Cognitive Account Research Articles

XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief

Abstract Drawing inspiration from a well-attested historical tradition, I propose an account of cognition according to which knowledge is not only prior to belief; it is also, and crucially, not a kind of belief. Believing, in turn, is not some sort of botched knowing, but a mental state fundamentally different from knowing, with its own distinctive and complementary role in our cognitive life. I conclude that the main battle-line in the history of epistemology is drawn between the affirmation of a natural mental state in which there is a contact between ‘mind’ and ‘reality’ (whatever the ontological nature of this ‘reality’) and the rejection of such a natural mental state. For the former position, there is a mental state which is different in kind from belief, and which is constituted by the presence of the object of cognition to the cognitive subject, with no gap between them. For the latter position, all our cognition is belief, and the question becomes how and when belief is permissible.

A Cognitive Grammar account of sentence types in English

This paper provides new insights into sentence types in English, based on Cognitive Grammar. The paper applies three of its theories of meaning to sentence types. One theory is that a linguistic expression is polysemous, having more than one function. On this basis, the paper argues that a sentence type has a wide range of functions that gather around a central function. Another theory is that the meaning of a linguistic expression is best understood in terms of the domain to which it belongs. On this basis, the paper argues that sentence types form sets in which they highlight not only similarity but also difference. A further theory is that the use of a linguistic expression is governed by the particular construal imposed by the speaker on its content. On this basis, the paper argues that the use of a sentence type results from the particular construal the speaker chooses to describe a situation. The aim of the paper is to present a new conception of sentence types, using the tools of Cognitive Grammar. A sentence type has been found to be polysemous in nature, associated with pragmatic functions, and the result of construal imposed on its content. (Kirkuk University)

The Shape of the Kantian Mind

AbstractKant's readers have disagreed about whether, according to his account of cognition, concepts, representations of the understanding, are involved in intuitions, representations of sensibility. But proponents of the affirmative 'conceptualist' answer and those of the negative 'non‐conceptualist' answer have alike presupposed that such involvement should be construed in a particular way: i.e., as the involvement of particular concepts in particular exercises of sensibility. I argue, on the contrary, that it should not be: that though, for Kant, no concepts are applied in exercises of sensibility, nonetheless the understanding, the faculty of concepts, is teleologically internal to sensibility and, therefore, to its exercises. That is, those exercises are per se directed towards the provision to the understanding of objects to which its fundamental concepts, the categories, are applicable, though no act of categorical application is internal to them. This conception of sensibility, available only in light of a careful distinction between capacities and acts, is demanded, I argue, by Kant's conception of a priori knowledge as elaborated in his Transcendental Deduction.

The intensity and connectivity of spontaneous brain activity in a language network relate to aging and language

Neuroimaging studies often either look at functional activation in response to an explicit task, or functional connectivity (i.e., interregional correlations) during resting-state. Few studies have looked at the intensity of brain activity or its relationship with age, behavior, and language. The current study investigated both intensity (i.e., the Amplitude of Low-Frequency Fluctuations, ALFF) and the functional connectivity of spontaneous brain activity during rest and their relationship with age and language. A life-span sample of individuals (N = 152) completed a battery of neuropsychological tests to assess basic cognitive functions and resting-state functional MRI data to assess spontaneous brain activity. Focusing on an extend language network, the mean ALFF and total degree were calculated for this network. We found that increased age was associated with more intense activity (i.e., higher ALFF) but lower within-network connectivity. Additionally, these increases in activity within the language network during resting-state were related to worse language ability, particularly in younger adults, supporting a dedifferentiation account of cognition. Our results support the utility of using resting-state data as an indicator of cognition and support the role of ALFF as a potential biomarker in characterizing the relationships between resting-state brain activity, age, and cognition.

Inclusive (social) citizenship and persons with dementia

This article aims to advance knowledge of inclusive (social) citizenship, through an empirical analysis of the access work of persons with a dementia. Drawing on the notion of cognitive accessibility and empirical data collected in Southern England using a novel methodology of go-along walking interviews with 15 people with dementia followed by a sit-down interview that included a nominated family member, this paper examines how persons with dementia access the outside world. The study found that access work entailed three spheres of activity: ‘access to location technologies’, ‘access to ordinary places’, and ‘consciously sharing the responsibility of access work’. Overall, this article contributes to the growing literature on cognitive accessibility by evidencing the mental demands of access work, as experienced by people with dementia, and need to share the responsibility of access work between humans and non-humans, and state and non-state actors. Points of interest Access to the outside world is important for disabled people, including people with dementia. This study examined the outdoor experiences of 15 persons with dementia living at home in southern England, to find out what access means for someone with a neurological condition. This study found that access work involved ‘access to location technologies’, ‘access to ordinary places’, and ‘consciously sharing the responsibility of access work’. The study shows how important it is to take account of cognition when promoting access rights for disabled people, including people with dementia.

