Scientific Account Research Articles

Knowledge, beliefs and pedagogy: how the nature of science should inform the aims of science education (and not just when teaching evolution)

Lisa Borgerding’s work highlights how students can understand evolution without necessarily committing to it, and how learners may come to see it as one available way of thinking amongst others. This is presented as something that should be considered a successful outcome when teaching about material that many students may find incompatible with their personal worldviews. These findings derive from work exploring a cause célèbre of the science education community—the teaching of natural selection in cultural contexts where learners feel they have strong reasons for rejecting evolutionary ideas. Accepting that students may understand but not commit to scientific ideas that are (from some cultural perspectives) controversial may easily be considered as a form of compromise position when teaching canonical science prescribed in curriculum but resisted by learners. Yet if we take scholarship on the nature of science seriously, and wish to reflect the nature of scientific knowledge in science teaching, then the aim of science education should always be to facilitate understanding of, yet to avoid belief in, the ideas taught in science lessons. The philosophy of science suggests that scientific knowledge needs to be understood as theoretical in nature, as conjectural and provisional; and the history of science warns of the risks of strongly committing to any particular conceptualisation as a final account of some feature of nature. Research into student thinking and learning in science suggests that learning science is often a matter of coming to understand a new viable way of thinking about a topic to complement established ways of thinking. Science teaching should then seek to have students appreciate scientific ideas as viable ways of making sense of the currently available empirical evidence, but should not be about persuading students of the truth of any particular scientific account.

Addressing the Question of Homophobia in Jordanian Public Discourse

This article investigates the question of homosexuality, homosexuals, and homophobia in the Jordanian public debate in the aftermath of an LGBTQIA meeting that was held secretly in Amman in May 2015. The main purpose of the article is to demonstrate the constituents and arguments which reproduce the public discourse on anti-homosexuality and anti-homosexuals and homophobia in Jordan. This purpose is reached by analysing 35 journal articles written in Standard Arabic in Jordanian public and open-access media. The analysis involves the qualitative analysis of the argument, processes, and themes used to represent homosexuality and homosexuals by the discourse producers. The analysis reveals that the question of homosexuality and homosexuals in Jordan can be addressed in terms of seven angles: the public anti-homosexuality and anti-homosexuals’ calls, the (Islamic) religious argument, protecting and reinforcing law and order, the argument of (homo)sexually-transmitted diseases, the calls of pro-homosexuality and pro-homosexuals and LGBTQIA’s rights activists, the homosexuals’ own self-representation, and the neutral scientific account and representation.Keywords: Jordan, homosexuality, homosexuals, homophobia, LGBTQIA, discourse analysis

A tribute to Alexander Davidson Bain: An NMR pioneer and mentor at McMaster University

AbstractIn this tribute to our friend, mentor and colleague Alexander Davidson Bain we have collectively recapitulated the milestones of his career at McMaster university. We start from Alex's scientific and educational achievements and continue with his accomplishments as a community and infrastructure builder. We attempt to provide a sense of the breadth and depth of his seemingly endless scientific contributions while at McMaster by briefly summarizing selected representative examples from his body of work. Following Alex's lead, the scientific account is mixed with anecdotes and “bits of wisdom” we fondly remember from our interactions and collaborations with him. We also touch upon his brilliant and nurturing educational style and his “aggregator” role within the McMaster and wider NMR communities. We conclude with a more personal picture of Alex D. Bain, in which his scientific excellence and profound intellect are inextricably tied to his kind, nurturing and optimistic character and to his uniquely wry humor. He was not just a “good guy,” he was the epitome of the “good guy.”

Sexual violence perpetrated against women in India: the role of forensic evidence

ABSTRACTIn response to the upsurge in acts of sexual violence against women in India, Parliament passed the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013, amending existing statutes and rules of evidence relating to crimes of sexual violence and the practices of forensic professionals in the country. While a step in the right direction, this law paid little attention to forensic evidence in sexual violence cases, which can provide a more objective, scientific account of events, aid in the reconstruction of crimes, and help strengthen cases against perpetrators. The objectives of this article are twofold: to raise awareness for the need for a more prominent role of forensic evidence in sexual violence cases and to recommend ways to establish uniform and comprehensive policies and procedures on the collection and preservation of forensic evidence in order to ensure that cases of sexual violence against women are heard in Indian courts.

