Acquaintance Theory Research Articles

Familiarity analysis and time-advance experimental study of LP-NGD RC-circuit intended to operate with Unity-normalized gain

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to develop a familiarity analysis of resistive-capacitive (RC) network active circuit operating with unfamiliar low-pass (LP) type negative group delay (NGD) behavior. The design method of NGD circuit is validated by simulation with commercial tool and experimental measurement.Design/methodology/approachThe present research work methodology is structured in three main parts. The familiarity theory of RC-network LP-NGD circuit is developed. The LP-NGD circuit parameters are expressed in function of the targeted time-advance. Then, the feasibility study is based on the theory, simulation and measurement result comparisons.FindingsThe RC-network based LP-NGD proof of concept is validated with −1 and −0.5 ms targeted time-advances after design, simulation, test and characterized. The LP-NGD circuit unity gain prototype presents NGD cut-off frequencies of about 269 and 569 Hz for the targeted time-advances, −1 and −0.5 ms, respectively. Bi-exponential and arbitrary waveform signals were tested to verify the targeted time-advance.Research limitations/implicationsThe performance of the unfamiliar LP-NGD topology developed in the present study is limited by the parasitic elements of constituting lumped components.Practical implicationsThe NGD circuit enables to naturally reduce the undesired delay effect from the electronic and communication systems. The NGD circuit can be exploited to reduce the delay induced by electronic devices and system.Social implicationsAs social impacts of the NGD circuit application, the NGD function is one of prominent solutions to improve the technology performances of future electronic device in term of communication aspect and the transportation system.Originality/valueThe originality of the paper concerns the theoretical approach of the RC-network parameters in function of the targeted time-advance and the input signal bandwidth. In addition, the experimental results are also particularly original.

Gertler's acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge and internalist requirements for reasons

ABSTRACT Gertler argues that, in some introspective judgments about experience, phenomenal reality intersects with one's grasp of that reality to the effect that one can have knowledge by acquaintance. This new version of the acquaintance theory depends on the idea that some introspective judgments about experience can be justified by the fact that the phenomenal property of an experience is a component of the introspective judgment about the experience. The goal of this paper is to show that even this most promising version of the acquaintance theory is not successful. For this goal, in particular, I argue that even if we grant that, in the relevant cases, the phenomenal property of an experience is a component of an introspective judgment, this fact can hardly play the epistemic role that Gertler envisions. I establish this on the basis of two internalist requirements for reasons, namely, the evaluability condition and the endorsement condition. On the former condition, a reason for justifying a judgment must be the kind of thing that can be evaluated as correct or incorrect. And on the latter condition, having a reason for justifying a judgment requires that the subject endorse the reason as correct.

Singular thoughts, singular attitude reports, and acquaintance

AbstractIt is widely accepted among philosophers that there is a tension between acquaintance constraints on singular thought and the plausible assumption that the truths of singular attitude reports ensure the subject's having singular thoughts. From this, anti‐acquaintance theorists contend that acquaintance constraints must be rejected. As a response, many acquaintance theorists maintain that there is good reason to doubt a strong connection between singular attitude reports and singular thoughts. In this paper, however, I defend the acquaintance theory by arguing that there is in fact no tension at all. I consider three objections regarding singular attitude reports against the acquaintance theory: (i) ultra‐liberal singular attitude reports, (ii) the “There is something that S believes to be F” locution, and (iii) infelicities of singular attitude reports. Then, I argue that none of them succeed in showing a genuine tension.

Acquaintance, presentation and judgement: from Brentano to Russell and back again

ABSTRACT The notion of acquaintance is one of the pillars of Russell’s philosophy and it remains at the center of work in the philosophy of mind and language. Russell’s development of his theory of acquaintance was influenced by Brentano and Meinong. In this paper I will trace this Austrian Influence on the development of Russell’s theory of acquaintance through two phases; one before and one after Russell introduced the multiple relation theory of judgement in 1907. I will use Brentano’s view of the distinction between judgement and presentation to highlight problems with Russell’s theories of acquaintance in both phases. In doing so I will give special attention to Russell’s notion of experiencing together that plays a foundational role in the second phase. The paper concludes by recommending to Russell that he returns to Brentano’s original ideas about judgement and presentation.