The Force of Numbers: Investigating Manual Signatures of Embodied Number Processing.

The study has two objectives: (1) to introduce grip force recording as a new technique for studying embodied numerical processing; and (2) to demonstrate how three competing accounts of numerical magnitude representation can be tested by using this new technique: the Mental Number Line (MNL), A Theory of Magnitude (ATOM) and Embodied Cognition (finger counting-based) account. While 26 healthy adults processed visually presented single digits in a go/no-go n-back paradigm, their passive holding forces for two small sensors were recorded in both hands. Spontaneous and unconscious grip force changes related to number magnitude occurred in the left hand already 100–140 ms after stimulus presentation and continued systematically. Our results support a two-step model of number processing where an initial stage is related to the automatic activation of all stimulus properties whereas a later stage consists of deeper conscious processing of the stimulus. This interpretation generalizes previous work with linguistic stimuli and elaborates the timeline of embodied cognition. We hope that the use of grip force recording will advance the field of numerical cognition research.

Encoding and referent event influence on retrospective memory.

Previous work from our lab has shown that event structure can influence memory performance. Our work in prospective memory has shown that, consistent with an event model view, performance is better when multiple encoding events refer to a common retrieval event. The aim of this study was to assess the generality of this influence of event model structure on memory by using two retrospective memory tasks. This was done using lists of sentences (Experiment 1) and narrative texts (Experiment 2). The results of these retrospective memory tasks replicated that of the prospective memory task and are most consistent with an event cognition account. These results also suggest that encoding and referent event structures may affect some levels of representation (e.g., the surface form) more than others (e.g., the textbase and event model). Overall, we demonstrate that event structure has principled influences on memory apart from the nature of the materials or the task. Moreover, we discuss how these findings are inconsistent with more traditional theories of memory processing, such as associative interference and spreading activation accounts.

Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion by Patrick McAllister

Reviewed by: Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion by Patrick McAllister Joel Feldman (bio) Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion. By Patrick McAllister. Vienna: Austrian Academy of the Sciences Press, 2020. Pp. vi + 394. Paperback $34.95, ISBN 978-3-7001-8400-3. Eleventh-century Buddhist philosopher Ratnakīrti has garnered increasing scholarly interest over the past two decades. The conciseness and logical precision of his work, which encapsulates arguments from the lengthier works of his teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, make him a convenient window into the last phase of Buddhist philosophy in India. We now have reliable translations of most of the extant philosophical works of Ratnakīrti, and a number of studies have explicated his philosophical views on a range of issues. Patrick McAllister's recent book, Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion, makes an important contribution to this growing body of scholarship by providing not only a clear and precise translation of the Apohasiddhi, but also a new critical edition of the text, and an extensive analysis of Ratnakīrti's formulation of the theory of exclusion. McAllister thereby advances significantly our understanding of Ratnakīrti's views on the ontological status of universals, his theory of language, and his account of conceptual cognition. The theory of exclusion (apoha) is a distinctive aspect of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy tracing back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, which embraces a radical nominalism holding that ultimately only absolute momentary particulars exist. The apoha theory is designed to provide an account of the meaning of general terms by appealing to the exclusion of others (anyāpoha) as an alternative to positing real universals. On this view, the word "cow" is able to refer to all particular cows, not because of the presence of a universal, cowhood, in all the particulars, but rather because the word "cow" signifies the exclusion of all those particulars that are not cows. This theory was the subject of much debate over several centuries both within Buddhism and with opponents from the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā traditions. McAllister's thorough study sheds light not only on Ratnakīrti's late formulation of and argument for the theory, but also on its development during the period from Dharmakīrti to Jñānaśrīmitra. The book begins with a concise discussion of Ratnakīrti's central philosophical views, setting the context for the exposition of the theory of [End Page 1] exclusion. McAllister then undertakes an extensive examination of all available manuscripts of the Apohasiddhi, providing a new critical edition of the text in transliteration with references to all variant manuscripts, which is likely to become the definitive edition for future scholarship. The translation itself aims for scholarly precision over readability, but succeeds admirably in achieving both. References to a detailed outline of the argument are provided in the margins, helping the reader find a clear path through the dense and detailed thicket of arguments and objections considered in the text. The extensive footnotes offer a wealth of references to both modern scholarship and to the works of earlier Buddhist authors and their opponents, setting the arguments into their proper historical context. This goal is also advanced in the fourth chapter, which offers comments on selected passages from the text, tracing key elements of Ratnakīrti's argument through a range of earlier authors, not only from Buddhist sources, but also the works of their Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā critics, often providing translations of key passages. Many other relevant passages from Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla are translated in an appendix, revealing much about the evolution of the theory of exclusion. One notable feature of the translation is that the square brackets, prominent in many scholarly translations, have been printed in a lighter grey. These brackets are used to signal words, implicit in the original, that have been added by the translator. This stylistic tendency has been criticized by some for inhibiting the readability of translations, including Parimal Patil, who emphasized this point by publishing his 2011 translation of the Apohasiddhi under the title, "Without Brackets." While the elimination of brackets certainly aids the readability of a text, there...

Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? by Frans de Waal

Reviewed by: Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? by Frans de Waal John Skalko Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? by Frans de Waal (New York: W. W. Norton, 2016), 340 pp. Frans de Waal's 2016 Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? is an exciting read into the baffling and brilliant world of what goes on inside non-human animal heads. Given the sheer number of studies published in the late twentieth century on animal cognition, de Waal does an amazing job presenting many of them in a highly readable fashion with just enough detail to understand the importance and rigorous facets of the research (or in some cases not so rigorous), but without making the detail overwhelming. The extensive bibliography at the end of the book provides ample material for any curious reader interested in further research regarding any of the scientific studies. Much of what is presented in the book would present a big challenge for any contemporary Cartesians who may hold, as Descartes did, that animals are mere automata. If non-human animals are self-moving machines devoid of cognition, then how do chimpanzees learn to stack boxes high enough to reach objects overhead? De Waal tells the famous story of Sultan the chimpanzee who accomplished such a feat without any prior training or teaching (65). Further, if non-human animals have no emotions, then what of the two bottlenose dolphins who came to the rescue of a third after the explosion of a stick of dynamite (133)? De Waal's book presents many challenges for the Cartesian mechanistic view of animals. Most people today, however, need not be persuaded that that the Cartesian view is wrong. On a popular level the overwhelming view is that there is no significant difference in kind between the cognition of non-human [End Page 309] animals and that of man. It is this view that de Waal himself espouses throughout the book, and for which he provides much evidence, although at times his phrasing sounds a bit like dogmatic worship of Darwin. Nevertheless, if Darwin is right, he is right. And given the contemporary biological and psychological courses of study, Darwin appears to be the most reasonable view. But an older, middle view, between the extremes of Cartesian automata and Darwinian cognitivism has been forgotten by many scholars. This is the view of the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle held a more nuanced view of animal cognition: animals are not mere machines devoid of cognitive states, but neither do they possess all of the same kind of mental faculties that man has—"In all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only imagination."1 In the footsteps of Aristotle, Avicenna and Aquinas also did much to develop a rich account of animal cognition. De Waal seems to be completely unaware of the middle ground of the Aristotelians concerning animal cognition. Most of the case studies de Waal mentions remain perfectly compatible with the Aristotelian tradition (albeit, perhaps in its more developed forms): ravens have cognitive perspective-taking (147–48); apes imitate other apes (153–54); thrushes cognize ahead in gathering food for their young (205–6); rats remember in which part of a maze they encountered chocolate before (211); and wasps recognize the faces of other wasps (70–71). But various challenges remain for the Aristotelian. De Waal provides various cases of what he takes to be reasoning in non-human animals. Many of these cases are not reasoning in the Aristotelian sense: reasoning (for the Aristotelian) is coming to know another proposition from two prior propositions that are known. De Waal mentions Sadie, a chimpanzee who could cognize when a box had a fruit in it and when another box did not: [The experimenters] placed an apple in one [box] and a banana in another. After a few minutes of distraction, Sadie saw one of the experimenters munching on either an apple or a banana. This experimenter then left, and Sadie was released to inspect the boxes. She faced an interesting dilemma, since she had not seen how the experimenter had gotten...

