Accidental Bequests Research Articles

Means testing and Social Security in the United States

AbstractThis paper uses a heterogeneous‐agent overlapping‐generations model to examine the fiscal and distributional consequences of introducing a means test in US Social Security. I find that a means test, that is, conditioning benefit payments on a household's earnings or assets, leads to a higher implicit tax on old‐age resources, but has desirable distributional effects. A 75% cut in the benefits to households with earnings of more than 200% of the median leads to a 2.3% reduction in the overall size of Social Security, but has almost no effect on average dollar benefits. In contrast, a fiscally comparable payroll tax cut leads to an across‐the‐board decline of 2% in the average dollar benefits, despite an increase in capital and labor. A fiscally comparable delay in the benefit eligibility age increases benefits for all, but negatively affects capital and labor. Finally, an asset‐based means test causes a decline of 1% in the average dollar benefits, but has a large negative effect on capital and the accidental bequests left behind by deceased households.

Premature deaths, accidental bequests, and fairness*

AbstractWhile there is little agreement regarding the taxation of bequests in general, there is a widely held view that accidental bequests should be subjected to a confiscatory tax. We re‐examine the optimal taxation of accidental bequests by introducing a concern for compensating individuals for a premature death. Assuming that individuals care about what they leave to their children, we show that, whereas the 100 percent tax view holds under the utilitarian criterion, the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst‐off ex post) implies subsidizing accidental bequests so as to compensate the short‐lived. In a second‐best setting, compensating the short‐lived justifies taxing total bequests at a rate increasing with the age of the deceased. Finally, when the model is extended to an intergenerational setting, accidental bequests can no longer be used as a redistributive tool, so that ex post egalitarianism rejoins the 100 percent tax view.

Bequest motive, household portfolio choice, and wealth inequality in urban China

This paper studies the role of bequest motives in household portfolio choices and wealth inequality using a computable incomplete-market life-cycle model with precautionary saving motives, accidental bequests and voluntary bequests. Calibrating the model to match the main features of household finance in China Household Finance Survey, we quantitatively measure the effect of voluntary bequest motives on the household portfolio choices and the wealth distribution in urban China. Our results indicate the importance of bequest motives in shaping the Chinese household portfolio choices and wealth inequality, and have the policy implication on the implementation of inheritance taxes to alleviate the wealth concentration and to promote household consumption in contemporary China.

Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation

Abstract We examine how the absence of annuities in financial markets affects capital accumulation in a two-period overlapping generations model. Our findings indicate that the effect on capital is ambiguous in general equilibrium, because there are two competing mechanisms at work. On the one hand, the absence of annuities increases the price of old-age consumption relative to the price of early-life consumption. This induces a substitution effect that reduces saving and capital, and an income effect that has the opposite effect as households want to consume less when young, causing them to save more. On the other hand, accidental bequests originate from the assets of the deceased under missing annuity markets. The bequest received in early life always has a positive income effect on saving, but the bequest received in old age, conditional on survival, is effectively a partial annuity with both substitution and income effects. We find that when the desire to smooth consumption is high, the income effects dominate, so the capital stock always increases when annuity markets are missing. However, when the desire to smooth consumption is low, the substitution effects dominate, and the capital stock decreases with missing annuity markets.

Differential mortality and the progressivity of social security

There is a well-established negative correlation between earnings and mortality risk. Using a calibrated general-equilibrium macroeconomic model, this paper examines how this correlation interacts with the welfare implications of Social Security's benefit-earnings rule. My primary findings suggest that the welfare ranking of alternative benefit-earnings rules is somewhat sensitive to differential mortality. Due to their relatively high mortality risk, households with unfavorable earnings histories heavily discount the expected utility from old-age consumption, and therefore do not put much weight on better work-retirement consumption smoothing. Because of this reason, Social Security's benefit-earnings rule warrants less redistribution in the presence of differential mortality, compared to when mortality risk is uncorrelated to earnings. I find that this result continues to hold when household-level labor supply distortions are ignored, and also when an alternative “maximin” welfare criterion is considered, but not when accidental bequests from the deceased are redistributed to the survivors.

Premature Deaths, Accidental Bequests and Fairness

While little agreement exists regarding the taxation of bequests in general, there is a widely held view that accidental bequests should be subject to a confi…scatory tax. We propose to reexamine the optimal taxation of accidental bequests in an economy where individuals care about what they leave to their offspring in case of premature death. We show that, whereas the conventional 100 % tax view holds under the standard utilitarian social welfare criterion, it does not hold under the ex post egalitarian criterion, which assigns a strong weight to the welfare of unlucky short-lived individuals. From an egalitarian perspective, it is optimal not to tax, but to subsidize accidental bequests. We examine the robustness of those results in a dynamic OLG model of wealth accumulation, and show that, whereas the sign of the optimal tax on accidental bequests depends on the form of the joy of giving motive, it remains true that the 100 % tax view does not hold under the ex post egalitarian criterion.

