychological essentialism. Humans tend to intuitively explain organisms’ characters as those of artifacts—that is, being intentionally designed for the role they visibly serve (design teleology) and remaining fixed and determined by that role (psychological essentialism). Because a major difficulty for students and the public is to understand how very different forms could have evolved from common ancestors through natural processes— something antievolutionists often contend is inconceivable—we argue that evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) can help address these erroneous preconceptions about evolution. Evo-devo provides evidence that large morphological change is possible and that it does not necessarily require major changes in the genome. Gilbert (2003) and Arthur (2004) have also suggested taking development into account when teaching evolution. Research in science education has shown that even an active-learning course with integrated evolution content may have only moderate learning outcomes. In a study of college students published in BioScience (Nehm and Reilly 2007), knowledge of natural selection content was discussed in 90% of the classes attended by an intervention group. The participating students had all completed an undergraduate introductory biology course; furthermore, most had previously heard about natural selection at school. However, although 70% of these students employed more than four key evolutionary concepts in their responses to the final test, importantly, only 30% of them did so without misconceptions. Why? Conceptual development research has shown that particular, deeply rooted, and strongly held intuitions generate misconceptions, which arise during early childhood and persist into adulthood. These intuitions make the idea of evolution seem entirely counterintuitive and, consequently, difficult to understand. First, it seems that teleological intuitions in combination with an early awareness of intentionality may make people think about the parts of organisms in the same way that they think about the parts of artifacts. This does not necessarily mean that people consciously consider organisms to be artifacts but, rather, suggests that they unconsciously think of both organism and artifact parts in terms of intended uses. For example, seeing an eagle flying does not make people think of it as an artifact, as they would do for an airplane. However, it may be the case that seeing an eagle flying by using its wings makes people think of these wings as they do of those of an airplane—that is, as parts made for an intended use. Whether there is a conscious, intentional agent behind this, which is correct for artifacts, is a distinct question, subordinate to the idea that organisms’ parts serve an intended use. It is the unconscious, intuitive idea of an intended use (intended for some purpose and perhaps intended by someone) that makes design teleology an important conceptual obstacle to understanding evolution. Second, the notion of a set of characteristic properties that determine category identity may prevent us from realizing the enormousness of the existing variation within each category. Consider the following sentences: The eagle is flying by using (1) its wings.