Abstract Labour & Value in Marx’s System (A belated reply to I.I. Rubin)

The essay aims to elucidate a scientific account of value. Crucial to this is the analysis of abstract labour as the source and substance of value. The first part of the essay is devoted to my analysis of what abstract labour actually is. The latter part of the essay draws out some significant contrasts from my analysis, by way of comparison, with the perspective of abstract labour put forward by I.I. Rubin.

Antileishmanial activity of selected South African plant species

In vitro screening of forty extracts prepared from selected South African plant species was conducted against Leishmania donovani (MHOM-ET-67/L82). Crude plant extracts were also subjected to an antiproliferative bioassay in an attempt to determine their potential lethality or safe therapeutic application against rat skeletal myoblast L6 cells. Of all the tested plant species, only 10% exhibited significant leishmanicidal activity with acceptable SI values (SI≥10). The current study is the first scientific account on the significant antileishmanial activity (IC50≤5μg/ml) of Bridelia mollis (Phyllanthaceae), Vangueria infausta subsp. infausta (Rubiaceae), Syzygium cordatum (Myrtaceae) and Xylopia parviflora (Annonaceae). Further phytochemical investigations are currently underway in an attempt to isolate and identify the chemical constituents that may be attributable to the leishmanicidal efficacy observed in the study.

Places of Information Generation: Bridging Pannenberg’s Logos and Deacon’s Emerging Semiosis

ABSTRACTBridging Wolfhart Pannenberg’s comprehensive twentieth-century systematic theology of Creation and Terrence Deacon’s very thorough scientific account of material and biological development and evolution results in an integrative view of Creation from Trinitarian relationality to biomolecular processes. Pannenberg’s understanding of Logos guides the investigation of the progressive unfolding of forms toward the key construct of information generation which Deacon’s theory of emergence explains as selection dynamics. Modeling both space and form as a place where activity generates information synthesizes Pannenberg’s complementary activities of Logos and Spirit with Deacon’s emergent dynamics and semiosis to develop generative distinctions among a field of systems as a key component of a scientifically plausible theological anthropology.

Rationalizing the Permissibility of Mosque Decoration

<p>This paper discusses the subject of mosque decoration and some of the criteria which determine its permissibility or otherwise. Some aspects of the matter are somewhat sensitive and double-edged. Thus, the paper presents an objective, balanced and scientific account of the theme, steering clear of the sentimental aspects of the evidences often put forth by both the proponents and opponents of mosque decoration. The main thrusts of the paper are the issues pertaining to the legitimacy of decoration in general, the subject of the function of mosques vis-à-vis their decoration, as well as the broad guidelines that regulate mosque decoration emphasizing the decoration of the <em>mihrab </em>(praying niche) area and the <em>qiblah</em> wall. The paper concludes that in principle mosque decoration is permissible so long as it conforms to the requirements of the Islamic spirituality and the quintessence of genuine Islamic art and architecture.</p>

Two Comments on Bruce Ackerman,We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution

In his recent book, Professor Ackerman further develops his ambitious account of the constitutional identity of the U.S. polity. He does that by marshaling four mutually reinforcing methodologies: analyzing the history of the relevant legal and political scene before, during, and after the enactment of key civil rights laws; second, developing a legal reconstruction of this piece of history by locating these laws in their appropriate place within the American constitutional framework; third, developing a political–scientific account of the institutional mechanisms by which the American people have expressed their support for the civil rights legislations; and fourth, developing a philosophical reconstruction of the emerging constitutional framework in the light of the theory of dualist democracy he developed in his two previous volumes of We the People . One of the most striking points of the Book comes out of the combination of the two following claims: Private actors, not only state authorities, must recognize constitutional rights; these rights include equal opportunity as well as respectful treatment within each sphere of constitutional concern. 1

On Ethically Solvent Leaders: The Roles of Pride and Moral Identity in Predicting Leader Ethical Behavior

The popular media has repeatedly pointed to pride as one of the key factors motivating leaders to behave unethically. However, given the devastating consequences that leader unethical behavior may have, a more scientific account of the role of pride is warranted. The present study differentiates between authentic and hubristic pride and assesses its impact on leader ethical behavior, while taking into consideration the extent to which leaders find it important to their self-concept to be a moral person. In two experiments we found that with higher levels of moral identity, authentically proud leaders are more likely to engage in ethical behavior than hubristically proud leaders, and that this effect is mediated by leaders’ motivation to act selflessly. A field survey among organizational leaders corroborated that moral identity may bring the positive effect of authentic pride and the negative effect of hubristic pride on leader ethical behavior to the forefront.