Growth effects of annuities and government transfers in perpetual youth models

We show that in overlapping generations endogenous growth models with uncertain lifetime, the introduction of government transfers always increases economic growth by crowding out the private annuity market and increasing accidental bequests. In particular, if the government imposes a flat-rate consumption tax (which is neutral to the consumption–saving margin), uses part of the tax revenue for unproductive purposes, and rebates the rest equally across agents as a lump-sum transfer, the economy grows faster and improves the welfare of future generations.

The Optimal Inheritance Tax in the Presence of Investment in Education

This paper provides an example aimed at calculating the optimal inheritance tax in a model in which inheritances are used to finance investment in education. Two results are obtained: (1) The optimal inheritance tax schedule includes a threshold, estimated between 2.5 and 5.5 times per-capita GDP. This result holds for a Rawlsian social planner that maximizes the welfare of the poorest individual, who does not leave bequests. (2) Contrary to the result of a 100 % tax on pure accidental bequests, the optimal simulated tax rates are between 28 %, for the case of educational bequests, and 57 %, for the case where educational and accidental bequests interact. This range is in line with existing schedules in developed economies.

Is it really good to annuitize?

Although rational consumers without bequest motives are better off investing exclusively with annuitized instruments in partial equilibrium, we demonstrate the welfare effect of annuitization is ambiguous in general equilibrium on account of pecuniary externalities. Absent institutional constraints like prices and budgets, the optimal consumption rule would have marginal utility increase at the preferential discount rate. In a rational competitive equilibrium where households fully annuitize, the growth rate of marginal utility will be the discount rate minus the interest rate, resulting in a consumption profile that is too flat. Accidental bequests transfer wealth from the old to the young, steepening the consumption profile and yielding a better equilibrium. If households are restricted to Keynesian consumption functions, the optimal irrational equilibrium with standard preferences can replicate observed consumption and macroeconomic behavior, and the equilibrium without annuities delivers higher utility than the equilibrium with annuities. Whereas preceding papers have merely hypothesized that households might engage in socially optimal, yet irrational behavior, the failure of households to annuitize is a real-world example of this. Policymakers should not take steps to encourage more annuitization by the public.

A TRAGEDY OF ANNUITIZATION? LONGEVITY INSURANCE IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

We study the microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of longevity insurance. Using a tractable discrete-time overlapping-generations model of a closed economy we first study different types of government redistribution of accidental bequests in general equilibrium. Individuals face longevity risk, as there is a positive probability of passing away before the retirement period. We find nonpathological cases where it is better for long-run welfare to waste accidental bequests than to give them to the elderly. Next we study the introduction of a perfectly competitive life insurance market offering actuarially fair annuities. There exists a tragedy of annuitization: although full annuitization of assets is privately optimal, it is not socially beneficial, because of adverse general equilibrium repercussions.

A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation

This paper derives optimal inheritance tax formulas that (a) capture the key equityeciency trade-o, (b) are expressed in terms of estimable sucient statistics, (c) are robust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit ourselves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal inheritance tax rates can always be expressed in terms of distributional parameters, aggregate behavioral elasticities and social preferences for redistribution. Importantly, those results carry over with tractable modications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. In all cases, the optimal inheritance tax rate increases with the concentration of bequest received and decreases with the elasticity of aggregate bequests to the net-of-tax rate. The optimal tax rate is positive and quantitatively large if concentration is high, the elasticity is low and society cares mostly about those receiving little inheritance. In contrast, the optimal tax rate is negative when society cares mostly about inheritors. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We nd that for realistic parameters

Endogenous lifetime, accidental bequests and economic growth

This paper introduces the concept of unintentional bequests in a closed economy à la Chakraborty (J Econ Theory 116:119–137, 2004) with overlapping generations. We show that scarce public investments in health can lead to poverty traps depending on the relative size of the output elasticity of capital. More importantly, the existence of unintentional bequests, rather than a market for annuities, means that health tax rates play a prominent role in determining the stability of the long-term equilibrium in rich economies. In fact, Neimark–Sacker bifurcations and endogenous fluctuations occur depending on the size of the public health system.

Accidental Bequests: A Curse for the Rich and a Boon for the Poor*

AbstractWhen accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics, such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance and those who do. The first tagged group receives a Mirrlees second‐best tax schedule; the second group, when its type is fully revealed, faces a first‐best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high‐ability types worse off and low‐ability types better off. High‐ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100 percent, while low‐ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller, as well as larger, than 100 percent, and it might even be negative.