Aquinas on Animal Cognitive Action in Light of the Texts of Aristotle

Aquinas famously held that only intellectual beings can grasp the natures or essences of things and cognize universals per se. Below these intellectual beings, however, were the non-human animals who shared many of the interior sense faculties in common with man; such animals’ highest sense was merely what is called the estimative power. Aquinas’s account of animal cognition has largely been ignored in contemporary biological research, although hopes for a resurgence have been emerging in the Thomistic world. In this paper I seek to explicate Aquinas’s account of animal cognitive activities, particularly by explicating a more detailed account of animal cognitive action as found in the biological works of Aristotle known by Aquinas. I then turn to various contemporary biological findings to show that many purported modern discoveries (like dolphins rescuing a man or recognition of social hierarchies) shouldn’t be so surprising after all. Many such cognitive acts were already there in the texts of Aristotle read by Aquinas.

Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown (By Mohammad Azadpur)

Reviewed by: Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown by Mohammad Azadpur Muhammad U. Faruque (bio) Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown Mohammad Azadpur New York: Routledge, 2020. Viii + 128 Pages. Recent years have witnessed a revival, and even a defense, of traditional, non-modern epistemologies. One thinks of Robert Pasnau’s After Certainty, which shows what is wrong with contemporary epistemology by arguing that the narrow epistemic ideals to which modern philosophers subscribe are unattainable.1 In a similar vein, in his recent Platonism and Naturalism, Lloyd Gerson defends Platonism against the anti-representationalism (the possibility of attaining truthful representations in the sciences) of Richard Rorty by establishing the explanatory role of the superordinate first principle of all, the Idea of the Good.2 In its own way, Mohammad Azadpur’s groundbreaking book makes a strong case for Avicenna’s (d. 1037) anti-naturalist account of perception vis-à-vis some of the limitations of contemporary Anglo-American discussions in empirical knowledge and sensory intentionality. In particular, the book engages in a constructive dialogue between Avicenna and such major twentieth-century analytic philosophers as Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell. Judged from its philosophical sophistication and philological precision, the book must be regarded as a major study of Avicenna that sheds new light on the contemporary relevance of one of the greatest thinkers of all time. Since the book presents a highly nuanced account of Avicennian epistemology, I shall first provide a sketch of its chapter outlines, before proceeding to engage with some of its key arguments. [End Page 102] The first chapter examines Sellars’s attack on the so-called “the Myth of the Given” concerning the foundation of empirical knowledge. This idea itself goes back to the Cartesian dualism of mind and world, and to the argument that the world somehow gives itself to us in a way that we can understand. For Sellars, the epistemological Given encompasses various empiricist views, according to which knowledge is grounded in non-inferential knowledge of matter-of-fact. According to the Myth, non-inferential knowledge is foundational in that it is not justified by a more basic form of knowledge. Sellars challenges this account by arguing that knowledge requires concepts, and since concepts are linguistic entities, an initiation into the linguistic space of reasons is what enables us to establish non-inferential knowledge. Chapter 2 investigates Sellars’s account of the pseudo-intentionality of sense impressions and its relation to the cognitive order. Appropriating Franz Brentano’s seminal concept of “intentionality” (i.e., object-directedness), Sellars distinguishes between pseudo-intentionality and genuine intentionality in relation to both sense impressions and the cognitive order. Sellars’s psychological nominalism leads him to a naturalistic account of intentionality that conforms to his scientism, according to which progress in science leads to a more accurate representation of the world. Chapter 3 discusses Sellars’s scientism in relation to his distinct version of philosophia perennis. This chapter defends the argument that the “manifest image” (i.e., our commonsense experience of the world) of things is real but constantly refined through scientific progress. Importantly, Azadpur claims that Sellarsian perennialism, in tandem with McDowell’s revision of the Myth of the Given, enables us to resist the debilitating effects of scientism on our knowledge of the world. In Chapter 4, Azadpur argues that Avicenna is in agreement with Sellars regarding the naturalistic fallacy of the Myth of the Given, since he, too, grounds non-inferential factual knowledge in conceptual sensory experience. However, Sellars claims that sensory experience is non-relationally intentional, whereas, Avicenna assigns a relational intentionality to the senses due to the intellect’s involvement in sensory perception. Chapter 5 delves into the deeper dimensions of Avicenna’s philosophy of mind and his complex view of experience. It argues that in contrast to the Sellarsian space of reasons, Avicenna’s account of cognition reaches all the way out to sensory impingements (cf. similar views in McDowell’s Mind and World).3 In Azadpur’s view, this particular reading of Avicenna contributes to McDowell’s refined epistemology, as it develops an account of the categorial unity of the space of reasons through modifying Aristotle’s substance ontology. The...

