Act Of Bioterrorism Research Articles

Intranasal Vaccination Induces Protective Immunity against Intranasal Infection with VirulentFrancisella tularensisBiovar A

The inhalation of Francisella tularensis biovar A causes pneumonic tularemia associated with high morbidity and mortality rates in humans. Exposure to F. tularensis usually occurs by accident, but there is increasing awareness that F. tularensis may be deliberately released in an act of bioterrorism or war. The development of a vaccine against pneumonic tularemia has been limited by a lack of information regarding the mechanisms required to protect against this disease. Vaccine models for F. tularensis in inbred mice would facilitate investigations of the protective mechanisms and significantly enhance vaccine development. Intranasal vaccination with the attenuated live vaccine strain (LVS) of F. tularensis reproducibly protected BALB/c mice, but not C57BL/6 mice, against intranasal and subcutaneous challenges with a virulent clinical isolate of F. tularensis biovar A (NMFTA1). The resistance of LVS-vaccinated BALB/c mice to intranasal NMFTA1 challenge was increased 100-fold by boosting with live NMFTA1 but not with LVS. The protective response was specific for F. tularensis and required both CD4 and CD8 T cells. The vaccinated mice appeared outwardly healthy for more than 2 months after NMFTA1 challenge, even though NMFTA1 was recovered from more than half of the vaccinated mice. These results show that intranasal vaccination induces immunity that protects BALB/c mice from intranasal infection by F. tularensis biovar A.

Microbial forensics: the next forensic challenge.

Pathogens and toxins can be converted to bioweapons and used to commit bioterrorism and biocrime. Because of the potential and relative ease of an attack using a bioweapon, forensic science needs to be prepared to assist in the investigation to bring perpetrators to justice and to deter future attacks. A new subfield of forensics--microbial forensics--has been created, which is focused on characterization of evidence from a bioterrorism act, biocrime, hoax, or an inadvertent release. Forensic microbiological investigations are essentially the same as any other forensic investigation regarding processing. They involve crime scene(s) investigation, chain of custody practices, evidence collection, handling and preservation, evidence shipping, analysis of evidence, interpretation of results, and court presentation. In addition to collecting and analyzing traditional forensic evidence, the forensic investigation will attempt to determine the etiology and identity of the causal agent, often in a similar fashion as in an epidemiologic investigation. However, for attribution, higher-resolution characterization is needed. The tools for attribution include genetic- and nongenetic-based assays and informatics to attempt to determine the unique source of a sample or at least eliminate some sources. In addition, chemical and physical assays may help determine the process used to prepare, store, or disseminate the bioweapon. An effective microbial forensics program will require development and/or validation of all aspects of the forensic investigative process, from sample collection to interpretation of results. Quality assurance (QA) and QC practices, comparable to those used by the forensic DNA science community, are being implemented. Lastly, partnerships with other laboratories will be requisite, because many of the necessary capabilities for analysis will not reside in the traditional forensic laboratory.

The evolving field of biodefence: therapeutic developments and diagnostics

The threat of bioterrorism and the potential use of biological weapons against both military and civilian populations has become a major concern for governments around the world. For example, in 2001 anthrax-tainted letters resulted in several deaths, caused widespread public panic and exerted a heavy economic toll. If such a small-scale act of bioterrorism could have such a huge impact, then the effects of a large-scale attack would be catastrophic. This review covers recent progress in developing therapeutic countermeasures against, and diagnostics for, such agents.

Genetic Analysis and Attribution of Microbial Forensics Evidence

Because of the availability of pathogenic microorganisms and the relatively low cost of preparing and disseminating bioweapons, there is a continuing threat of biocrime and bioterrorism. Thus, enhanced capabilities are needed that enable the full and robust forensic exploitation and interpretation of microbial evidence from acts of bioterrorism or biocrimes. To respond to the need, greater resources and efforts are being applied to the burgeoning field of microbial forensics. Microbial forensics focuses on the characterization, analysis and interpretation of evidence for attributional purposes from a bioterrorism act, biocrime, hoax or inadvertent agent release. To enhance attribution capabilities, a major component of microbial forensics is the analysis of nucleic acids to associate or eliminate putative samples. The degree that attribution can be addressed depends on the context of the case, the available knowledge of the genetics, phylogeny, and ecology of the target microorganism, and technologies applied. The types of genetic markers and features that can impact statistical inferences of microbial forensic evidence include: single nucleotide polymorphisms, repetitive sequences, insertions and deletions, mobile elements, pathogenicity islands, virulence and resistance genes, house keeping genes, structural genes, whole genome sequences, asexual and sexual reproduction, horizontal gene transfer, conjugation, transduction, lysogeny, gene conversion, recombination, gene duplication, rearrangements, and mutational hotspots. Nucleic acid based typing technologies include: PCR, real-time PCR, MLST, MLVA, whole genome sequencing, and microarrays.

