War Activities Research Articles

Piracy, navies and the law of the Sea: the case of Somalia

This contribution concentrates on the legal aspects of piracy and tries to explain some of the practical problems which modern navies experience in their fight against piracy and maritime violence off Somalia. The UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 provides a traditional though largely deficient set of rules for control and counter measures. Modern legal instruments such as the SUA Convention of 1988 as amended, recent resolutions of the UN Security Council and regional treaties try to fill the loopholes. Against this background the paper discusses e. g. the law of boarding and investigation of suspicious vessels, the arrest and penal prosecution of criminals and the right of self-defence in case of an imminent attack. The international mandates and the national rules of engagement in which the navies operate reflect these ambiguities that result in a loss of momentum. After all piracy is not an act of war, but a crime. In conclusion apolitical solution on land is indispensable as the navies and coast guards can only fight the symptoms and not the causes of crime and unrest in a failed State.

With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups

Non-state war actors have trajectories. While recent research contributions stress the role of material interest as the driving force for the formation of non-state war actors, this article attempts to sketch an alternative explanation for their formation. Based on a data-set of 80 cases and comparative case discussion it focuses on the relationships that leaders and staff members of armed groups entertain before the actual formation of such groups. Three mechanisms of formation are consecutively distinguished, depending on the degree and kind of social relationships that precede their formation. The article discusses the causal settings of each mechanism and reveals in how far state policies in medium term and long run horizons produce what they want to curb: the formation of violent challenges.

What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old Bottles

The idea of a framework of jus post bellum has recently gained momentum as a new category of law to be applied in the post-conflict phase, in order to reconstruct a stable and peaceful society after conflict. This framework of jus post bellum rules seems to be just what the world needs as the rules of jus ad bellum, which regulate the beginning of a war, and the rules of jus in bello, which regulate the conduct of the actual war, are not comprehensive enough to be of constructive help in the post-conflict phase. What is the content of such a jus post bellum framework? Will this framework be useful? Will it consist of international law, national law, or both? Does the necessary international law perhaps exist already and it only remains to reassemble pertinent parts of it and re-label them as jus post bellum? Or does a framework of jus post bellum presuppose the invention of a genuinely new body of law to cater to the particular needs of the post-conflict situation? This article examines all of the above questions, and the possible consequences that a framework of jus post bellum rules may have. These consequences may go so far as to open up the possibility of retroactively conditioning the legality of interventions on respect for the rules of jus post bellum. The authors believe that it is time for a shift in thinking about peacebuilding, especially since a well-regulated post-conflict phase is essential for the well-being of a state's people, something international law is designated to protect.

Regime Change in North Korea?: Economic Reform and Political Opportunity Structures