Sons of Khun Bulom: The discovery by modern Lao historians of the ‘birth of the Lao race’

The opening of the nithan khun bulom genre of texts is usually regarded as a mythic account of Lao history. But the process by which Lao historians themselves began to perceive this was an important nationalist project of the elite during the Royal Lao Government (RLG) period. As early as the 1920s, Lao authors began rewriting the old folktales into a new, modern, scientific account of the past, the ‘birth of the Lao race’. By studying elite writings in the RLG period I show that Lao nationalism was more modernist and autonomous than previously recognised.

The great enrichment: a humanistic and social scientific account

ABSTRACTThe scientific problem in explaining modern economic growth is its astonishing magnitude – anywhere from a 3000% to a 10,000% increase in real income, a ‘Great Enrichment.’ Investment, reallocation, property rights and exploitation cannot explain it. Only the bettering of betterment can, the stunning increase in new ideas, such as the screw propeller on ships or the ball bearing in machines, the modern university for the masses and careers open to talent. Why, then, the new and trade-tested ideas? Because liberty to have a go, as the English say, and a dignity to the wigmakers and telegraph operators having the go made the mass of people bold. Equal liberty and dignity for ordinary people is called ‘liberalism,’ and it was new to Europe in the eighteenth century, against old hierarchies. Why the liberalism? It was not deep European superiorities, but the accidents of the Four R's of (German) Reformation, (Dutch) Revolt, (American and French) Revolution and (Scottish and Scandinavian) Reading. It could have gone the other way, leaving, say, China to have the Great Enrichment, much later. Europe, and then the world, was lucky after 1800. Now China and India have adopted liberalism (in the Chinese case only in the economy) and are catching up.

The Mystic Science: George Schaller in the Field

The Mystic Science:George Schaller in the Field Lily Huang (bio) In the twenty-five years between 1947 and 1972, only two Westerners personally saw a snow leopard in the wild. One of them was the biologist George Schaller. Thirty-nine years old in 1972, Schaller already had a singular reputation as a field worker. From conducting the first general survey of wildlife in Alaska and following the migration of Arctic caribou, he had gone to live among gorillas in Central Africa and then among lions in the Serengeti. In those studies he had dispelled the long accepted idea of gorillas as foul-tempered man-eaters and given the first systematic account of how predation works on the African plains. So it is understandable that, when he returned to the Himalayas in 1972, accompanied by the writer Peter Matthiessen, to study the Himalayan blue sheep, Matthiessen would regard him with a certain awe. Matthiessen had been told that Schaller was “the finest field biologist working today,” though “finest” is an odd way of expressing all the qualities that, in fact, made Schaller not representative of a certain standard of scientific practice: some of his “data” were obtained by reasoning and some by sheer guts; he freely admitted that his deepest motivation was a profound empathy with his subjects; he had patience for all animals except people. His stay at any given field site was almost invariably followed by the creation of an official wildlife preserve there, and these particular legacies—the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Virunga National Park in the Congo, Shey-Phoksundo National Park in Nepal—revealed his aims as a conservationist, beyond the scope of strictly scientific research. [End Page 358] By the time George Schaller, of Berlin and Missouri, took his wanderlust to Alaska as an undergraduate, the sociologist Robert Merton had written that science had a normative structure, and two of its institutional norms were universalism, or objective criteria for evaluation, and personal disinterestedness. Max Weber had pronounced the world “disenchanted” by scientific reasoning, and with the loss of mysticism had come the loss of ultimate meaning: science left no mysteries, except for the now unanswerable question, “What shall we do and how shall we live?” Schaller’s science was deeply personal, frequently ad hoc, and inextricably bound with advocacy—yet all of this only elevated his status as the premier biologist of the field. Does the field qualify sociological and epistemological theories about science? Or does the best of field biologists show field science to be an altogether different kind of endeavor? Does it take someone like Schaller—essentially romantic, perceived as both scientist and sage—to do this kind of science? Schaller and Matthiessen’s trip to the northwest of Nepal and the Land of Dolpo in Tibet produced two books. Matthiessen’s The Snow Leopard might have been conceived, among other things, as an antidote to Schaller’s, which was a monograph on the region’s wild sheep and goats, called Mountain Monarchs. Schaller was on a mission, as usual, to give the first scientific account of several little-known species, among them blue sheep, about whose evolutionary lineage he had particular questions that he thought could be answered by observing behavior. Matthiessen was overtly on a quest. A convert to Buddhism, he wanted to see the ancient spiritual heritage of Tibet alive in Dolpo, where the Lama of Shey was, second to the Dalai Lama, the most revered of holy men. Matthiessen’s account is heavy with the sense of the hidden life of things. He perceives heroism in his very surroundings, “a blessedness to this landscape,” possibly owing, in part, to “the saintly tread of elephants.” The cicada makes an “unearthly sound”; his own porter wears an “enigmatic smile.” Following the Kali Gandaki, the river at the bottom of the world’s deepest canyon, he imagines its source high in the “hidden peaks and vast clouds of unknowing.” Surely the snow [End Page 359] leopard, the top predator of the highest reaches of the world, was one of the great living secrets of the Himalayas, like nature’s own Lama. If one appeared, it would be an earthly sign of whatever...

