Causal Account Research Articles

The Problem of Luck and the Contradictory Nature of Moral Responsibility in the Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

This paper aims to reveal the structural problem of libertarian accounts of free will. It is divided into three parts. In the first part, I formulate the main principles of libertarian accounts from the perspective of their values. I argue that there are two main understandings of autonomy that motivate libertarian project: causal-autonomy and substance-autonomy. Causal-autonomy refers to independency from the factors that are beyond the control of the agent. Substance-autonomy concerns the existence of the substance of self, which is self-sufficient and exercises control over a person’s behavior. I show that different strands of metaphysical libertarianism could be understood within the context of this distinction. Agent-causal theories emphasize the value of substance-autonomy as a necessary condition for causal-autonomy. Event-causal libertarianism considers causal-autonomy to be sufficient for genuine freedom of will. In the second part, I discuss different formulations of the problem of luck. I show the respective advantages of compatibilist position in the context of the problem of luck and sketch the main strategies of libertarian responses to this problem. Four versions of the problem of luck are discussed: rollback argument, promise argument, the problem of contrastive explanation of action and Hume’s statement of the problem of luck. In the third part, I develop Hume’s criticism of libertarianism making this criticism independent from Hume’s denial of the possibility of causal indeterminism. I argue that causal account of action both in event-causal theories and in agent-causal theories leads to contradictory intuitions about agent’s responsibility in indeterministic universe. My argument purports to show that attributions of moral responsibility for indetermined actions are not grounded because person is intuitively both responsible and not responsible for these actions.

Aristotle contra Plato on the Voluntariness of Vice: The Arguments of Nicomachean Ethics 3.5

AbstractAristotle’s arguments in NE 3.5 target Plato’s position that vice is not blameworthy but to be pitied because involuntary, i.e. contrary to our wish for our good—not the ‘Socratic paradox’ that wrongdoing is involuntary. To this end, Aristotle develops a causal account of voluntary action based on Plato, Laws 9, but replaces Plato’s character-based classification of actions with his own distinction between performing actions of a certain type and having a character of that type. This distinction, central to Aristotle’s account of character-formation by habituating actions, allows Aristotle to show how character, whether vicious or virtuous, can be voluntary.

Hayek on the essential dispersion of market knowledge

A key insight in Hayek’s thought is the importance of so-called “local knowledge” in economic activity. In The Fatal Conceit, he states that such knowledge is “essentially dispersed,” an especially intriguing description given that “essential” is a highly technical term from a philosophical perspective. In Section 1, we outline and discuss Hayek’s use of essential as found in The Fatal Conceit and in the process distinguish a “strong” and a “weak” sense of the term. We then explain the importance of this distinction to the theoretical viability of socialism and make an initial attempt to determine which sense Hayek himself might have had in mind. Section 2 explores the “strong” sense of essential in more detail and links it to Aristotle’s “causal account” of scientific knowledge. Section 3 traces the development of the popular and highly influential “empirico-positivistic” explanation of scientific knowledge –an explanation that does not support the strong sense of essential—and concludes that Aristotle’s account is superior. In Section 4 we employ the Aristotelian account and observe that, in point of fact, local knowledge is essentially dispersed in the strong sense and as such inherently defies the centralized management required by all forms of socialism. Evidence that the stronger sense of essential is more consistent with Hayek’s own thought is also briefly presented.

SYLLOGISMS AND EXISTENCE IN ARISTOTLE’S POSTERIOR ANALYTICS

Abstract In this paper I examine how Aristotle thinks syllogisms establish existence. I argue against the traditional Instantiation reading and in favor of an alternative causal or structural account of existential syllogisms. On my interpretation, syllogisms establish the existence of kinds by revealing that they are per se unities whose features are causally underwritten by a single cause/essence. They do so by tracing correlations between propria--peculiar, coextensive features--of the kind in question.

Towards A Logical Account of Epistemic Causality

Reasoning about observed effects and their causes is important in multi-agent contexts. While there has been much work on causality from an objective standpoint, causality from the point of view of some particular agent has received much less attention. In this paper, we address this issue by incorporating an epistemic dimension to an existing formal model of causality. We define what it means for an agent to know the causes of an effect. Then using a counterexample, we prove that epistemic causality is a different notion from its objective counterpart.