IntroductionThe issue of regime change in North Korea began to draw international attention after the fall of the communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many analysts predicted that North Korea would have followed Poland and Czechoslovakia in their abandoning of communism. However, North Korea has successfully kept its political system intact. Throughout the 1990s, North Korea intensified its ideological campaign to prevent unhealthy bourgeois culture and ideology from infiltrating the society and contaminating the youth and intellectuals.However, since the U.S. military action in Iraq in 2003, policy discussions on preemptive strikes and regime change in North Korea have been abounding in Washington. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration in its 2002 National Security Strategy unveiled that one of its main security schemes would include preemptive strike strategy. Washington's aim was to destroy any threats from terrorists and rogue states before they could ever reach U.S. borders, with or without the support from the international community.Although the act of war can be clearly viewed as one of the pathways to regime change as witnessed in Iraq, in the case of North Korea, such an option seems to remain only remote possibility. Rather than through war, many argue that North Korea's regime change could be brought about through an implosion. Recent North Korean efforts to liberalize its economy through experiments with bold economic reforms have led some analysts to assert that its civil society may eventually experience ascendance, or even exercise similar kind of power against its state as witnessed in Eastern Europe.The purpose of this article is to analyze the prospects for regime change through civil society mobilization in North Korea. It offers an analysis of North Korean exceptionalism in regard to its economic crisis and economic development theories of regime change. It argues that several components of political opportunity structures salient to North Korea work as constraints on regime change, which could be triggered by either economic crisis or economic development. The article first examines existing theoretical frameworks for regime change, probing the theses that both economic crisis and economic reform give rise to political pluralism, activate civil society, and thus lead to regime change. This section is followed by an analysis of the changes in North Korea's economic policies. The article then explores the relevance of political opportunity structures in accounting for regime change in North Korea. Finally, it offers an assessment of prospects for activation of North Korea's civil society and regime change.Theoretical Frameworks for Regime ChangeRegime denotes more permanent forms of political structures than government and refers to a government or sequence of governments in which power remains essentially in the hands of the same social group.1 The governments formed within particular regime embody common set of norms and procedures, and, on this account, change of government does not necessarily involve change in regime.2 Regime change pursues fundamental alteration of the norms and principles, while change within regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or principles.3 North Korea experienced change of government when Kim Jong Il came into power after the death of his father, Kim Il Sung. However, the regime remained in place, as the junior Kim adhered to the fundamental norms and values of his father's government. Therefore, any efforts to change the North Korean regime should involve attempts to destroy the fundamental values and structures of Kim's government, and alter the governing principles and norms, including the socialist values and the Juche (self-reliance) ideology.The structuralist perspective of regime change views economic constraints as the principal explanatory variable of regime collapse. …

Samuel Sheppard’s Faerie King and the Fragmentation of Royalist Epic

This essay offers a reading of Samuel Sheppard’s little-known heroic poem, The Faerie King, as part of the virtual subgenre of unfinished Royalist epic. Begun in 1648 while the author was imprisoned for publishing Royalist propaganda, The Faerie King narrates the fortunes of the invented kingdom of Ruina in an obscure, fragmented allegory of the Civil War. Sheppard brings together conflicting elements of elevated poetic style and vulgar newsbook rhetoric in a volatile generic mix that registers the impact of actual war on the processes of literary creation and forms of authorship available in the Interregnum.

Gothic Politics: Oshii, War, and Life without Death

Even before the recent Gulf wars brought on talk of a new kind of without end, has been a common, even ubiquitous theme in anime and manga. With this perhaps in mind, an interviewer asked an artist involved with the 2005 Gundam: Generating Futures exhibition at Tokyo's Mori Art Museum in Ueno Park how the Gundam generation could talk about with experience of The reply was that, simply, of us has experienced' virtual in a variety of ways/'1 It could be interesting to pursue the importance of virtual (as opposed to actual war) in social life, or perhaps of the experience of within video games (a question, at least in part, of technology). Certainly Oshii Mamoru, the anime director, filmmaker, artist, and novelist, works with each of these themes at different points in his own, typically war-centered, oeuvre. This article, however, takes up a far more generalized statement on how to think about war. In Oshii' s novel Blood: The Last Vampire; Night of the Beasts (2000, Kemonotachi no yoru ), as it now is configured is presented as part of a foundational logic of contemporary political and social life.2 This is not to say that war is merely figurative (or fictional) for Oshii. Blood: The Last Vampire; Night of the Beasts is centered in part on the Vietnam

Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of Global Conflict since 1945