KNOWLEDGE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

ABSTRACTIntroductions to epistemology routinely define knowledge as a kind of belief which meets certain criteria. In the first two sections of this article, I discuss this account and its application to religious epistemology by the influential movement known as Reformed Epistemology. In the last section, I argue that the controversial consequences drawn from this account by Reformed Epistemology offer one of the best illustrations of the untenability of a conception of knowledge as a kind of belief. I conclude by sketching an alternative account of cognition which also provides a different framework for religious epistemology.

Knowledge prior to belief: Is extended better than enacted?

In this commentary, we argue that Phillips et al.'s findings can be used to provide new important insights in the debate between externalists' theories of cognition. In particular, we claim that the results presented in this target article may offer us the conceptual palette needed for a sustained defence of an extended account of cognition over an enactive one.

ГЕНДЕР КАК ДОМИНАНТА АКТУАЛИЗАЦИИ И (РЕ)ФРЕЙМИНГА ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ В ХУДОЖЕСТВЕННОМ ПЕРЕВОДЕ

The paper explores cognitive mechanics of «doing» gender in literary translation and aims at providing a cognitive account of gender as both a function of the translator’s self and the translator’s practical concern, i.e. a meaning-making feature of the literary structure which is to be somehow relayed in the translator’s text. Having initially defined the notions «cognitive dominant» and «perspective», constitutive of the research framework, the author reflects on the instrumental role of gender, integrating biological, cognitive, sociocultural and discourse dimensions of the translator’s activity, as a meta-dominant of the translator’s cognition and discourse, which shapes 1) the translator’s phenomenological perspective, from which the text world is mentally construed and 2) strategic (re)framing of the narrative perspective in the translator’s text. A number of English-Russian translations are discussed to illustrate inherent dynamicity, fluidity, multiplicity, performativity and pervasiveness of gender as a dominant driving translation. Certain cognitive and aesthetic modes of doing and (re)framing gender in translation are distinguished as well. Overall, the research findings evince the urgent need for the translators to adopt and implement a gender-sensitive translation strategy, which is likely to considerably enhance the literary value of their translations.

A Cognitive Study of the NP+de(的)+VP Structure in Mandarin

The article presents a cognitive account of the NP+de(的) +VP structure in Mandarin. By making its syntactic functions and cognitive motivations explicit, it shows that the relationship between the constituents of the structure is subject-predicate rather than modifier-head as claimed by previous studies. Based on the new proposals that the structure is exocentric and the particle de is a nominalizing infix, the article offers a possible solution for the long-debated contradiction between the overall nominal functions of the structure and its constituents’ verbal part of speech. We conclude that a cognitive linguistic approach to analyzing structures in Mandarin can be useful in producing a picture of the formation of the structures and revealing how they are cognitively motivated. This study contributes to the development of cognitive studies on Chinese grammar and sheds light on Chinese language instruction in the long run.

Belajar Bahasa Indonesia Bagi Penutur Asing (BIPA) Secara Informal: Sebuah Inkuiri Naratif

This paper aims to unveil an American couple’s, Andi and Becky (Psudonyms), experiences when learning Bahasa Indonesia for foreign speakers in Indonesia (BIPA) informally aside from their non- formal learning. They were undertaking a BIPA course hosted by a language center running under a higher education institution. The research in this paper employed a narrative inquiry method of research mainly through interview to cast more light on their informal learning of BIPA. From the findings, it was revealed that they perceived informal BIPA learning as important as the course they were taking and they believed that culture was part of language learning therefore in their views, experiencing it at the natural context would be the best way of learning the culture. Furthermore, when carrying out informal learning to support their BIPA course, they hung out to public place to make exchanges with local people, invited local friends to come home and to help them practice speaking, always took a small notebook of new vocabulary list, the visualization of vocabulary through drawing, writing a journal, listening to Indonesian music, and watching YouTube video. Most of these findings were consistent with the account of sociocultural perspective and situated cognition on learning.

How subjective are Mandarin reason connectives?