Thérèse Raquin by Emile Zola: surgical method in psychiatry - reflection.

There are several novels that pique our common interest, but Zola's ambition to put a ‘scientific aim above all others' in his 19th-century novel Thérèse Raquin provides a particularly interesting topic for collective reflection. After being criticised for vulgarity, in the preface to the second edition of his work Zola justified his portrayal of a gruesome ménage àtrois as being analogous to the ‘analytical work that surgeons conduct on cadavers'. Criticism of Zola's work often focuses on whether he achieves the degree of reductionism and determinism that he allegedly strove for or whether, in fact, his predilections for the gothic and fantastic overshadow the novel's scientific, ‘surgical’ veneer. Similarly, psychiatric case notes often begin with a highly formulaic scientific account, yet on closer inspection digress to read more like a tragic novel.

Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories: beyond inductive risk

The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It maintains that the more severe the social consequences of erroneously accepting a theory would be, the more evidence is needed before the theory may be accepted. However, an implication of this position is that increasing evidence makes the impact of social values converge to zero; and I argue for a stronger role for social values. On this position, social values (together with epistemic values and other empirical considerations) may determine a theory's conditions of adequacy, which among other things can include considerations about what makes a scientific account unbiased and complete. I illustrate this based on recent theories of human evolution and the social behaviour of non-human primates, where some of the social values implicated are feminist values. While many philosophical accounts (both arguments from inductive risk and from underdetermination) conceptualize the relevance of social values in terms of making inferences from evidence, I argue for the need for a broader philosophical framework, which is also motivated by issues pertaining to scientific explanation.

Ontology Down-to-Earth

Hilary Putnam famously pronounced an obituary for Ontology with a capital 'O' (Putnam 2004, 84-85). Without trying to enumerate ways in which I do and do not agree with Putnam,1 I want to consider ontology (without a capital 'O') as a more pedestrian enterprise than Putnam's capital-'O' Ontology. Ontology, as I see it, just tells us what entities and properties there are in irreducible reality. As such, ontology yields a form of realism. The task of ontology, I believe, is to bring to light what is required for a doubtlessly partial, but nonredundant, account of reality.2By 'reality,' as we shall see, I do not mean some artificial domain buttressed by a priori constraints. I mean full-throttle reality that includes everything-all entities, properties, and kinds-required to make intelligible what we perceive and interact with and what survives our inquiries.3 The only appropriate constraint on ontology is that what it includes is genuinely real, where genuine reality is understood in terms of what cannot be reduced to more basic items and what cannot be eliminated without loss.Many contemporary philosophers, however, put further constraints on ontology. I shall consider three of these constraints, and argue that each constraint gratuitously circumscribes reality to fit some a priori conception.4 The three constraints that I shall consider are, first, that ontology is limited to what is mind-independent; second, that ontology includes only what is deducible from physics; and third, that ontology must be expressible in a regimented Tarskian language.Each of these constraints-meta-ontological add-ons, really-is tantamount to a closure principle on reality. Each constraint, I shall argue, severely truncates reality, by excising (a priori) some important part of reality, and hence hobbles our efforts to formulate an adequate ontology. So, an ontology that is governed by any of these three constraints is ipso facto inadequate. Or so I shall argue.After arguing against the three constraints, I shall briefly sketch out my own view, which I call (Baker 2007). Practical Realism has room for normative phenomena that are embedded both in everyday practices and in scientific practices. And, while respecting the deliverances of science, Practical Realism does not take a scientific account of reality to be exhaustive. I offer Practical Realism as a new realism that takes genuine reality to include everything required for an exhaustive description of what we perceive, interact with, and the things that survive our investigations.FIRST CONSTRAINT: MIND INDEPENDENCEThe first constraint, which is almost universally held, is that ontology deals only with mind-independent items. Something is mind-independent if it could exist or be exemplified in a world without minds. Roughly, mind-independence restricts genuine reality to what would exist if higher animals had never evolved.Ted Sider mentions robust realism as a view ubiquitous among analytic philosophers, according to which the world is the way it is independent of human conceptualization (Sider 2009, 387). But consider: Great swaths of reality are ontologically dependent on human conceptualization. Credit default swaps-and other financial practices-could not exist without human conceptualization. The view mentioned by Sider may be ubiquitous, but it is surely arbitrary: We conceptualizing persons do exist and make significant contributions to what there is.Ernest Sosa has said, What the metaphysical realist is committed to holding is that there is an in-itself reality independent of our minds and even of our existence (Sosa 1993, 609). Yes, I agree, there is an in-itself reality independent of our minds, but that reality is far from exhaustive of genuine reality. Indeed, taking mindindependence as a constraint on genuine reality arbitrarily strips reality of most of what is important today. (Just try to describe current events in mind-independent terms. …