Consumer Adoption of Consumer-Created vs. Expert-Created Information: Moderating Role of Prior Product Attitude

Today, consumer-created information such as online consumer reviews have become important and popular, playing a key role in consumer decision making. Compared with expert-created information, each piece of information is less powerful or persuasive, but their aggregation can be more credible and acceptable. This concept is called collective intelligence knowledge. This study focuses on the persuasive effect on consumer product attitudes of consumer-created information compared to expert-created information. Using source credibility and familiarity theory, the study reveals how prior brand attitudes can play a moderating role in the persuasive effect of consumer-created information and expert-created information. Specifically, this study shows how consumer-created information is more persuasive when consumers have more favorable prior brand attitudes, while expert-created information is more persuasive when consumers have less favorable prior brand attitudes. Based on the results, this study proposes practical strategies for information structure, curation, and presentation. If a company has a good-quality brand evaluation of its products, it should increase the weight of consumer-created information such as online consumer reviews. Otherwise, the company needs to first improve brand evaluation through expert-created information such as third-parties or power-blogger reviews.

Coalescent theories and divergent paraphrases: definites, non-extensional contexts, and familiarity

A recent challenge to Russell’s theory of definite description centers upon the divergent behavior of definites and their Russellian paraphrases in non-extensional contexts. Russellians can meet this challenge, I argue, by incorporating the familiarity theory of definiteness into Russell’s theory. The synthesis of these two seemingly incompatible theories produces a conceptually consistent and empirically powerful framework. As I show, the coalescence of Russellianism and the familiarity theory of definiteness stands as a legitimate alternative to both Traditional Russellianism and alternative semantic frameworks.

Definiteness in Chiyao

The aim of this paper is to examine the linguistic devices used to express definiteness in Chiyao, a Bantu language of Southern Tanzania, Southern Malawi, and north-western Mozambique. The analysis is guided by the familiarity theory of definiteness, and is based on the data collected through audio-recording of traditional narratives which were later transcribed to identify utterances with definite NPs. Findings establish three main strategies of signalling definiteness in the language, which include morphological, morphosyntactic, and use of bare nouns. The morphological indicators of definiteness include subject and object markers while the morphosyntactic indicators include demonstratives, locative particles, possessive determiners, genitive expressions, and relative clauses. Bare definiteness is mainly expressed by nouns of inalienable possession, including those denoting body parts and family relations. These findings enrich the existing literature on definiteness in Bantu languages and inform future typological and comparative studies on this subject.

Italian Pension Funds Struggling with Domestic Sovereign Risk

The paper investigates the determinants of Italian pension funds’ exposure to the domestic sovereign bonds through a panel analysis, over the time-period 2008-2014, on a sample of 70 funds and 230 investment lines. We investigate the drivers on sovereign home bias along two main explicative arrows: the familiarity theory, and the opportunity set theory. Results indicate that both factors are significant. However, from a quantitative point of view, the main determinant is the presence of restrictions in the investment mandate. The existence of a minimum guaranteed return increases on average by 11 per cent the weight of the Italian sovereign bonds on the European sovereign portfolio, while extending the investment spectrum outside Europe determines a decrease of 4.5 per cent on average. This finding suggests that exposures to the domestic-sovereign risk of Italian pension funds would probably reduce after specific mandate restrictions have loosened. Since sovereign home bias translates into concentration risk, it may weaken the soundness of the private pension pillar in case the Italian T-bonds suffer from a significant price reduction. Regulators should pay close attention to this issue to enhance the stability of the Italian pension fund industry, considering that such a large sovereign home bias could simultaneously undermine the private and public pension payments.