AbstractStudies in several languages find that causal connectives differ from one another in their prototypicalmeaning and use, which provides insight into language users’ cognitive categorization of causal relations in discourse. Subjectivity plays a vital role in this process. Using an integrated subjectivity approach, this study aims to give a comprehensive picture of the semantic-pragmatic distinctions between Mandarinreasonconnectivesjìrán‘since’, yīnwèiandyóuyú‘because’. The data come from spontaneous conversation, microblog, and newspaper discourse, while most previous studies have focused only on written data. The results show that, despite the contextual differences in discourse from each corpus, the connectives display distinctive and robust profiles.Jìránis subjective. It prototypically expressesspeech actandepistemiccausalities featuringspeech actandjudgmentin the consequent.Speaker SoC(subject of consciousness) is actively involved yet remainsimplicitin the utterances.Yóuyú, by contrast, is objective. It typically expressesvolitionalandnon-volitional contentcausalities featuring the consequent ofphysical actandfact,which are usually independent of SoCs.Yīnwèiis neutral in general, with a slight preference tovolitional contentandepistemicrelations, to the consequent offact, and tospeaker SoC.Only one interaction with discourse style is found: in relations introduced byyīnwèi,the linguistic realization of the SoC varies across corpora: significantly moreimplicityet fewexplicitcases in microblogs, yet the opposite is true in conversations. The specific profile ofyīnwèi, depending on the ordering of the antecedent and the consequent, is robust across corpora. Furthermore, the relative importance of the associated subjectivity features is determined. In conclusion, the study contributes to our understanding of causal coherence and extends theempirical database that supports the claims of a cognitive account of causal coherence relations.

The influence of entrepreneurs\u2019 immigrant status and time on the perceived likelihood of exporting

We contribute in this paper to the scant literature on the factors and conditions influencing the development of different perceptions of potential international opportunities for immigrant and native entrepreneurs in the pre-internationalization phase. Specifically, we investigate what factors influence the perceived likelihood entrepreneurs have of exporting. Building on entrepreneurial intentions and opportunity-based entrepreneurial processes, we propose a cognitive account of perceived likelihood of exporting based on entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the desirability and feasibility of export opportunities. We investigate how the immigrant status (i.e., individual characteristics) and time (i.e., contextual factors) influence the relationship between the desirability and feasibility of exporting, and entrepreneurs’ perceived likelihood of exporting. We employ an experimental design on a matched-pair sample of 108 native and immigrant entrepreneurs in domestic technology-based firms. The results are a unique account of the cognitive antecedents of the perceived likelihood of exporting under different temporal conditions, comparing immigrant and native entrepreneurs. We discuss theoretical and practical implications.

A Preliminary Examination of Derived Relational Responding in the Context of Body Image

Relational Frame Theory (RFT), a contemporary behavioral account of language and cognition, has been offered as an explanatory model of the development and maintenance of body image disturbance. RFT proposes derived relational responding (DRR) as a process through which the functions of a stimulus are transformed consistent with its relation with other stimuli (and absent direct learning contingencies. Conceptual work has assumed DRR to be central to the development and treatment of body image disturbance. This study offers the first empirical investigation of DRR with body-image stimuli, and untrained approach-and-escape functions. Participants readily demonstrated mutual and combinatorial entailment with stimuli they generated to represent their own body image, along with images fatter and thinner than themselves. Participants also readily demonstrated transformation of untrained approach-and-escape functions consistent with that of thinner and fatter body images. These findings provide a preliminary demonstration of DRR in the context of body image disturbance and support further research applying RFT in this area.

Decisions and Structures: A Dialogue between Herbert Simon and Critical Realists

AbstractThis paper compares critical realist (CR) approaches and their applications to management with Herbert Simon's account of individual and organizational cognition to provide an integrated framework for analysing the interaction between human beings and social structures. We establish several important conceptual and methodological affinities between both approaches, such as understanding decision and bounded rationality or emergentist accounts of organizations. Such affinities provide a coherent explanation of psychological mechanisms accounting for agency–structure interplay. With such an explanation, Simon's cognitivism leads to a deeper understanding of Margaret Archer's morphogenetic cycles and reflexivity, and affords fresh insight into David Elder‐Vass's mechanisms of organizational role‐playing. Simon's type of cognitivism is a social cognitivism as well, which addresses and incorporates other social sciences. It allows for a Simon‐CR analytical synthesis, which contributes to the individualism/structuralism debate in social and management research. We propose new arguments for separating structures from agency in organization studies. We elaborate key analytical implications of our synthesis, characterizing, in particular, deviant organizational culture and work division in both morphogenetic and Simonian terms.