Atomic means national suicide. The ultimate delusion of atomic era is notion that national suicide is a feasible means of defense, and How apparently sensible and sane men could drift into such beliefs, journalist LF. Stone commented, will astound future historians, if there are any. As race to develop more destructive nuclear weapons with farther range escalated during 1950s, Stone warned: war clouds are gathering which could mean end of our species. The Russians and Americans resemble two huge herds moving toward possible conflict, too closely packed to struggle successfully against their fate. The helplessness of human kind is dominant feature of planetary landscape as crisis approaches.1Stone's comments effectively capture twisted logic of nuclear deterrence and crisis management during Cold War. The leaders of largest states consistently sought to avoid nuclear Armageddon by making prospect of a new world more horrific. By holding all of humankind hostage to possibility that full-scale conflict between strongest states would annihilate civilization, they hoped to insure restraint and compromise around sites of greatest danger - particularly Berlin, Taiwan Strait, Cuba, and Middle East. This was a strategic logic that encouraged all-ornothing thinking - stable preservation of geopolitical status quo or complete destruction in a fire of biblical proportions; an imperfect long peace or a radiated landscape where envy dead.2Despite its perversity, nuclear deterrence and crisis management worked during Cold War. On numerous occasions, American, Soviet, and later Chinese leaders stepped back from brink of conflict and sought compromise. They recognized that continued aggression against strong enemy interests would produce irreversible consequences. They recognized that victory in areas of most central Cold War disputes was not possible. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev captured chastening influence of nuclear threats most clearly he appealed to President John F. Kennedy to help untie knot of in aftermath ofthe Cuban missile crisis.3 [WJe are living at a time, Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy, when it is important to achieve progress together in international affairs. It is particularly important, I would say, that this be really tangible and actual progress creating a new situation - a situation of relaxation of tension, thus opening to us prospect of solution to other pressing problems and questions.4 The moment of greatest nuclear danger in Cold War inspired strongest push for settlement among leaders who controlled absolute weapon.5A Cold War settlement, however, never came to fruition. This was at least in part because of nuclear weapons. They encouraged avoidance of war, but they also encouraged continuation of conflict. McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs, captured this paradox he explained that nuclear capabilities were the most potent status symbol since African colonies went out of fashion.6 Powerful states with global ambitions - particularly United States and Soviet Union - did not wish to use these weapons, but they manipulated their placement and posturing for purpose of displaying power. Nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery vehicles became currency for calculating strength, measure of a regime's ability to assure its own security, and security of its allies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact, two dominant post- 1945 alliances, centred their activities on deployment of nuclear forces. The use of these weapons for threats and signals of resolve, not actual war, was fundamental to Cold War diplomacy.A new international body of expert opinion coalesced around attempts to find most effective nuclear postures for national gain, without crossing threshold to Armageddon. …

The West Side Boys: military navigation in the Sierra Leone civil war

ABSTRACTThe West Side Boys were one of several military actors in the Sierra Leonean civil war (1991–2002). A splinter group of the army, the WSB emerged as a key player in 1999–2000. In most Western media accounts, the WSB appeared as nothing more than renegade, anarchistic bandits, devoid of any trace of long-term goals. By contrast, this article aims to explain how the WSB used well-devised military techniques in the field; how their history and military training within the Sierra Leone army shaped their notion of themselves and their view of what they were trying to accomplish; and, finally, how military commanders and politicians employed the WSB as a tactical instrument in a larger map of military and political strategies. It is in the politics of a military economy that this article is grounded.

Guerra semiótica, jornalismo e propaganda

This article intents to investigate the recent hibrydation between Journalism and Propaganda. We will go back to the discussion between the two Social Communication working fields. We will go back to the questions that arise on war historic context. In this case, the analysis will recover upon the US invasion in Iraq in 2003 and its coverage by the international media. If, in one hand, in peace time, it is difficult to see and to realize the interdependence between Journalism and Ideological Propaganda, on other hand, in the war time these relations become themselves pretty clear. Our hypothesis is that, in contemporary communication, the actual war (material, termodynamical) is duplicated by the “semiotic war” (immaterial, informational).

On Fighting Terrorism Justly

This article is about the war on terror as an actual war and as police work — and then as something in between these two. The in-between space, where special forces operate, is critically important. We don't have clear standards that apply to it, and we need to begin to think about what those standards might look like.