Syndromic surveillance and bioterrorism: embracing the network‐centric warfare paradigm

Military operations today more than ever are carried out by large coalitions, usually distributed between several organisations and often separated by substantial temporal and spatial scales. To facilitate such military operations, network‐centric warfare is often cited as the panacea of command and control, possessing the characteristics of elevated speed of command, high levels of self‐synchronisation and shared situational awareness. A nation's ability to respond to infectious diseases resulting from an act of bioterrorism or naturally occurring pathogens depends on a framework that supports operations by a large number of distributed organisations facing inherent temporal and spatial challenges. The effects of infectious diseases, whether intentionally inflicted or naturally occurring, can threaten a nation's security. Syndromic surveillance is a detection methodology that encompasses systematic collection, analysis, interpretation and application of real‐time indicators for disease and outbreaks. This paper introduces the NCW paradigm and highlights the inherent characteristics that would facilitate syndromic surveillance in support of an expedient public health response in the event of a bioterrorist attack.

Genetics and attribution issues that confront the microbial forensics field

The commission of an act of bioterrorism or biocrime is a real concern for law enforcement and society. Efforts are underway to develop a strong microbial forensic program to assist in identifying perpetrators of acts of bioterrorism and biocrimes, as well as serve as a deterrent for those who might commit such illicit acts. Genetic analyses of microbial organisms will likely be a powerful tool for attribution of criminal acts. There are some similarities to forensic human DNA analysis practices, such as: molecular biology technology, use of population databases, qualitative conclusions of test results, and the application of QA/QC practices. Differences include: database size and composition, statistical interpretation methods, and confidence/uncertainty in the outcome of an interpretation.

The Role of the Infection Control Practitioner in Bioterrorism Preparedness: Bringing in the Bucks for Bioterrorism

ISSUE: Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax epidemic, attention has been focused on the ability of hospitals and emergency medical services to respond to bioterrorist events. Hospitals have many needs for bioterrorism preparedness that are typically deferred due to the financial support required to meet those needs. The state of Indiana has taken advantage of a grant provided by the Health Resource & Services Administration (HRSA) to help meet the preparedness needs of hospitals throughout the state. PROJECT: In April 2002, a state advisory committee, the Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Planning Committee (HBPPC), was formed. The membership consisted of professionals throughout the state from various specialties and backgrounds. The infection control practitioner at Bloomington Hospital represented the hospital, and the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), Indiana Chapter #76, on the committee. The purpose of the committee was to devise a plan to distribute the $2.5 million dollars Indiana received for hospital preparedness. The committee's objectives were: to assess the current hospital preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks and bioterrorism events, to increase hospitals' ability to handle a surge of infected or injured patients, and to provide for access to pharmaceuticals and supplies necessary to address a disease outbreak or act of bioterrorism. RESULTS: The HBPPC devised a hospital capability assessment for readiness survey which was sent out to all hospitals in Indiana. The state was then divided into ten public health districts. Some of the HBPPC members were assigned to be coordinators for their respective public health districts. The hospitals were required to meet five deliverables as outlined by the HBPPC in order to receive a portion of the grant. The funds the hospitals received ranged from $1500 to $44,000. Since Indiana fulfilled the requirements of the 2002-2003 HRSA grant, they received an additional grant for $10 million dollars for 2004. The hospitals are required to work together to determine their preparedness needs as a district in order to qualify for funding from this grant. LESSONS LEARNED: Infection control practitioners have received recognition for their knowledge and expertise in bioterrorism preparedness since the terrorist attacks in 2001. The HRSA grant has enabled hospitals in Indiana to receive funding in order to improve their bioterrorism capability and readiness.

Strategic dilemmas of biosecurity in the European Union.

