Account Of Human Nature Research Articles

The Pleasures of Fiction

The Pleasures of Fiction Denis Dutton Human Beings Expend staggering amounts of time and resources on creating and experiencing art and entertainment—music, dancing, and static visual arts. Of all of the arts, however, it is the category of fictional story-telling that across the globe today is the most intense focus of what amounts to a virtual human addiction. A recent government study in Britain showed that if you add together annual attendances in plays and cinema with hours watching television drama, the average Briton spends roughly 6% of all waking life watching dramatic performances. And that figure does not even include books and magazines: further vast numbers of hours spent reading short stories, bodice-rippers, mysteries, and thrillers, as well as so-called serious fictions, old and new. The origins of this obsession with comic and dramatic fictions are lost in remote prehistory, as lost as the origins of language itself. But like language, we know the obsession with fiction is universal: stories told, read, and dramatically or poetically performed are independently invented in all known cultures, literate or not, having advanced technologies or not. Wherever printing arrives, it is used to reproduce fictions. Whenever television appears in the world, soap operas soon show up on the schedule. Both the forms that fiction takes and the ideas, types of characters, and kinds of conflict that make up its content can be shown to be strikingly similar across cultures. It has specialist practitioners—rhapsodes, novelists, playwrights, actors—and is governed both informally with stylistic conventions and sometimes formally—for example, by censorship laws. A love of fiction is as universal as governance, marriage, jokes, religion, and the incest taboo. [End Page 453] The question for any general aesthetics is: Why? Joseph Carroll is a literary theorist who has applied his probing mind over the last decade to the origins, nature, and functions of literary experience. His new collection of essays and reviews, Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature, and Literature (Routledge, $85.00 boards, $23.95 paper) looks at literature and literary theory through the lens of evolutionary psychology. At the same time, Carroll's eye is that of an extremely perceptive literary critic. In fact, I would judge him to be one of the most acute and knowledgeable readers of fiction I've ever encountered. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that he is sometimes dubious, or even scathing, about evolutionary explanations of literature that have been offered up by writers whose grasp of psychology exceeds, in his opinion, their command of high literature. His complaints, however, are not to the fundamental notion that evolution by natural and sexual selection have made human beings into the story-loving animals they have become: his adjustments are intended to increase the accuracy and usefulness of Darwin's revolution. However critical he is of evolutionary psychologists, Carroll remains a Darwinian through and through. Carroll holds that the only way to attain a general theory of literature is through an account of human nature that builds from the ground up, from the most basic conditions for the evolution of the human species. A Darwinian literary theory first needs a Darwinian psychology. Once we have a basic Darwinian psychology in place, we can see that the narrative proclivities of human beings, far from being an incidental by-product of the evolved mind, are central to some of its most human functions. The structures of basic motives and dispositions are what would be appropriate for a species, as Carroll describes it, that "is highly social and mildly polygynous, that displays concealed ovulation, continuous female receptivity, and postmenopausal life expectancy corresponding to a uniquely extended period of childhood development, that has extraordinary aptitudes for technology, that has developed language and the capacity for peering into the minds of its conspecifics, and that displays a unique disposition for fabricating and consuming aesthetic and imaginative artifacts." Such a list alone, he contends, would make it impossible to imagine a blank-slate view of the mind, in which the mind evolves in a vacuum, goes onto produce culture, which then gives back to the mind all content and structure. Some of the mental processes that grow from...

A Response to Nordenfelt's “The Varieties of Dignity”

I respond to Lennart Nordenfelt's analysis of dignity by questioning his attempt to establish an objective standard by which dignity can be determined. I approach this by considering the way in which claims to dignity may be contested and defended. This leads, in the cases of dignity of merit and dignity of moral status, to an apparent relativism. This relativism is checked by further consideration of dignity of identity, and in particular by consideration of the nature of the processes that serve to humiliate people. It is suggested that acts of humiliation attack certain competences that human beings develop as embodied, social beings. Menschenwurde may then be articulated as an account of human nature, in terms of the human potential to develop a series of core competences. This account of human nature aspires to universality, and as such offers an objective ground to dignity. This paper is a product of the research project on Dignity and Older Europeans (Fifth Framework (Quality of Life) Programme, Contract No QLG6, 2001, 00888).

Whatever happened to the soul? Theological perspectives on neuroscience and the self.

Traditional religious teachings about the nature of the person, especially body-soul dualism, influence majority views of the self. Following a historical overview, it is argued that a purely physicalist account of human nature is equally compatible with contemporary science and with Christian thought. However, an account that reduces higher human capacities to neurobiology is unacceptable from a theological perspective.