Towards a theory of singular thought about abstract mathematical objects

This essay uses a mental files theory of singular thought—a theory saying that singular thought about and reference to a particular object requires possession of a mental store of information taken to be about that object—to explain how we could have such thoughts about abstract mathematical objects. After showing why we should want an explanation of this I argue that none of three main contemporary mental files theories of singular thought—acquaintance theory, semantic instrumentalism, and semantic cognitivism—can give it. I argue for two claims intended to advance our understanding of singular thought about mathematical abstracta. First, that the conditions for possession of a file for an abstract mathematical object are the same as the conditions for possessing a file for an object perceived in the past—namely, that the agent retains information about the object. Thus insofar as we are able to have memory-based files for objects perceived in the past, we ought to be able to have files for abstract mathematical objects too. Second, at least one recently articulated condition on a file’s being a device for singular thought—that it be capable of surviving a certain kind of change in the information it contains—can be satisfied by files for abstract mathematical objects.

God knows: acquaintance and the nature of divine knowledge

AbstractTheists typically believe that Godknowsall truths. However, accounts of divine omniscience almost always focus on thescopeof God's knowledge or perhaps on whether certain kinds of facts are there to be known by God, such as counterfactuals of creaturely freedom or future contingent facts. Very rarely do these accounts include for analysis thenatureof God's knowledge. In this article, I develop an acquaintance theory of God's knowledge where acquaintance with an epistemic relation that guarantees that the truth of God's beliefs is necessary for knowledge. I argue that this view achieves an ideal way of knowing, worthy of the divine being.

Reid and the State Conceptual/Nonconceptual Apprehension Distinction: A Reply to Wolterstorff

There is an interesting controversy in recent literature over the nature of Reid's theory of perception. Interpreters are divided over whether Reid's theory of perception is compatible with an acquaintance model of perception. This article discusses Nicholas Wolterstorff's (2006) objections to the acquaintance interpretation of Reid. I argue that these objections are inadequate insofar as they do not account for the possibility that Reid offers a ‘state conceptual’ – rather than a ‘state nonconceptual’ – acquaintance theory of perception. I provide textual support for thinking that a state conceptual acquaintance interpretation of Reid is a live possibility, and show how such an interpretation is immune to Wolterstorff's criticisms.

Kant on Perceptual Content

Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial in itself and in attribution to Kant, it promises to make sense of central claims within his critical philosophy.

“矫枉过正”效应的理论解释及其神经机制

在测验中将错误题目的正确答案反馈给个体后，在随后的测验中，信心水平高的错误题目比信心水平低的错误题目更容易被改正，这一现象被称作“矫枉过正”。目前关于“矫枉过正”现象有三种理论解释。注意力理论认为相对于信心水平低时出错，人们发现自身信心水平高的题目竟然会犯错误，因此会唤起注意力，并且花费较多精力去学习正确答案；熟悉性理论指出，那些信心高时所犯错误的一般知识可能是人们一开始就知道的，学习一种已经存在于记忆中的信息远远比学习一个新颖的知识简单；最近学习区理论从学习的角度进行阐述“矫枉过正”可能的心理机制，最近学习区中的知识材料学起来不太困难，但是在没有进行再次学习(如反馈)的情况下也不会被直接提取出来，因此反馈本身很关键。“矫枉过正”的神经机制研究发现在错误矫正时，除了代表元记忆不匹配的共同脑区发生活动，背外侧前额叶只有在高信心回答错误的情况下发生活动，在低信心回答正确时没有出现活动，右背外侧前额叶也是如此，因此可以认为背外侧前额叶参与了错误矫正过程，是错误记忆的抑制机制。未来可以考虑在一些特殊人群等领域展开大量研究，如记忆障碍者、学习障碍者是否存在“矫枉过正”现象，这对于了解人类高级认知过程极具价值。Hypercorrection refers to the phenomenon that after the correct answers of questions are fed back to the individual in the test, in the following tests, comparing to the wrong questions of low confidence level, those of high confidence level are more likely to be corrected. There have been three kinds of theories to explain the phenomenon. Attention theory holds the view that people feel surprised when they have failed in questions which they are sure to get the right answers, so, it will arouse their attention and people will spend more time learning the correct answers. Familiarity theory points out that people have known the knowledge of the questions of high confidence level, and learning the information existing in the memory is much easier than learning new knowledge. Recent study area theory tries to explain this phenomenon from a teaching perspective that learning knowledge in recent study area is not difficult, but it will not be extracted directly without relearning (e.g. feedback), so the feedback itself is the key. Hypercorrection’s neural mechanism study found that the brain regions of metamemory which does not match are involved in error correction process; especially dorsolateral prefrontal is activated only in the high- confidence but wrong answers, which is the same as right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. So dorsolateral prefrontal is the inhibition mechanism of false memories. In future research we should pay more attention to the areas of some special groups, such as memory disorder and learning disabilities; this is extremely valuable to know human advanced cognitive process.