The Moral Equality of Combatants

According to the Just War tradition a war can only be just if two sets of principles are satisfied. (1) First there is the jus ad bellum. These principles tell us when it is just to start a war. There has to be a good reason or a just cause in order for a war to be morally permissible (self-defense, defense of others, putting a stop to human rights violations). The decision to go to war has to be taken by a legitimate authority. Those who wage war need to be motivated by good intentions (desire to promote a more stable peace). War should not only be a last resort (necessity), it must also offer a reasonable chance of success. Moreover, the good the warring party hopes to obtain should outweigh the evil caused by the war (proportionality). The second set of principles, the jus in bello or the right in the war, focuses on the moral constraints that need to be observed during hostilities. Noncombatants must never be the intentional target of military actions (discrimination), and the military utility of a particular act of war has to outweigh the damage it will cause. It is clear that combatants, whatever side they are on, have a moral and legal obligation to respect the in hello principles. This is what ethicists call their in bello responsibility. Can combatants be held responsible for participating in an unjust war? Do they, aside from their in hello responsibility, have an ad bellum responsibility? If so, this would mean that combatants have a duty to judge the justice of the war and refuse to participate in an immoral conflict. Those combatants who would not take such an ad bellum responsibility seriously, and simply follow orders, would risk being considered unjust combatants. Anyone who studies the moral and legal reality of warfare will quickly notice that this presumption of military ad bellum responsibility is firmly rejected. (2) At the core of the Just War tradition is the fundamental doctrine of the moral equality of combatants. Basically this doctrine says that the realm of responsibility of combatants on all sides is equally limited to that of the jus in bello. Combatants cannot be held responsible for the just or unjust nature of the war in which they participate. The ad bellum responsibility belongs solely to the political decisionmakers. Despite its basic role in the normative appreciation of war, the doctrine of moral equality of combatants is not beyond dispute. Even Michael Walzer, who is a strong defender of a strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, admits that this moral dualism can be somewhat puzzling. (3) It is, after all, far from obvious that the moral status of a combatant in a defensive war is the same as that of a combatant participating in a war of aggression. The former is clearly engaged in a morally legitimate activity (self-defense), whereas the latter is contributing to what most would term a criminal act. So, how can these two be moral equals? Should we not add an ad bellum responsibility for combatants? If, as some philosophers and lawyers argue, we decide to hold soldiers responsible in this regard, wouldn't that stop them from participating in wars of aggression? (4) The objective of this article is to shed light on this problem by answering two questions: (a) What arguments are there to support the traditional position that limits the responsibility of the military to the jus in bello? and (b) Can combatants ever be blamed for unjust wars, and if so, under what circumstances? Military Subordination Perhaps the most straightforward reason why the responsibility of the military is limited to the jus in bello has to do with the strict military subordination to political authority. Politicians decide to go to war, whereas the military is expected to execute this decision to the best of its ability. This subordinate role does not, however, reduce the military to a mere political instrument that obeys orders without question. …

The Silent Victims: Effects of War and Terrorism on Child Development

<p>Acts of war and terrorism are increasingly prevalent in our society. Although war and terrorism can victimize almost everyone living in a country, group, or area, children and families are those who are the most affected. UNICEF has estimated that 80% of the casualties in foreign wars were women and children. Two million children were killed and 6 million were injured or permanently disabled in war zones between 1993 and 2003. Wars are not only fought on the battlefield but also today take place in cities and towns. These wars include the use of small arms and weapons and are often fought over the control of natural resources and religion. The result is massive dislocation of children and families.</p> <h4>ABOUT THE AUTHORS</h4> <p>Anas Alkhatib, MD, is Chief Fellow, Division of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. Judy Regan, MD, MBA, JD, is with the Chief Mental Health Care Line, VA Tennessee Valley HealthCare System. Donna Barrett, MSN, APRN(BC), is with the VA Tennessee Valley HealthCare System.</p> <p>Address correspondence to: Anas Alkhatib, MD, <a href="mailto:mhd.a.alkhatib@vanderbilt.edu">mhd.a.alkhatib@vanderbilt.edu</a>.</p> <p>Dr. Alkhatib, Dr. Regan, and Ms. Barrett have disclosed no relevant financial relationships.</p>

DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND BELLIGERENT PARTIES: INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN STATES AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORKS

Following the 9/11 attacks, the US declared a war on terrorism, principally aimed at Al Qaeda. The declaration could be dismissed as a sleight of words were it not for the fact that, for the US and for those it affects, it has real and serious legal consequences. The US claims that its declaration of a war on terror is merely an act of self-defence as in its view, Al Qaeda declared a state of war through the 9/11 attacks and these initiated an armed conflict to which the laws of armed conflict apply. Although the characterization of the war on terror as an armed conflict has been rejected by many authorities, the view that the 9/11 attacks were an armed attack giving rise to the rise of self-defence has been widely accepted.If the 9/11 attacks are armed attacks giving rise to the right of self-defence but the attacks did not constitute an armed conflict; as an act of war, they would not be subject to the laws of war. This would disconnect jus ad bellum and jus in bello in relation to acts of war. If there is a state of war without there being an armed conflict, this would allow the US to take certain measures in relation to the terrorist threat but would not give it the more extensive liberties associated with an actual wartime situation.

MENC from 1957 to 1982: Music Education against the Backdrop of the Cold War, the Struggle for Civil Rights, and Emerging Technology

A Time of Change for Education and Music Education The twenty-five-year period from 1957 to 1982 was a time of dynamic change for American society and for music education. Our profession matured during that quarter-century to meet the needs of American society. The story of American education in general, though, is not so bright. It is considered to be a period of education reform, but realistically, not much reform actually occurred. The word reform suggests that a problem has been addressed and solved, and that did not happen. Many of the problems that plagued education in 1957 still have not been solved to this day. I prefer to call this a period of change, rather than reform, because it was a time when we kept trying new things--fads that lasted for a year or three years--and then we tried something else, almost always with no significant lasting consequences. But on the bright side for music education, it was an interesting and fruitful period, a time of many new developments when our profession began to give serious thought to how we should and could serve society's needs. It is not possible to describe this period without going back a few years earlier to identify what set the stage for so much change. During this quarter-century three strands of American history stand out for their effect on music education: the Cold War, technology, and the struggle for civil rights. PART I The First Strand: The Cold War At about the halfway point of the twentieth century, following two world wars, the United States found itself engaged in a new conflict, this time against the only other world superpower, the Soviet Union. Until the Soviet Union dissolved in 1992, the Cold War continually threatened to heat up into a real war that conceivably could have destroyed both countries. Fear of war was a major factor in shaping American society during the second half of the century. (1) It was also largely responsible for the United States coming to terms with the inadequacies of its public schools. The country had to maintain constant readiness for actual war in an emerging technological age, but schools were not preparing students to function effectively in a technological society. The public became increasingly alarmed as the shortcomings of the schools became more evident. In fact, government officials made it clear that national security could be at stake if public education did not improve. And so, for the first time, the federal government stepped in and became involved, not only in what was taught in the schools, but also how it was taught. This was the beginning of an extended period of school reform, a period that still has not ended. It was also a time of discomfort for music educators. In the 1950s music education leaders became uncomfortable with the rationales that had historically supported their discipline because they no longer provided adequate justification for music in schools. Spokespersons for other subjects--reading, writing, mathematics, science, and languages--could easily justify their places in the curriculum because those subjects related directly to national security. Although music remained a core subject, it was not generally perceived by the public as a necessary discipline. The Federal Government Becomes Involved The federal government became directly involved in the schools when it created the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), a cabinet-level agency, in 1953. The first secretary of HEW was Oveta Culp Hobby, formerly commander of the Women's Army Corps. Previously the federal government had treated education issues so peripherally that they were channeled through the National Security Council. As the government became more deeply involved in education, HEW eventually evolved into several agencies, and the U.S. Department of Education became a separate cabinet-level agency in 1980. Even though education authority is a state, rather than federal, responsibility, the federal government provides money for schools that the states cannot afford to lose. …

AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR

ABSTRACTWhile Michael Walzer's distinction between preemptive and preventive wars offers important categories for current reflection upon the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq, it is often treated as a modern distinction without antecedent in the classical Christian just war tradition. This paper argues to the contrary that within Augustine's corpus there are passages in which he speaks about the use of violence in situations that we would classify today as preemptive and preventive military action. While I do not claim that Augustine makes an explicit distinction between the two types of war (such would be anachronistic), I will argue that based on examinations of De libero arbitrio I.v.11–12 and De civitate Dei I.30 Augustine's discussions of hypothetical cases or actual wars in history provide insights helpful for contemporary reflection on preemptive and preventive wars.

Looking at Foreigners in Biblical and Greek Prophecy

AbstractThe article investigates the role of foreigners in biblical and Greek prophecy and shows how words against foreigners or foreign people are used to reaffirm one's own (i.e Israelite or Greek) ethnicity or group identity. Oracles against foreigners have to be located in the context of (imagined or actual) war and tend to imply salvation for the group who hears these words. Here, a few short characterizations of the foreigners are used that tend to evoke stereotypical images. Whether the knowledge of the other is historically accurate or based on concrete encounters is, however, not important for the authors of such words since the salvation of the own group is the determining feature.

War without End(s): The End of Clausewitz?

This article argues that both anti- and pro-Clausewitzians have tended to base their views on an incomplete understanding of Clausewitz. We claim that the so-called ‘new wars’ do not require a new analytical paradigm, as is suggested by anti-Clausewitzians like Martin van Creveld and John Keegan. But this does not mean that the prevailing pro-Clausewitzian discourse cannot be challenged. Clausewitz, as is well-known, employed a dialectical method of arguing in extremes. But whereas we suggest that Clausewitz sought to situate actual war between extremes, the modern discourses share the mistake of seeing the extremes as incompatible alternatives. We argue that a deeper understanding of Clausewitz's theory, and in particular his views on the state, on policy and politics, as well as on his so-called ‘trinity’ of competing forces of war, provides a framework for analysis that is still valid. This also implies that the attempt to replace Clausewitz with another classical thinker, Sun Tzu, may not be necessary; it may in fact be unproductive. Our approach furthermore suggests that a strong strand in anti-Clausewitzian discourse, which sees the new wars as endemic and marked by irrational, barbaric, and purposeless violence, is at least partly mistaken. The wars of the future may be endless, but they are unlikely to be without ends.

A Small State's Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making: Norway's Role in Achieving Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Tracing Norway's role in Sudan's parallel peace processes – the official negotiations between the parties and the grassroots People-to-People peace conferences – provides compelling evidence that small states can make a major contribution to peace-making in deeply divided states with protracted violent conflicts. Working behind the scenes with official and unofficial actors in Sudan's multiple-layered war, Norwegians in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NGO community co-operated in their efforts supporting more prominent mediators – the United States and the Kenya-led IGAD process. Sudan's years-long peace-making illustrates how a co-ordinated effort among many mediators can facilitate a peace agreement with the promise of ending decades of devastating, brutal violence.

Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability

The tragedy and suffering in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is symptomatic of a crisis in the United States that extends far beyond matters of governance and the incompetence of the Bush administration. Rather than simply represent a crisis of leadership, Katrina is analysed as part of a biopolitics of disposability—in which entire populations marginalized by race and class are now considered redundant, an unnecessary burden on state coffers and consigned to fend for themselves. This new biopolitics is marked by deeply existential and material questions regarding who is going to die and who is going to live, and represents an insidious set of forces that have given up on the sanctity of human life for those populations rendered "at risk" by global neoliberal economies, and as Katrina makes clear works in diverse ways to render some groups as disposable and privileges others. Giroux argues that to confront the biopolitics of disposability, of which the political disaster of Katrina offers an exemplary case, we need to recognize the new confluence of anti-democratic forces that are now shaping American society. But more is needed than understanding and critique, such dark times also demand a new understanding of a cultural politics in which pedagogy becomes central to a renewed struggle for a politics in which the crisis of meaning, agency, and resistance can be addressed through a language of critique and possibility in order to create the conditions for multiple collective and global struggles that refuse to use politics as an act of war and markets as the measure of democracy. Making human beings superfluous is the essence of slavery, colonialism, and totalitarianism, and the ongoing struggle for an inclusive and substantive global democracy is the antidote in urgent need of being reclaimed. Katrina should keep the hope of such a struggle alive for quite some time because for many of us the images of those floating bodies serve as an desperate reminder of what it means when justice and politics, as the lifeblood of democracy, become cold and indifferent in the face human suffering and death.

Value-Added Assessment and Systemic Reform: A Response to the Challenge of Human Capital Development

Mr. Hershberg believes that the highly competitive global economy of the 21st century requires dramatic improvements in America's schools. While he sees merit in the basic intent of No Child Left Behind, he suggests that a shift to value-added assessment, if it is used as the foundation of a comprehensive school reform model, will be the key to raising the achievement of all students. Our nation, which has prevailed in conflict after conflict over several centuries, now faces a stark and sudden choice: adapt or perish. I'm not referring to the war against terrorism but to a war of skills--one that America is at a risk of losing to India, China, and other emerging economies. And we're not at risk of losing it on factory floors or lab benches. It's happening every day, all across the country, in our public schools. Unless we transform those schools and do it now ... it will soon be too late. --Louis Gerstner, former chairman, IBM; chairman, The Teaching Commission TERRORISM and the war in Iraq are high on the list of the nation's concerns, but the greatest danger facing America is, as Louis Gerstner recognized, the challenge of human capital development. Our nation's public schools, the foundation for this effort, are still failing far too many of our children despite investment of some $500 billion annually. Sadly, we've known about this threat for quite some time. In 1983 A Nation at Risk suggested that, if the mediocrity of our schools had been imposed by unfriendly foreign power, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. We understood then that companies all over the world could buy foolproof machinery that compensated for deficient worker skills and that billions of people were willing to use that machinery for a fraction of the wages American workers wanted. But recent trends make clear that globalization is about far more than displacing our nation's blue-collar workers. Every job in America is at risk. As author and New York Timescolumnist Thomas Friedman argues in The World Is Flat, 30 years ago you'd rather be a B student in Boston than a genius in Bangalore or Beijing because the economic opportunities were all in America. Today, he explains, that is no longer true. Intellectual work can be digitized, disaggregated, delivered, distributed, produced, and shipped from anywhere on the planet to anywhere else. (1) Friedman identifies 10 developments--or flatteners --that have helped to level the playing field of the global economy. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the triumph of capitalism. The development of Microsoft Windows and the introduction of the Netscape browser helped fuel the high-tech bubble. Most of us looked at the dot.com collapse as a disaster, but it was actually a great boon to globalization because billions of dollars were spent on fiber optic telecommunications cable to connect the continents. When the initial investors went bust, other companies bought these transmission networks for pennies on the dollar, which made it possible to offer those networks to users worldwide at minimal cost. New software created compatibility among diverse computer applications. Companies could now send jobs (outsourcing) or whole factories (off-shoring) overseas; have employees in different locations collaborate online though shared operating systems, such as Linux (open sourcing); allow other companies such as UPS to take over whole sections of their operations (insourcing); or create global supply chains so that when a product is sold in the U.S., another is immediately made in China (supply-chaining). Powerful new search engines, such as Google and Yahoo, enabled people around the world to mine unlimited data sources, and new wireless technologies and Voice Over Internet Protocols are now accelerating these developments. The 21st century has seen three billion new people enter the world economy, the majority from China, India, and the former Soviet Union, all societies with rich educational heritages. …