The common view in legal education and practice has been that obiter dicta or ‘the things said in passing’ are not part of the corpus of legal reasoning that is binding, which then begs the question, ‘If so, what is their value?’ This review essay offers a detailed overview of Neil Duxbury’s The Intricacies of Dicta and Dissent, highlighting the significance of Duxbury’s contribution to the literature on this important subject. Against a backdrop of few book-length treatments of these commonly deemed ‘subsidiary’ forms of legal reasoning, Duxbury offers a comprehensive historical account of dicta and dissent in adjudication, and of their varied impacts on legal development. Though falling short of advancing a normative account, Duxbury’s book nevertheless provides a nuanced and balanced description of the natures of dicta and dissent, engaging with the complexities of judicial reasoning beyond a conventional black-and-white approach. In so doing, this book sets the groundwork for any normative analysis of the role dicta and dissent can play in shaping common law principles. It is anticipated that this book will remain an invaluable contribution to the field of judicial interpretation, especially as a necessary, vital resource upon which future scholarship may build.