A role for individuality and mystery in “managing” change

This philosophical paper explores why people have so much trouble understanding, coping with and managing change. It looks behind the problem to try to understand its origins. It provides an account of human nature that suggests people are “naturally” capable of coping with change but that we have forgotten how to do so because of our intellectual history. It suggests the pervasive influence of scientific paradigms and rationalism has turned us into conformists who are afraid to trust our own individual experiences and who rely on others to validate them and tell us how to respond. Change makes it difficult to conform because we do not know on whom to rely for validation; we do not know which paradigm is “right.” This paper suggests some current management remedies respond to this conformity problem but others may exacerbate it. It offers its philosophical analysis as a tool to interpret and evaluate such remedies from a fresh perspective.

Working with creative creatures: towards a Christian paradigm for social work theory, with some practical implications

Summary In a previous article (Bowpitt, 1998), I examined the role of Evangelical Christianity as a neglected feature in the historical origins of social work in Britain, arguing that the secular humanist paradigm that came to dominate the profession for the bulk of the twentieth century goes a long way towards explaining that neglect but that the chal lenging of that dominant paradigm may throw light on the recent revival of interest in the importance of religion to social work. The present article seeks to follow up this historical narrative with a normative consideration of what a Christian theological perspective might imply for social work theory and practice today. It does so in the context of an examination of some traditional philosophical difficulties which social work thinkers have encountered with the relationship between the theoretical and ethical foundations of social work. It then argues for an over-arching theoretical account of human nature as a possible way of overcoming these difficulties, and out lines the main features of a Christian theological anthropology as providing just such an account. It finishes by looking at some implications for a Christian approach to social work practice.

The other as fetish

Fowler, Don D. and Donald L. Hardesty, eds. Others Knowing Others: Perspectives on Ethnographic Careers. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994. xi + 234 pp. $15.95 paper. Sampson, Edward E. Celebrating the Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. x + 207 pp. including bibliography and index. $55.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Reviews : Edward E. Sampson, Celebrating the Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. £12.95, x + 207 pp

Reviews : Edward E. Sampson, Celebrating the Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. £12.95, x + 207 pp

Celebrating the other: a dialogic account of human nature

Celebrating the other: a dialogic account of human nature

Melanie Klein and the "Oresteia Complex": Love, Hate, and the Tragic Worldview

'reud's concept of the Oedipus is well known. Well known too is how this complex-particularly as expressed in the myth of the primal horde-not merely explains a little boy's love for his mother but the origins of civilized society as well. As such, the Oedipus is really a worldview, for it is an account of human nature as well as the nature of society. In contrast to the Oedipus I set the Oresteia complex as developed by Melanie Klein (although she did not identify it as such). A contemporary of Anna Freud, Klein, like the Freuds, fled Germany and went to England (Klein's father was a student of the Talmud, her mother the daughter of a rabbi). For a number of years during and immediately after the war, Klein was the leading intellectual force in the British Psychoanalytic Society, at that time the most influential psychoanalytic society in the world.1 She stressed the continuity between her work and that of Sigmund Freud, which may have been a political position on her part. In

Aristotle on the Foundations of the State

Aristotle's Politics shows an apparent tension between a recognition of the desirability of individual liberty and his claim that ‘none of the citizens belongs to himself but all belong to the state’. We can start to resolve that tension by considering Aristotle's doctrine of man as a political animal. Artistotle offers a particular account of the nature of man according to which his specifically human capacities cannot be realized outside of the state. This is not an account adopted arbitrarily for Aristotle's political theory but follows directly from his analysis of substances in the Physics. On Aristotle's account of human nature, man is essentially rational and virtuous and the political theory allows the rational and virtuous man to be as free as possible without intefering with others. Some are less rational and are subject to authority in virtue of this. We can see that Aristotle's theory has advantages over rights-based theories since Aristotle has an account of what constitutes human flourishing, without which one cannot found rights claims.

James Madison and the Metaphysics of Modern Politics

Federalist, No. 10, argues that human beings demand that their opinions concerning their distinctive excellence be recognized as true. This recognition, however, cannot be political. The political realm cannot do justice to the “angel” in man, and the futile attempts to secure such political recognition lead to tyranny. Where does the recognition of one's own humanity occur? The Federalist does not say. Yet it must occur somewhere for political freedom to be regarded as a human good. It is essential for the perpetuation of human freedom that the account of human nature given in The Federalist, which is comprehensive enough to secure political freedom, be supplemented by an account of the human being's transpolitical dimension. Madison provides such an account in “On Property” and in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. These two sources show that political freedom is for the performance of religious duty, which is discoverable by human beings through their conscientious use of reason and should, therefore, be understood to complete American constitutional theory.

