The interest to the stated topic is stipulated by the combination of several circumstances: the experience of scientific guidance of graduate students, long-term participation in the work of the dissertation council and the development and teaching (for over ten years) a special course for undergraduates “The History and Methodology of Legal Science”. The reason for writing this article was the increase of the requirements of the State Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles for the structure of the abstract in the section “Methodological basis of the study”. First of all, the emphasis is on the need to specify each of the known methods used by the dissertator. This provision is perceived only as a signal, a call to increase the attention of the academic community to the methodology of the research. The author of the article analyzes the development of primarily domestic specialists (theorists, criminologists and civil law scholars) in historical terms. In the structure of methodology, along with the traditional elements (methods), some relatively new ones are distinguished, which are part of the academic terminology, such as construction and generalization. As a tool for cognition of law, generalization is found in the abstracts of criminologists but can be quite appropriate and functional in a private law doctrine (“legal nature”, legal regime, etc.). The article pays attention to the objects of copyright for works of legal science, analyzes the updated copyright legislation. The need for clearer regulation of the legal status of such subjects as a scientific supervisor, a scientific editor, a scientific consultant, an opponent, and a reviewer is substantiated. Examples from the practice of copyright disputes arising in connection with the uncertainty of the legal status of the parties to a trial are given. The private law doctrine in recent decades draws attention to the ambiguous understanding of the concept of “legal nature”. The positions of scientists are different, and there is no special theoretical study yet. Civil law will satisfy any theory; the variety of plots is inexhaustible. However, it would be nice to agree at least on the main parameters, preferably at the monographic level. The understanding of the legal nature proposed by S.S. Alekseev could be the starting point: “The legal nature is a legal characteristic of this phenomenon expressing its specificity, place and functions among other legal phenomena in accordance with its social nature.” The generally multifaceted structure of the legal nature of the phenomenon in question seems acceptable. For example, when characterizing a contractual obligation, it is necessary to present it both as a transaction and as a legal relationship. The system of norms governing the relevant relations must also be qualified (branch, institute, etc.). The state of science, in one way or another, requires study and evaluation. Perhaps there is an “academic discipline” within the curriculum and this circumstance also reflects the legal nature.