Abuse Of Dominant Position Research Articles

Implementation of Google Play Billing (GPB) for Indonesian Developers and Consumers based on Law No. 5 of 1999 Concerning Monopoly Practices

This study aims to analyze the Google Play Billing (GPB) policy implemented by Google towards developers and consumers in Indonesia in the context of Law No. 5 of 1999 concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition. This policy requires developers to use the Google Play Store internal payment system with a commission rate of 15-30%. This policy is considered to limit the freedom of developers in determining monetization methods and suppress their competitiveness, especially for small developers who have limited resources. The research method used is normative juridical with a statutory approach and case studies. Data were collected from regulations, official documents, and literature reviews. The analysis was carried out on relevant regulations and related legal cases, such as case 03/KPPU-I/2024 which is currently being handled by the KPPU. The results of the study show that the GPB policy has the potential to violate the principles of fair business competition, especially regarding abuse of dominant position and conditional sales practices (tying). This policy also creates barriers to market entry for new developers and limits the choice of payment methods for consumers, which has an impact on high prices for digital services and reduced innovation and diversity of applications. The conclusion of this study confirms the need for strong regulatory intervention to ensure a fairer, more transparent and competitive digital ecosystem. The novelty of this study is an in-depth analysis of the relevance of GPB policies to the legal framework for competition in Indonesia and policy recommendations that support local innovation and consumer protection.

Competition and industrial policy in the 21st century

Abstract Large fixed costs and (direct and indirect) network externalities generate barriers to entry and high markups for winners in the digital industry. The potential for high prices, low innovation and abuses of dominant position as well as the contribution to rising inequality raise the question of how countries should regulate the industry. The tech giants’ dominance does not confront us with an unpalatable choice between laissez-faire and populist interventions. The commentary explains economic stakes, considers desirable adaptations of regulation in the digital age and draws some conclusions for policy reform.

The EU’s Digital Markets Act: Regulatory Reform, Relapse or Reversal?

Abstract As of 7 March 2024, the EU Commission began to enforce its controversial Digital Markets Act (DMA). This article sheds light on the recent debate. It lists the dos and don’ts of the DMA as well as stakeholder reactions to them before tracing some of the underlying motivations and reasoning that emerge from the EU’s current policy reversal with reference to dealing with abuse of dominant positions in line with Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Following this, the paper reviews economic aspects of digital platforms, concerns about market foreclosure and essential facility as well as appropriate remedies before closing with a discussion of the challenges in stipulating and enforcing efficient rules to govern digital platforms. It is argued that the DMA ought to be rewritten to stipulate clear and cogent legal standards, return to a strengthened system of ex post control and provide platforms with the opportunity to deliver efficiency defenses as part of corporate self-regulation.

Article: Competition on the Merits

This article examines the meaning and contemporary relevance of the notion of competition on the merits in Article 102 TFEU case law. It also considers whether a finding of abuse presupposes that a practice is “abnormal” or amounts to a “wrongful act”. The analysis identifies friction between the old and the most recent case law. This friction was exposed in Servizio Elettrico Nazionale. Seminal rulings such as Hoffmann-La Roche, where the notion of competition on the merits was introduced, are grounded on the assumption that it is possible to distinguish, ex ante and in the abstract, between lawful and unlawful conduct. The case law that followed moved away from these ideas and clarified that whether or not a practice amounts to an abuse is typically a context-dependent inquiry.Against this background, the article provides a structure that reconciles the old and the newstrands of case law and shows that there is a place for competition on the merits within Article 102TFEU. Competition on the merits, Article 102 TFEU, unlawful conduct, abuse of dominant position

EX-POST APPLICATION OF STRUCTURAL REMEDIES TO LARGE ONLINE PLATFORMS AT A NATIONAL LEVEL

The enormous market power enables Online Platforms to leverage their data and economic power to spread into the digital sector. Abuse of dominant position through various means, mainly exclusionary conduct, such as leveraging or self-preferencing, can be seen in the conduct of Online Platforms. Most countries, including international authorities such as the EU Commission, concluded that there is a gap in the law in the context of digital competition and decided to fill this gap through extensive regulation. However, digital life has just blossomed and is proliferating with technological development. Regulating a fast-changing and developing area would harm its character and innovative nature. Therefore, instead of a rushed ambition to regulate the area, which could be disruptive and harmful to the competition, all alternative methods should be considered before taking ambitious steps. In that case, a well-defined ex-post method could become a better alternative to address the competition problems in the digital sector. Therefore, this paper argues that recent competition interventions in the digital sector seem to be quite relevant and effective against competition problems present in the sector. Instead of an ex-ante regulation, which may hinder innovation and development in the long term, an ex-post could be the relevant solution to the current situation.