Reason, Development, and the Conflicts of Human Ends: Sir Isaiah Berlin's Vision of Politics

At the root of the conflict between Berlin and his critics is a fundamental disagreement over the possibility of certainty and over the relation of human ends to politics. Gerald MacCallum's formalist critique obscures the political question of whose values a free person is at liberty to pursue. Macpherson's attempt to defend positive liberty as not rationalistic is shown to fail because he (a) conflates liberty with its conditions and (b) assumes a rational pattern to human moral development. And Crick charges Berlin with ignoring politics, understood as active participation in the polis. Finally, Berlin's conception of politics as a form of human interaction aimed at creating the conditions of human dignity in a situation where we sincerely disagree over the ends of life is shown to be an effort to liberate us to live life for our own purposes. Yet Berlin's defense of liberty is problematic because it is too skeptical; to overcome this difficulty, a non-teleological yet developmentalist account of human nature and a weakly hierarchical account of human values is suggested.

The Anatomy of Leviathan (review)

,178 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in accord with Thomas on certain important points, but his own theology is more in the spirit of Plato and Augustine. Professor Kristeller's vast learning is at the service of admirably balanced conclusions . Not everyone will agree with all his interpretations; Ficino perhaps did not imagine himself to be "constructing a system of philosophy" (p. 96) since the very title of his work, Theologia platonica, suggests that he continues, with new materials, the labor of mediaeval theolo#ans. And Ficino's doctrine of the continuity of the supernatural life of the soul in this world and the next (p. 120) seems to be completely in accord with Thomas. But the author's very careful scholarly method and sound general conclusions are beyond criticism. Two hitherto unpublished Latin texts are printed in critical edition at the end of the French lecture, the Opus aureum in Thomistas by Baptists Mantuanus, which is anti-Thomas, and the Opusculum ad Laurentium Medicem on beatitude, by Vincentius Bandellus, which is pro-Thomas. Like Professor Kristeller's fine lecture, these new texts are a permanent contribution to scholarship. PAUL J. W. MILLER University of Colorado The Anatomy of Leviathan. By F. S. McNeilly. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968. Pp. 264. $8.50) The one thing about which Hobbes's commentators have agreed is the absence of any significant process of development in the several statements of his philosophic views. This has been most evident in their willingness to use the various texts as a common repository from which evidence for their interpretations could be drawn with little regard for its specific textual origin. Notoriously, no consensus has emerged from such endeavors and McNeilly believes this method of interpreting Hobbes far too indiscriminate. He contends that careful examination of the differing expressions and contexts of apparently recurrent arguments will show, in many cases, not the same argument repeated several times, but several different arguments. And these, properly discriminated , reveal a definite pattern of development culminating, in Leviathan, with a political theory substantially different from that of the earlier works. While the political theory of the Elements of Law and De Cive consists of a series of predictions founded on the known psychological tendencies of men, the theory of Leviathan, MeNeilly contends, is independent of any particular concept of human nature. Rather it is a "formal system of necessarily true propositions" (p. 213) constituting "a systematic analysis of value systems generally" (p. 245). Excepting two introductory chapters, the whole of McNeilly's argument is given over to substantiating this radical thesis, his point of departure being Hobbes's allegedly shifting views on method which are taken to vary somewhat inconsistently in the earlier works among self evidence, conventionalist and hypothetico-deductive theories and combinations of these. By contrast, in Leviathan, McNeilly argues, Hobbes expounds a conventionalist view with "clarity and persistence" (pp. 84-85). When this BOOK REVIEWS 479 conventionalism is combined with the adoption of mathematics as the paradigm of sound science, it leads Hobbes to the view that pohtical theory can be constructed as a formal system of necessary propositions because he believes that mathematics is about the world and extends this mistake to formal systems generally. These methodological commitments then, render any concept of human nature irrelevant to political theory. McNeilly's task in the second main section of the book is to show that in contrast to the earlier works, and contrary to all appearances, the Leviathan's account of human nature is completely neutral with regard to any possible set of motives and hence, wholly formal. Specifically he argues that materialism and mechanism play no active role in Hobbes's account of the passions and that the psychological egoism characteristic of the Elements and the fourth part of De Corpore is abandoned. (Throughout it is assumed that De Corpore was substantially complete before Leviathan was composed; this may not be true of the fourth part, as McNeilly recognizes, but he is undeterred.) The formal account of the passions in Leviathan then is formally compatible with either egoistic or nonegoistic interpretations of human motivation. Similarly, it is argued that Hobbes gives up his pessimism about men as...