Critical Notice: Paul Russell’s The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)

In The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume’s series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life, ’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’”; (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle”; of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Hume’s (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’”; (2008, 3)? Or does Hume’s skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature”; (290)? Russell’s controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Hume’s fundamental intentions in the Treatise”; is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Hume’s irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.

The relationship between local field potentials (LFPs) and the electromagnetic fields that give rise to them.

The relationship between local field potentials (LFPs) and the electromagnetic fields that give rise to them.

A dictionary without definitions: romanticist science in the production and presentation of the Grimm brothers' German dictionary, 1838-1863.

Between 1838 and 1863 the Grimm brothers led a collaborative research project to create a new kind of dictionary documenting the history of the German language. They imagined the work would present a scientific account of linguistic cohesiveness and strengthen German unity. However, their dictionary volumes (most of which were arranged and written by Jacob Grimm) would be variously criticized for their idiosyncratic character and ultimately seen as a poor, and even prejudicial, piece of scholarship. This paper argues that such criticisms may reflect a misunderstanding of the dictionary. I claim it can be best understood as an artifact of romanticist science and its epistemological privileging of subjective perception coupled with a deeply-held faith in inter-subjective congruence. Thus situated, it is a rare and detailed case of Romantic ideas and ideals applied to the scientific study of social artifacts. Moreover, the dictionary's organization, reception, and legacy provide insights into the changing landscape of scientific practice in Germany, showcasing the difficulties of implementing a romanticist vision of science amidst widening gaps between the public and professionals, generalists and specialists.

The Story of Big History

Consilience has long been the dream of many scientific thinkers, best expressed by the desire for a unified theory that could explain essentially everything. Such a desire is based on the assumption that there is a general unity that underlies the various branches of science, a unity that should be expressed by a simple and elegant law of nature. “Best of all would be if underpinning this scheme,” the astrophysicist Paul Davies explained in regard to a universal theory of physics, “there was some sort of basic physical principle that bestowed upon it a credibility and elegance, thus commending it to us on aesthetic as well as scientific grounds.” Ideally such a theory would be best expressed in a “mathematical scheme,” one that could be represented by a single and simple “formula compact enough to wear on your T-shirt.” And even better would be if such a theory could be extended to include not just the natural sciences but the humanities as well. Currently, a group of historians is claiming that it might be history that provides the framework for a scientific and evolutionary account of everything. Big History, so named by its foremost practitioner, David Christian, seeks to unite the two cultures under the framework of an elegant story of the universe, a history, in the words of fellow practitioner Fred Spier, “that places human history within the context of cosmic history, from the beginning of the universe up until life on Earth today.” Big history, it would seem, is not only a science, but the science, combining the fields of astrophysics, cosmology, geology, geography, biology, archaeology, anthropology, and history, not to mention the various sub-disciplines involved, while the “grand unifying theory” is not best expressed as an elegant mathematical