This special issue discusses various aspects of mental actions and mental agency. Mental actions and mental agency are specific subcategories of actions and agency, respectively. The challenges of elucidating what ‘actions’ are in contrast to other bodily movements, and what role ‘agency’ plays in performing such actions, have elicited intensive discussion within the framework of Action Theory. Thus, before discussing the peculiarities of mental actions and mental agency, and the specific contributions of our authors to these issues, we would like to give a brief introduction to some of the core insights from classic Action Theory. According to a prominent view in Action Theory, actions – in contrast to other bodily movements, like reflexes – are caused by some an agent’s beliefs, desires and/or other mental states. Donald Davidson ([1963] 2001), for example, argues that an individual’s reasons to act function as causes of his or her action. According to Davidson, an individual acts for what she calls a ‘primary reason’ when the individual Bcan be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards actions of a certain kind and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that this action is of that kind.^ (p. 3–4). For example, when an individual feels hungry (pro attitude) and believes there is something to eat in the fridge, this belief-desire pair causes the individual to walk to the fridge (and eat something). Proponents of a teleological approach to action, in contrast, argue that actions are not caused by mental events but need to be explained by the teleological dimension of the action in question, i.e. by the aims and goals that an agent pursues when executing an action. Alfred Mele (2000), for example, argues for a teleological account of action and against a causal account of action, illustrating by means of a series of examples that an agent’s bodily movements may be consistent with but are still not caused by the agent’s beliefs and desires. Others Rev.Phil.Psych. (2015) 6:683–693 DOI 10.1007/s13164-015-0289-5