Husserl's Account Research Articles

Husserl and Schlick on the Logical Form of Experience

Over a period of several decades spanning the origin of the Vienna Circle, Schlick repeatedly attacked Husserl's phenomenological method for its reliance on the ability to intuitively grasp or see essences. Aside from its significance for phenomenolo- gists, the attack illuminates significant and little-explored tensions in the history of analytic philosophy as well. For after coming under the influence of Wittgenstein, Schlick proposed to replace Husserl's account of the epistemology of propositions describing the overall structure of experience with his own account based on the structure of language rather than on the intuition of essences. I discuss both philosophers' accounts of the epistem- ology of propositions describing the structure of experience. For both philosophers, this epistemology was closely related to the general epistemology of logic; nevertheless, neither philosopher had a completely coherent account of it. Comparison of the two approaches shows that perennial and severe theoretical obstacles stand in the way of giving an epistem- ology of the structure of experience, a central requirement for both philosophers' theories. Consideration of these obstacles sheds a new light on the reasons for the historically decis- ive split between the continental and the analytic traditions, as well as on the subsequent development of the analytic tradition away from the structural description of experience. Beginning in the early twentieth century, the idea that our sensory exper- ience of the world has a specific logical structure or form became the basis for a variety of prominent epistemological projects. Most signific- antly for the subsequent development of twentieth-century philosophy, the idea of a connection between the structure of experience and the logical form of knowledge was shared between Husserl's phenomenology and the logical positivism of Schlick and the Vienna circle. But the two schools' agreement on the outlines of the general project of scientific epistemology concealed the wide differences of philosophical attitude and aim between them; and it was precisely on the question of the epistemology and on- tology of the logical form of experience that phenomenology and logical positivism would first publicly diverge, in a dispute between Schlick and Husserl conducted over a long period spanning the origin of the Vienna Circle. In the debate, questions about the logical form of experience in- creasingly became the source of a web of methodological and thematic disagreements concerning the nature of conceptual analysis, the epistem-

Désirer connaître par intuition

The greater part of this paper is devoted to the task of showing that Husserl's account of knowledge and truth in terms of a synthesis of fulfilment falls prey neither to a form of 'metaphysics of presence' nor to a 'myth of inferiority' or mentalism. Accordingly, Husserl's presentation fo the desire to know, his awareness of irreducible forms of absence at the heart of the intuitive presence of the object of knowledge and his formulation of general rules concerning the possible accomplishment of a synthesis of fulfillment, are carefully examined. Special attention is also given to the fact that the determination of knowledge and truth provided by the Sixth Logical Investigation rests on an account of an original interweaving between the thing, consciousness, and language. Unlike in Husserl's earlier and later works, no attempt is thereby made to subordinate any of these three elements involved in all knowledge to one of the others.

Derrida's empirical realism

A major charge levelled against Derrida is that of textual idealism – he effectively closes his deconstructive approach off from the world of experience, the result being that it is incapable of being coherently applied to practical questions of ethics and politics. I argue that Derrida's writings on experience can in fact be reconstructed as an empirical realism in the Husserlian sense. I begin by outlining in very broad strokes Husserl's account of perception and his empirical realism. I then set out some of the major criticisms of Derrida proffered by Dallas Willard and Peter Dews and counter them with evidence from Derrida's texts themselves. I conclude by presenting his account as a variant of Husserl's, which does not discernibly develop on or depart from the latter.

