Acquisition Of Arms Research Articles

The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace (review)

Book Reviews 143 Again, Oren's study is an objective, thoroughly scholarly, and carefully researched work. While probably mainly of interest to academicians specialiZing or particularly interested in detailed material on the ArabIsraeli conflict, it is a significant contribution to the field and deserves to be in college and university libraries that have holdings on the subject. Scott D. Johnston Department of Political Science Hamline University The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace,edited by Steven L. Spiegel. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. 197 pp. $10.95 (p). This collection of essays examines various aspects of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The authors are a mixed group, including Israelis, Palestinians, other Arabs, Americans, Canadians, and Europeans; most are academics. The fact that some of the chapters are exceedingly short and in many cases citations of sources are minimal creates the impression that they were prepared for a conference, but this does not appear to have been the case. In any event, the overall tone of the book is one of policy prescription rather than academic analysis. According to the editor, these essays are intended to concentrate on "contributions that can be made by the regional parties and outside actors to create conditions favoring peace in the Middle East" (p. 4). The three parts into which the book is divided deal respectively with: 1) prenegotiation factors, including Palestinian and Israeli perspectives, as well as analyses of the negotiating process itself; 2) potential economic cooperation among the conflicting parties; and 3) the problem of arms control. The fourteen substantive chapters vary somewhat in quality, as is often the case in multi-authored works. There is also a certain repetitive quality in the contributions that deal with economic cooperation. Of necessity, these chapters deal with such basic problems as water supplies, trade relations, and capital flows. Significantly, some of these issues are the subject of individual working groups which have been established in the ongoing peace process which began at Madrid in October 1991. Finally, the third part of the book underlines the problem of creating an atmosphere of sufficient mutual trust to permit any kind of arms control at all. In these discussions, emphasis falls on the problem of balancing the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal against the stockpile of poison gas and 144 SHOFAR Winter 1994 Vol. 12, No.2 biological weapons which some of the Arab states are trying or threatening to accumulate, as well as possible acquisition of nuclear arms by such renegade states as Iraq and Iran. One of the inevitable vulnerabilities of books on the contemporary Middle East is the danger of rapid obsolescence. Unfortunately, this book in some respects falls victim to this danger. This is especially true of the first section, dealing with conditions leading to negotiations. Repeatedly, several of the authors criticize what they perceive to be the Israeli government's rigidity, especially with regard to settlements in the administered territories. The problem here is obvious: the government in question was turned out of office by the Israeli voters in June of 1992. The government in power at this writing (early May 1993) has assumed a very different posture on this issue, as well as on other critical matters which are cited as obstacles to peace in this book. It is, of course, entirely possible that this government might fall, either because of a breakup of the existing coalition alignment, or possibly (though not likely) new elections, and that a new government might revert to the more hawkish stance of the Shamir government. But given the Clinton Administration's commitment to an active role, and the power of the purse which the United States can still exercise despite budgetary stringency at home, an outburst of Israeli stonewalling seems highly implausible. Notable in this connection is Galia Golan's citation here of opinion polls which showed that a significant majority of pro-likud voters (59%) favored freezing of settlement activity in the territories, and that a majority of likud Party central committee members favored territorial concessions in exchange for peace. Other opinion studies confirm these findings and suggest that the outcome of the 1992 election should not be regarded as surprising. These polls also imply that, despite...

Chaos As A Tool For Exploring Questions of International Security

Mathematical models-static or dynamic-of international systems arc often used to predict outcomes of specific policy choices. The focus of this paper is not such predictions themselves but the question of whether or not such predictability is meaningful. Non-predictability in a deterministic dynamic model is usually referred to as “chaos” and is used in this paper as a paradigm for crisis instability and the possible outbreak of war in a system of competing states. The use of the paradigm is illustrated via initial explorations of three international security questions: 1.) Which is more stable, a bipolar or a multipolar system? 2.) Which are more war prone, democracies or autocracies? 3.) Which leads to more stability, seeking security via independent acquisition of arms or via a balance of power? A simple model-not empirically founded but manifesting some dominant aspects of the situation-is formulated for each question. The stability regime of each model is then determined. Using the postulate that a larger stability range indicates a less war-prone world, and vice-versa, answers to these questions are found, thus providing an alternate approach to the investigation of pressing theoretical and practical questions in international relations.

Defense Economics: 1776 to 1983

Economists and political leaders alike have discussed defense economics for more than two centuries. Issues have included the economic causes and consequences of war; the financing of armies and navies; and the acquisition of manpower, arms, supply, and transport. One can trace these issues from the early years of the Republic through the wars (and industrialization) of the nineteenth century to the two world wars. Since the 1950s two new aspects of defense economics have emerged: first, peacetime defense spending levels have exerted a major and permanent impact on the economy; and, second, economists have contributed to a full range of defense decisions. During the 1960s economists achieved a major influence over such decisions, if only by their rising to senior levels in the Defense establishment. That influence, however, has declined since the 1960s. Nevertheless, defense economics has taken on an added significance as the country has-since the mid-1970s-increased defense spending by substantial amounts and signaled an intent to pursue a number of defense initiatives that are meant to influence the way major sectors of the economy will conduct business in the future.

Nth Powers of the Future

Acceptance of the NPT by a majority of states after 1968 created an impression that the danger of further proliferation beyond the five nuclear weapon states (US, USSR, China, UK, and France) had been put to rest. India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" shattered this impression and pointed up the danger of proliferating nuclear options, if not nuclear weapons. The list of potential proliferators has changed from the 1950s to the 1970s and may continue to change in the 1980s. Israel and, by some views, India are on the list, but others like Japan, Australia, South Africa, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, and Argentina are being added. This paper asserts that proliferation, while unstoppable, is slow, not because the NPT is necessarily working, but because the military and economic security perceptions of potential proliferators do not dictate a faster rate of proliferation. Yet the possible deterioration of the strategic environment in the 1980s may induce faster proliferation. The new stress may not be on the acquisition of nuclear arms but, because nuclear arms are becoming militarily less useful, it may be on develop ment of nuclear options coupled with a strategy of their non- use or nonconversion into weapons.