Systems for societal/homeland security in both Europe and the United States are in flux to adjust to 21st century threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime. It is important that reforms take place on both sides of the Atlantic that recognize the interdependence of Europe and the United States. Security, including biosecurity, for Europe is strongly connected to security in the U.S. Diseases transcend borders, and their consequences can be the same, irrespective of where the outbreak occurs or whether it is a natural occurrence or an act of bioterrorism. This article examines the political and strategic dilemmas and complexities that would confront the European Union (EU) in the event of a bioterrorism attack or a naturally occurring outbreak. Although several initiatives have been taken by the 15 member states and within the EU Commission, the EU is not institutionally prepared for transnational, rapidly moving diseases that could cause grave consequences in Europe and other regions, including the U.S. The prime responsibility for protecting European citizens against outbreaks rests with each member state. However, with intertwined and open European societies, the consequences would likely spill across borders. The EU Commission would have to become involved because such aspects as the internal market and freedom of movement would be affected. Responsibility, but not authority, would be pushed to the top. A coordinated EU response to such crises depends on European political leadership.

Which bio‐weapons might be used by terrorists against the United Kingdom?*

The properties of potential biological weapon agents for bioterrorism include a consistent effect at low dosage and short incubation period in a population of low immunity, being difficult to treat, able to be produced in bulk, stable in storage and readily disseminated. Possible agents include smallpox, haemorrhagic fever viruses, anthrax, tularaemia and plague. The example of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) demonstrates the possible consequences of an act of bioterrorism, but also the necessary global response. There is scepticism about the practicability of surveillance schemes and the global elimination of biological weapons though the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains urgent.

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Epidemic: Everything You Wanted to Know About SARS but Were Afraid to Ask

There is no irrefutable evidence that the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) pandemic of 2003 resulted from deliberate intent. The U.S. public health community strongly believes that bioterrorism was not a factor in the genesis of the epidemic. Several counterterrorism experts have refused, however, to rule out the possibility that the outbreak was consequential to an act of bioterrorism or an on-site accident at a covert Chinese bioweapons development program. The fact is that terrorists—unless operating as part of a militarily styled campaign to create as much internal chaos as possible (e.g., the Palestinian intifada or Al Qaeda’s campaign of attacks in Saudi Arabia)—rarely, if ever, take credit for their actions when they have the option of doing so. This behavior, coupled with even the most sophisticated science laboratory’s inherent inability to ascertain if an outbreak of deadly disease has been deliberately propagated, means such a determination would have to be established chiefly by conjecture and circumstantial inferences. Of course, we should not expect China’s senior leadership and top public health officials, who have already been excoriated by the World Health Organization (WHO) for failing to provide adequate epidemiological data about the SARS epidemic occurring in that country, to be forthcoming if an accident at a state-secret weapons development program were responsible for the incident. Lacking an unambiguous declaratory statement on the part of the perpetrators and in the absence of confirmatory forensic investigation by public health authorities, this question cannot be answered with certainty. Why would terrorists prefer to act anonymously? One answer is that confusion over “who did it” might allow the perpetrators to escape the fury of their victims, particularly overwhelmingly stronger powers and especially American retaliation. In this regard, it is important to note that American counterterrorism experts spent years blaming Iran and sometimes Syria for a terrorist-caused airplane crash that claimed hundreds of lives, until Libya emerged as the most likely malefactor. Colonel Qaddafi subsequently acknowledged his nation’s role in the air piracy disaster. The United States is becoming more aggressive in hunting down terrorists to enact revenge, which is beginning to be seen as the sole effective deterrent. According to Vice President Dick Cheney,

Development of a 5′ nuclease assay to detect ciprofloxacin resistant isolates of the biowarfare agent Yersinia pestis

The detection of antibiotic resistance in agents of biowarfare is extremely critical in order to start appropriate therapy in a timely manner. We have developed a 5′ nuclease assay to detect ciprofloxacin resistance (Cip r) in Yersinia pestis. Two groups of fluorogenic probes were developed. The first group included a probe homologous to the wild type Y. pestis gyrA sequence with two corresponding probes that were homologous with two different mis-sense mutations in codon 81 of GyrA. The second group of probes included a wild type probe and two corresponding probes that recognized mis-sense mutations in codon 83 or gyrA. These probes specifically reacted only with the homologous DNA sequences. The 5′ nuclease assay was sensitive to 1 pg (∼1 colony forming unit) of starting template and could be used on semi-purified DNA. We tested our optimized assay against a group of 38 Cip r Y. pestis isolates and demonstrated that it was accurate at determining the gyrA allele encoded by these strains. The 5′ nuclease assay performed on the LightCycler proved to be sensitive, rapid and accurate at identification of Cip r Y. pestis and thus should be useful in characterization of this organism in the event of a future act of bioterrorism.