The Relevance of Nonsymbolic Cognition to Husserl's Fifth Meditation

In his Cartesian Meditations at the outset of the Fifth Meditation, Edmund Husserl proposes to sketch an account of how the meaning "other person" comes to be bestowed on certain items encountered in the perceived surrounding world. As he states the matter, he proposes to "discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense `other ego' becomes fashioned."1 An account of the constitution of such a sense is a necessary step in an account of how objects in the world come to have the sense "there for others." The latter demonstration is itself, of course, a necessary step in the larger phenomenological project of showing how the perceived world comes to have the sense it has in the natural attitude of everyday adult life. In introducing his projected account of sense constitution, Husserl presents it as an answer to the general charge that phenomenology entails transcendental solipsism. He judges, and rightly so, that the introduction of the sense "other" adds a dimension of meaning that converts the perceived world into a common world, with the result that all apparent support is withdrawn from the accusation that phenomenology is transcendental solipsism. Unfortunately, his placing of an allusion to solipsism at the beginning rather than at the conclusion of his account (or better still, in a footnote), has often led to a construal of that account as an attempt to answer the philosophical problem of solipsism. Such an interpretation is clearly mistaken. Sense constitution is an exercise in semantics, and not in ontology. Consequently, the account can hardly be intended as a refutation of solipsism, much less a refutation via a demonstration of the existence of other persons. Admittedly, the situation is somewhat apt to engender confusion. An account of semantic constitution traces out the nature of the evidential situation grounding the constituted sense, and hence closely parallels an epistemological account of knowledge constitution. In addition, Husserl claims in his discussion of skepticism in Ideas I that an appreciation of the evidential situation suffices to reveal "the countersense" committed by those skeptical theses that view essential peculiarities of evidence as deficiencies.2 As a result, it is inevitable that the account of semantic constitution should contain, implicitly at least, a rebuttal of certain solipsistic theses, namely those committing a countersense of the sort noted by Husserl. Be this as it may, the solipsistic theses affected could not include the classical solipsistic thesis that questions the existence of other minds, where "a mind"' has the sense of "a private world of representations." The reason is simply that the sense, "private world of representations," can only be a subsequent addition to the sense "other person" being constituted in Husserl's account, and hence a sense available for solipsistic maneuvers only on the later occasion of its constitution. The present essay proposes to answer two sorts of objections commonly raised against the constitution of the sense "other" sketched in the Fifth Meditation. One sort features the claim that the sense constituted in Husserl's account is not the genuine sense of "other subject"--that the proper sense includes essential dimensions ignored in the account, dimensions such as the person's social status and function,3 or the person's radical irreducibility to another person's possible acts of consciousness.4 The second sort of objection centers on the claim that the proposed derivation is circular, that is, that it must presuppose what it sets out to constitute. Here some elaboration is in order. Objections of the second sort readily grant that Husserl is right in his estimation of the nature of the task, that to avoid circularity the projected constitution of the sense "other subject" must begin at a semantic level that contains no trace of that sense--a level Husserl terms "the sphere of ownness. …

Letter to Lawlor

June 14, 1995 Dear Len, I appreciate your attempt, your letter of March 21, 1995, to shift emphasis to positive philosophical contribution of Derrida's texts. And I appreciate fact that your approach is not simply to turn away from Husserl's text and Derrida's reading of it, since you find positive contribution arising out of reading. This is what Strategies of Deconstruction, whatever its flaws, was about-the way Derrida tries to reach certain conclusions on basis of his reading of Husserl. So I am happy to follow your suggestion that we try once again to approach Derrida's contribution via discussion of Husserl's account of retention, and that order to avoid getting bogged down a dispute about whether Husserl contradicts himself, we look at what you call Husserl's definition of retention. I have some difficulty with your line of thought here, so let me approach things step by step. As we all recognize, Husserl explicitly makes use of two different senses of According to one, retention is not perception; according to other, retention is perception. In Strategies I suggested that we can keep things clear by use of subscripts. Thus: 1. Retention is not perception,. 2. Retention is perception2. If we left out subscripts, these sentences would at least appear to contradict one another, and when he shifts from one to other Husserl is careful to write, Here, therefore, an entirely different concept of perception is question (Hue X, 41/43). Retention is perception one while it is not perception another sense. Thus, if there is something perplexing or confusing here, we have to find it qualified version, which its formulation, at least, no longer even borders on being contradictory, as you put it, since retention is not being characterized both as perception and non-perception, not, that is, same of perception, as your formulation suggests. The version without subscripts appears to be contradictory (as you insist), but may not be, while version with subscripts appears not to be contradictory (as I insist), but may turn out to be. In each case, further inquiry is required. Neither of us can rest his case at this point. The same issue appears later your letter, when after quoting my SPEP paper you write the wording (secondary memory `is not opposed, but is opposed' to retention) at least suggests something like a (203). But contradiction is not even suggested once one returns in one of `perception' and in another sense to what I wrote. It is only when qualification is left aside that things sound perplexing way you suggest. But perhaps I am missing crucial issue here, getting stuck on reading Husserl. There seems to be something like a philosophical principle about distinctions behind your approach: why does Husserl use same word? Since he uses same word, then, it seems, he himself sees some sort of relation between two uses (even though he distinguishes two senses). It seems to me that, general, different contexts of same word are not and cannot be irrelevant to one another; they cannot be completely separated from one another. (20243) There might be reason to be a bit skeptical here, since there can be a variety of reasons why same word might be used to express distinct senses. One might be historical background: earlier thought may have seen a relation we no longer feel required to acknowledge. Historical accident can play a role. On other hand, distinguished senses might indeed be intimately related to one another, perhaps intertwined some respects (and therefore entangled, contaminating one another?). While I am not sure about your principle stated with this universality, I suspect that it is generally true of important and subtle distinctions. …

Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude

In this paper I will give a systematic account of Husserl's notion of the natural attitude in the development from its first presentation in Ideas I (1913) until Husserl's last years. The problem of the natural attitude has to be dealt with on two levels. On the thematic level, it is constituted by the correlation of attitude and horizon, both stemming from Husserl's theory of intentionality. On the methodic level, the natural attitude is constituted by three factors: naturalness, naivety and normality. I shall conclude by sketching out a possible motivation for leaving the natural attitude and thus for entering the sphere of phenomenology.

Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism

The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to relate Husserl's account to Fregean insights about the sense and reference of a term. Neither Husserl nor Frege suggest plausible routes to a naturalistic account of intentionality and I turn to Wittgenstein to provide a naturalistic reading of the crucial terms involved in the analysis of intentional content. His account is normative in a way required by both Husserl and Frege and yet manages a kind of Aristotelian naturalism which avoids crude biologism.

An Alternative Husserlian Account of the other

An Alternative Husserlian Account of the other

Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness.

The interest of modern philosophers in the nature of perception has been motivated by this question: Does our perceptual experience provide rational justification of our empirical beliefs? The same question motivated Husserl's study of perception, and he answered it in the affirmative.This book clarifies Husserl's notion of perceptual experience as immediate or direct with respect to its purported object, and outlines his theory of evidence. In particular, it focuses on Husserl's account of our perceptual experience of time, an aspect of perception rarely noted in', recent philosophical literature, yet which must be taken into consideration if an adequate account of perception is to be provided. Perhaps equally important, there is a wave of work in phenomenology (and intentionality), reflecting a synthesis of phenomenological and analytic philosophy, Miller's book is an important contribution to that new wave, and has a significant bearing on contemporary issues in cognitive science.A Bradford Book.

On Intensionalizing Husserl's Intentions

Husserl's account of intentionality rests on a theory of Meanings (Bedeutungen) in the Logical Investigations, and in the more fully developed phenomenology of the Ideas. Both are some sort of ideal meanings; in virtue of their embodiment in mental activity, they account for the precise manner in which we are directed toward those objects which ordinarily command our attention. The distinction between such entities and more ordinary ones thus suggests a comparison with the Fregean distinction between the Senses and the references of linguistically meaningful expressions. (Re. the earlier view: [2]: 139-140; [11]: 17; [14], I, 105; later view: [2], [10], [12], [13]) This is not, in fact, particularly appropriate with respect to Husserl's earlier view. Nevertheless, it remains tempting to view (as I once did: [1]: 107-116) his transition to the theory of noemata precisely as a transition to a more clearly Fregean position. I shall argue in favor of resisting this temptation.