On Wolfgang Spohn’s Laws of Belief

This is one of a pair of discussion notes comparing some features of the account of causation in Wolfgang Spohn’s Laws of Belief with the “interventionist” account in James Woodward’s Making Things Happen. Despite striking similarities there are also important differences. These include (i) the “epistemic” orientation of Spohn’s account as opposed to the worldly or “ontic” orientation of the interventionist account, (ii) Spohn’s focus on token-level causal claims in contrast to the primary interventionist focus on type-level claims, (iii) the role of temporal information in accounting for causal asymmetry, and (iv) the extent to which causal claims are “frame relative.”

The interpersonal costs of dishonesty: How dishonest behavior reduces individuals' ability to read others' emotions.

In this research, we examine the unintended consequences of dishonest behavior for one's interpersonal abilities and subsequent ethical behavior. Specifically, we unpack how dishonest conduct can reduce one's generalized empathic accuracy-the ability to accurately read other people's emotional states. In the process, we distinguish these 2 constructs from one another and demonstrate a causal relationship. The effects of dishonesty on empathic accuracy that we found were significant, but modest in size. Across 8 studies (n = 2,588), we find support for (a) a correlational and causal account of dishonest behavior reducing empathic accuracy; (b) an underlying mechanism of reduced relational self-construal (i.e., the tendency to define the self in terms of close relationships); (c) negative downstream consequences of impaired empathic accuracy, in terms of dehumanization and subsequent dishonesty; and (d) a physiological trait (i.e., vagal reactivity) that serves as a boundary condition for the relationship between dishonest behavior and empathic accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Living natural products in Kant's physical geography

In this paper I propose a new account of living natural products in Kant's physical geography. I argue that Kant adopts Buffon's twofold conception of natural history, which consists of a general theory of nature as a physical nexus of causes and a particular account of living natural products in the setting of the earth. Yet in contrast to Buffon, who placed the two parts of natural history on equal epistemic footing, Kant's physical geography can be understood as a second, pragmatic level of inquiry that stands under the formal conditions of nature outlined in Universal Natural History. On the higher, formal level, natural history provides a physical account of time and space as an expanding causal sequence. On the lower, pragmatic level, physical geography provides a causal account of particular natural products as developing within a specific place. I argue that this two-tiered account not only clarifies the relation between metaphysics and experience in Kant's pre-critical philosophy, it also sheds light on the continuity between the method of physical geography and the systematisation of nature presented in the critical philosophy.

Bontly on Harm and the Non-Identity Problem

AbstractThe ‘non-identity problem’ raises a well-known challenge to the person-affecting view, according to which an action can be wrong only if it affects someone for the worse. In a recent article, however, Thomas D. Bontly proposes a novel way to solve the non-identity problem in person-affecting terms. Bontly's argument is based on a contrastive causal account of harm. In this response, we argue that Bontly's argument fails even assuming that the contrastive causal account is correct.

Biblical Inspiration & Islamic Instrumental Causality: Thomas Aquinas on prophecy and the two authors of Sacred Scripture

AbstractScripture, according to the Christian tradition, has two authors: God as the principal author and the Holy Fathers as instrumental authors. Thomas’s biblical inspiration is accomplished through instrumental causality—the theory of causal motion where the power of a principal agent works hiddenly through a lower cause to achieve an end beyond the lower cause’s natural powers. However, Thomas formulates a new account of instrumental causality by integrating Islamic causal accounts within Greek and Christian ones. After confirming that Thomas accounts for biblical inspiration with instrumental causality, I will show how Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard explains his theory of instrumental causality pertaining to the sacraments and how it neatly fits biblical inspiration. Finally, I will demonstrate that Thomas’s formulation of instrumental causality is novel incorporating Islamic influences through Arabic sources including: the Arabic Liber de Causis, Averroes’s two sources of motion, and Avicenna’s modes of efficient causation. The paper will thereby conclude that Thomas’s explanation on how Scripture comes to be is beholden to philosophical thinkers of the Arabic tradition.