Beyond our pages

Beyond our pages

Bioterrorism Preparedness—What Progress has Congress Made Since September 2001?

The U.S. government has long been aware of the potential for a homeland attack using biological agents. Historically, there have been some limited efforts to respond to this threat. During the Korean War, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention established the Epidemic Intelligence Service as an early warning system to counter possible bioterrorist attacks. The Department of Defense has also developed biological defense programs and provided troops serving in high-risk areas with anthrax vaccine. In 1999, Congress appropriated funds for the first time for state and local bioterrorism preparedness. This article discusses congressional action since the fall of 2001 to respond and prepare for an act of bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a City against Panic

Bioterrorism policy discussions and response planning efforts have tended to discount the capacity of the public to participate in the response to an act of bioterrorism, or they have assumed that local populations would impede an effective response. Fears of mass panic and social disorder underlie this bias. Although it is not known how the population will react to an unprecedented act of bioterrorism, experience with natural and technological disasters and disease outbreaks indicates a pattern of generally effective and adaptive collective action. Failure to involve the public as a key partner in the medical and public-health response could hamper effective management of an epidemic and increase the likelihood of social disruption. Ultimately, actions taken by nonprofessional individuals and groups could have the greatest influence on the outcome of a bioterrorism event. Five guidelines for integrating the public into bioterrorism response planning are proposed: (1) treat the public as a capable ally in the response to an epidemic, (2) enlist civic organizations in practical public health activities, (3) anticipate the need for home-based patient care and infection control, (4) invest in public outreach and communication strategies, and (5) ensure that planning reflects the values and priorities of affected populations.

The malevolent use of microbes and the rule of law: legal challenges presented by bioterrorism.

Physicians and public health officials would bear the brunt of the health nightmare unleashed by an act of bioterrorism. Mass casualties and the worried well would swamp hospitals and health care facilities that barely cope with normal health care needs. Confusion and fear would haunt infectious disease specialists trying to control the aftermath of an attack with biological weapons (hereafter bioweapons). Supplies of antibiotics and equipment would likely be quickly used up. Efforts to treat the sick and control the spread of the pathogenic microbe could be hampered by shortages of medical staff and absenteeism. Public order would be imperiled. What is often neglected in thinking about the threats bioweapons pose to public health is the foundation that law provides for effective public health activities. Focusing on the link between public health and the law reveals that bioterrorism would also constitute a grave threat to the role law plays in regulating public and private behavior in the United States. In this article, I examine 3 significant challenges that the malevolent use of microbes would pose for the rule of law in the United States.

Design and Implementation of a Virtual Reality System and Its Application to Training Medical First Responders

This paper presents the design and implementation of a distributed virtual reality (VR) platform that was developed to support the training of multiple users who must perform complex tasks in which situation assessment and critical thinking are the primary components of success. The system is fully immersive and multimodal, and users are represented as tracked, full-body figures. The system supports the manipulation of virtual objects, allowing users to act upon the environment in a natural manner. The underlying intelligent simulation component creates an interactive, responsive world in which the consequences of such actions are presented within a realistic, time-critical scenario. The focus of this work has been on the training of medical emergency-response personnel. BioSimMER, an application of the system to training first responders to an act of bio-terrorism, has been implemented and is presented throughout the paper as a concrete example of how the underlying platform architecture supports complex training tasks. Finally, a preliminary field study was performed at the Texas Engineering Extension Service Fire Protection Training Division. The study focused on individual, rather than team, interaction with the system and was designed to gauge user acceptance of VR as a training tool. The results of this study are presented.

The next target of bioterrorism: your food.

One of the many forms that biological warfare may take is the targeting of major food crops. In a poor country where millions of citizens depend on staple crops such as rice, an act of bioterrorism that destroys the crop would create a famine, resulting not only in malnutrition and starvation but also in reduced immune resistance to a range of common illnesses. To reduce the potential of deliberate introductions of crop pathogens as acts of terrorism, researchers must be able to "fingerprint" pathogens at the molecular level and discriminate between naturally occurring and deliberately introduced outbreaks. Several domestic and international surveillance, tracking, and reporting efforts are under way.