Determining the motives for a positive optimal tax on capital

Previous literature demonstrates that in a standard life cycle model the optimal tax on capital is large. This paper highlights that after changing two assumptions in the standard model the optimal tax drops by almost half. First, the utility function is altered such that it implies that an agent's Frisch labor supply elasticity is constant over his lifetime. Second, the government is allowed to tax accidental bequests and ordinary capital income at separate rates. Quantifying the effect of these assumptions is important because the first has limited empirical evidence and the second confounds a motive for taxing capital and accidental bequests.

Social security reform with impure intergenerational altruism

This paper studies the long-run aggregate and welfare effects of eliminating Social Security in a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model where parents and their children are linked by voluntary and accidental bequests. Social Security in this model with impure altruism has a smaller effect on capital accumulation than in a pure life-cycle model, a bigger effect than in a model with two-sided altruism. The welfare gain of eliminating Social Security system under impure altruism is smaller than that in a pure life-cycle model, and bigger than that in a model with two-sided altruism.

Determining the Motives for a Positive Optimal Tax on Capital

Previous literature demonstrates that in a computational life cycle model the optimal tax on capital is positive and large. Given the computational complexities of these overlapping generations models it is helpful to determine the relative importance of the economic factors driving this result. I highlight the impact of changing two common assumptions in a benchmark model that generates a large optimal tax on capital similar to the model in Conesa et al. (2009). First, the utility function is altered such that it implies an agent's Frisch labor supply elasticity is constant, as opposed to increasing, over his lifetime. Second, the government is allowed to tax accidental bequests at a separate rate from ordinary capital income. The main finding of this paper is that these two changes cause the optimal tax on capital to drop by almost half. Furthermore, I find that the welfare costs of adopting the high optimal tax on capital from the benchmark model in the model with the altered assumptions, which calls for a lower tax on capital, are equivalent to 0.35 percent of total lifetime consumption. Quantifying the impact of these assumptions in the benchmark model is important because the first has limited empirical evidence and the second, although included for tractability, confounds a motive for taxing capital with a motive for taxing accidental bequests.

Determining the Motives for a Positive Optimal Tax on Capital

Previous literature demonstrates that in a computational life cycle model the optimal tax on capital is positive and large. Given the computational complexities of these overlapping generations models it is helpful to determine the relative importance of the economic factors driving this result. I highlight the impact of changing two common assumptions in a benchmark model that generates a large optimal tax on capital similar to the model in Conesa et al. (2009). First, the utility function is altered such that it implies an agent's Frisch labor supply elasticity is constant, as opposed to increasing, over his lifetime. Second, the government is allowed to tax accidental bequests at a separate rate from ordinary capital income. The main finding of this paper is that these two changes cause the optimal tax on capital to drop by almost half. Furthermore, I find that the welfare costs of adopting the high optimal tax on capital from the benchmark model in the model with the altered assumptions, which calls for a lower tax on capital, are equivalent to 0.35 percent of total lifetime consumption. Quantifying the impact of these assumptions in the benchmark model is important because the first has limited empirical evidence and the second, although included for tractability, confounds a motive for taxing capital with a motive for taxing accidental bequests.

Intergenerational Transfers in the Health and Retirement Study Data

Many economic analyses of public policy issues are based upon the life-cycle model of household behavior. The usual formulation omits private intergenerational transfers. This paper considers the possibility of a more sophisticated formulation that includes the latter. We examine 1992-2008 HRS data on inheritances and inter vivos gifts. We uncover an underreporting problem in the data: a household’s financial respondent often seems to understate transfers from his/her in-laws. Nevertheless, other aspects of the data seem very useful. About 30-40 percent of households eventually inherit. Inheritances seem to reflect a mixture of intentional and accidental bequests, with the latter twice as prevalent.

A tFragedy of Annuitization? Longevity Insurance in General Equilibrium

We construct a tractable discrete-time overlapping generations model of a closed economy and use it to study government redistribution of accidental bequests and private annuities in general equilibrium. Individuals face longevity risk as there is a positive probability of passing away before the retirement period. We find non-pathological cases where it is better for long-run welfare to waste accidental bequests than to give them to the elderly. Next we study the introduction of a perfectly competitive life insurance market offering actuarially fair annuities. There exists a tragedy of annuitization: although full annuitization of assets is privately optimal it is not socially beneficial due to adverse general equilibrium repercussions.

Accidental Bequests: A Curse for the Rich and a Boon for the Poor

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population into two groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax a la Mirrlees; the second group a first-best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals will necessarily face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100%. With a Rawlsian social welfare function, the low-ability types too face a more than 100% tax on bequests.