What Russell Couldn't Describe

The characteristic property of definite descriptions in natural language is commonly assumed to be their uniqueness requirement, although there is disagreement with respect to how occurrences should be interpreted, for instance with regard to the well-known restriction problem. I offer a novel argument against characterizing definite expressions in terms of uniqueness. If a singular definite description ‘the F’ implies that its denotation is the unique satisfier of ‘F’ (relative to a context) then there are real-life states of affairs that can be described in simple first-order languages, but which we are simply unable to describe accurately in natural language. I argue, first, that there is no way to describe these states of affairs properly without using definite descriptions. Second, if definite descriptions imply uniqueness we will systematically get the wrong truth conditions, regardless of whatever semantic or pragmatic resources the defender of the uniqueness-implying approach invokes. Hence, the Russellian idea of characterizing definite descriptions in terms of uniqueness must be given up. In the final section I explain what an adequate account of definite expressions must achieve—primarily coordinating elements brought to salience by context or previous discourse—and sketch a way of accomplishing this by using a liberal version of familiarity theory. Although there may be other accounts that can do the job, the account I sketch (based on an approach that has largely been overlooked) shows promise and can easily deal with the inexpressibility problem.

Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought?

In a series of recent articles, Robin Jeshion has developed a theory of singular thought which she calls ‘cognitivism’. According to Jeshion, cognitivism offers a middle path between acquaintance theories—which she takes to impose too strong a requirement on singular thought, and semantic instrumentalism—which she takes to impose too weak a requirement. In this article, I raise a series of concerns about Jeshion's theory, and suggest that the relevant data can be accommodated by a version of acquaintance theory that distinguishes unsuccessful thoughts of singular form from successful singular thoughts, and in addition allows for ‘trace‐based’ acquaintance.

Acquaintance and assurance

I criticize Richard Fumerton’s fallibilist acquaintance theory of noninferential justification.

Poston on similarity and acquaintance

In this article, I try to defend my conception of noninferential justification from important criticisms raised by Ted Poston in a recent article published in Philosophical Studies. More specifically, I argue that from within the framework of an acquaintance theory, one can still allow for fallible noninferential justification, and one can do so without losing the advantages I claim for the theory.

Similarity and acquaintance: a dilemma

There is an interesting and instructive problem with Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Fumerton’s explicit account requires acquaintance with the truth-maker of one’s belief and yet he admits that one can have noninferential justification when one is not acquainted with the truth-maker of one’s belief but instead acquainted with a very similar truth-maker. On the face of it this problem calls for clarification. However, there are skeptical issues lurking in the background. This paper explores these issues by developing a dilemma for an acquaintance theory.

Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen

This paper responds to Ernest Sosa’s recent criticism of Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory. Sosa argues that Fumerton’s account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa’s criticisms are both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton’s theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.

Support for a Unique Theory of Definiteness

No abstract.