Calibration for Epistemic Causality

The epistemic theory of causality is analogous to epistemic theories of probability. Most proponents of epistemic probability would argue that one’s degrees of belief should be calibrated to chances, insofar as one has evidence of chances. The question arises as to whether causal beliefs should satisfy an analogous calibration norm. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of a norm requiring calibration to chances and argue that this norm is the most fundamental evidential norm for epistemic probability. I then develop an analogous calibration norm for epistemic causality, argue that it is the only evidential norm required for epistemic causality, and show how an epistemic account of causality that incorporates this norm can be used to analyse objective causal relationships.

Constructing Causal Understanding in Complex Systems: Epistemic Strategies Used by Ecosystem Scientists

AbstractMoving from a correlational to a causal account involves epistemological assumptions in any discipline. It presents particular challenges when phenomena involve multiple causes, time lags, feedback loops, or thresholds, as is the case in ecosystem science. Although reductionist approaches may contribute to explanatory efforts, investigation in ecosystems science requires a systems perspective. Understanding how ecosystem scientists arrive at causal accounts—and importantly, that they do—is critical to public understanding of science. Interviews with ten ecosystem scientists revealed the strategies and habits of mind that ecosystem scientists bring to examining complex systems. The scientists described challenges in conducting experiments at relevant scales and the epistemic strategies employed in response. The themes included constructing a body of evidence using multiple approaches, integrating results through statistical and process-based models, measuring and describing variability, conducting experiments in context, thinking across levels, considering the limits to generalizability, and exercising epistemic fluency. We discuss implications for K–20 education.

All Hegemons Are Not the Same: The Role(s) of Relational Structures and Modes of Control

AbstractIn this article I adopt a relational-structural approach to hegemonic order, setting out two distinct forms of consensual order, which differ in their modes of control. The central argument is that patterned structures of relational interaction determine the way in which roles are developed, and this, in turn, conditions structural power asymmetries, legitimacy, and authority. Within an elevated hegemonic order, intraperipheral ties are sparse, and a well-connected hegemon has been able to control flows of meanings and understandings. This relational domination leads to the hegemon role-making its own role and alter-casting roles onto its periphery. The resulting role-structures generate hegemonic privileges and pronounced structural power asymmetries within an order that exhibits authority but wherein legitimacy is either absent or exists in the form of “submission legitimacy,” even though consent is forthcoming. In an ensconced hegemonic order, the periphery is densely interconnected, allowing secondary actors to establish common aims and negotiate collectively with the hegemon. Here, the hegemon cannot control role-creation to a significant degree, and dynamics of role-taking predominate, both for hegemon and periphery. This plays out in reduced structural power disparities and an order based on legitimated roles and functions. This relational-structural approach moves us away from the consent-coercion dichotomy toward interpretations of subtler forms of control, blending a relational-constructivist focus on the production, reproduction, and modification of actor-roles into a schematic causal account of how and why roles matter for hierarchy. The two models are then woven into an analytical narrative that interprets forms of hegemonic order in the Western Hemisphere during the post–Cold War period.

Negotiating history: Contingency, canonicity, and case studies

Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick’s determination of the structure of DNA.

What Caused What? A Quantitative Account of Actual Causation Using Dynamical Causal Networks.

Actual causation is concerned with the question: “What caused what?” Consider a transition between two states within a system of interacting elements, such as an artificial neural network, or a biological brain circuit. Which combination of synapses caused the neuron to fire? Which image features caused the classifier to misinterpret the picture? Even detailed knowledge of the system’s causal network, its elements, their states, connectivity, and dynamics does not automatically provide a straightforward answer to the “what caused what?” question. Counterfactual accounts of actual causation, based on graphical models paired with system interventions, have demonstrated initial success in addressing specific problem cases, in line with intuitive causal judgments. Here, we start from a set of basic requirements for causation (realization, composition, information, integration, and exclusion) and develop a rigorous, quantitative account of actual causation, that is generally applicable to discrete dynamical systems. We present a formal framework to evaluate these causal requirements based on system interventions and partitions, which considers all counterfactuals of a state transition. This framework is used to provide a complete causal account of the transition by identifying and quantifying the strength of all actual causes and effects linking the two consecutive system states. Finally, we examine several exemplary cases and paradoxes of causation and show that they can be illuminated by the proposed framework for quantifying actual causation.

Why only the commissioning parents should undertake parental duties in surrogacy cases?

The introduction of in vitro fertilization (IVF) results in a separation of sex and reproduction which has generated enormous ethical debate (Lauritzen 1993). Surrogacy makes this situation more complicated by bringing a surrogate mother into reproduction. A surrogacy case may involve five individuals (in addition to the surrogate child). These are the commissioning couple, the gamete donors, and the surrogate mother. Hence, a surrogate child may have up to five parents, including biological parents, commissioning parents, and a gestational parent. The question is which of these people should undertake parental duty? In terms of the acquisition of parental duty, there are three accounts. They are the biological connection account, the causal account, and the consent account. In this article, I try to argue that only the commissioning parents should undertake the parental duty for the surrogate child based on the latter two accounts. I do not apply the biological connection account because the biological connection account fails to explain one’s parental duty, which I will show in the following sections.

The causal situationist account of constitutive relevance

An epistemic account of constitutive relevance lists the criteria by which scientists can identify the components of mechanisms in empirical practice. Three prominent claims from Craver (Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) form a promising basis for an account. First, constitutive relevance is established by means of interlevel experiments. Second, interlevel experiments are executions of interventions. Third, there is no interlevel causation between a mechanism and its components. Currently, no account on offer respects all three claims. I offer my causal situationist account of constitutive relevance that respects the claims. By situating a part of a mechanism on the causal chain between the mechanism’s input and output, components can be identified with interventions, without the interventions suggesting interlevel causation. The causal situationist account is the only account on offer so far that clearly fits within Craver’s (2007) framework.

Reinterpreting the enemy: Geopolitical beliefs and the attribution of blame in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

How do geopolitical beliefs affect the attribution of blame for violent conflict? It is usually assumed that citizens in post-conflict societies come to adopt official nationalist discourses that fixate on the other side. Yet scholars of critical geopolitics recognize the importance of affect and localized interactions in shaping beliefs about the political world. This paper analyzes how geopolitical imagination shapes Azerbaijanis' attribution of blame for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, using data from a quasi-experimental study in Azerbaijan. Despite official narratives that demonize Armenia, the beliefs of Azeris in the study diverge in important ways from the official line. In particular, a disproportionate number of subjects “scaled up” culpability for the conflict and assigned a significant amount of blame to Russia. Subjects were prone to perceive Armenia as a Soviet-Russian proxy and to view Armenian behavior as subordinate to Russian interests rather than intrinsically derived. I argue that this causal accounting for the conflict reflects commonsense beliefs about how power is exercised, which were shaped by Azerbaijan's structural position vis-à-vis Russia and historical tropes that emphasize subversion, duplicitousness, and hidden agendas. The findings focus attention on how geopolitical imaginations can shape the ways contemporary events, including conflict, are interpreted. They also demonstrate the need to dig beneath the official discourse to reveal the sometimes surprising ways it is contested or subverted.

Causal account of brain network computations driving value-based decisions

Causal account of brain network computations driving value-based decisions

Avoiding Late Preemption with the Right Kind of Influence

David Lewis championed a counterfactual account of causation, but counterfactual accounts have a notoriously difficult time handling cases of late preemption. These are cases in which we still count one event as the cause of another although the effect does not depend on the cause in the way taken to be necessary by the account. Lewis recognized these cases, but they have been shown to be problematic even for his final analysis of causation, the Influence Account. In this paper, I show how these cases led to and remain a problem for Lewis’s Influence Account, and I give a new counterfactual account available to a Lewisian that can handle late preemption cases. What is crucial to my account is that a cause not merely has counterfactual influence over its effects, but that the cause has influence of the right kind. I conclude by arguing that even if problems remain with this account, they will not be problems of late preemption, and the problems stemming from other kinds of cases will be no worse for my account than for other counterfactual accounts.