Modern challenges in competition enforcement and the need for clearer goals of competition law

Abstract The debate over the goals of competition law and the standard by which to apply it have been around, more or less, ever since competition laws were first enacted. In principle, they influence every decision made by a competition enforcer or a court, whether this decision is around cartels, mergers, abuse of dominant position or even advocacy. In recent years competition authorities have been operating in an environment which is unprecedently challenging. Enforcement in digital markets and labour markets, as well as the interplay between competition and environmental policy and the green transition, shift competition enforcement to undiscovered territories. With these contemporary challenges, enforcers are far more frequently faced with the need to have a clear perception of the goal of competition law and the standard according to which to apply it to make enforcement decisions. the need for clarifying, or even redefining, the goals of competition law and the standards by which these goals are achieved, should be seriously considered by the enforcers as well as by the policy makers, who, from a democratic perspective, should be the ultimate decision makers on policy issues. The need for legal certainty presents yet another argument in the same direction.

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RA COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC COMPETITION IN SEPARATE AREAS DURING 2001-2021 / ՀՀ ՄՐՑԱԿՑՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՊԱՇՏՊԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՀԱՆՁՆԱԺՈՂՈՎԻ ԳՈՐԾՈՒՆԵՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԱՄՓՈՓ ԳՆԱՀԱՏԱԿԱՆՆ ԸՍՏ ԱՌԱՆՁԻՆ ՈՒՂՂՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ 2001-2021ԹԹ․ ԸՆԹԱՑՔՈՒՄ

Competition policy has a key role in the development of the economy. The effectiveness of the competitive policy is directly related to the effectiveness of its implementing body, and it is possible to find this out only by studying the activities of the implementing body. It is particularly relevant to consider the areas of activity of the antimonopoly authority, taking into account their role in the economic development of the country. The purpose of the article to identify the vector of activity of the RA Competition Protection Commission and find out in which direction the Commission is moving to achieve the desired result. The objective of the research was to consider a summary assessment of the activities of the RA Commission for the protection of economic competition in separate areas during 2001-2021 based on annual reports of the activities thereof. In the framework of the article, using statistical, comparative and logical methods it’s considered a summary assessment of the activities of the RA Commission for the protection of economic competition in separate areas during 2001-2021 based on annual reports of the activities thereof. As a result of research and analysis we came to the conclusion that the vector of development of the commission’s activities at all times, including the present, is directed towards the application of liability measures to economic entities for unfair competition. And the forms of unfair competition, as it is known, are directly related to issues related to consumer rights and the reputation of entrepreneurs, in contrast to cases of anti-competitive agreements, concentrations and abuse of dominant position, which are the objects of influence of purely competitive or anti-monopoly policies. As a result of the analysis, the following scientific novelty was obtained: in the conditions of the small economy of the RA, the protection of consumer rights is not as priority as improvement of the economic situation, development and encouragement of entrepreneurial activity: by providing the necessary environment for the development of entrepreneurial activity, the situation of the consumer will improve over time. The obtained results can be useful to responsibles for the sectors, researchers, and civil society.

Abuse of Dominant Position in the Realm of the Professional Sports Industry

The abuse of dominant position by sports regulators is a concerning issue that can significantly impact the integrity and fairness of sports competitions. Sports regulators, who are entrusted with maintaining the balance and promoting fair play within the industry, may sometimes exploit their authority to gain an unfair advantage or control over certain aspects of the sports landscape. When sports regulators abuse their dominant position, several detrimental consequences may arise.Competition law plays a crucial role in ensuring a fair and open market, free from anti-competitive practices. In recent years, there has been increasing attention towards applying competition law principles to oversee the actions of sports regulating bodies. This article aims to explore the potential of competition law in preventing sports governing organizations from abusing their monopoly power. It is imperative that the sports industry and the sports regulator function in an anti-competitive manner and avoid abuse of the powers instilled in them. It delves into suitable legal frameworks, examines relevant cases, and discusses the impact of enforcing competition law within the sports industry. The results highlight the significance of competition laws in fostering equitable competition, safeguarding athletes’ rights, and sustaining a dynamic and competitive sports landscape.

Rebates after the General Court’s 2022 Intel judgment

Twenty-two years after the first complaint against Intel’s distribution strategy was received by the European Commission, the saga continues. In January 2022, the General Court annulled the Commission’s infringement decision because it had not shown that Intel’s practices foreclosed market access, but this ruling has been appealed against by the Commission. This paper reviews the General Court’s 2022 judgment, explaining the introduction of a new approach to analysing rebates, its operationalization, and what this new approach means for the application of Article 102 TFEU to the conduct of dominant undertakings. abuse of dominant position, distribution strategy, rebates, market access foreclosure

Qualification of Violations of Antitrust Laws in Parallel Imports of Goods: a Comparative Legal Aspect

The practice of the antimonopoly authorities of Russia and foreign countries in relation to violations in the field of parallel imports of goods has been studied. The problems of qualification of this type of offenses (including in the law enforcement practice of a number of foreign states) in terms of vertical agreements and abuse of dominant position are identified. The authors conclude that the positions of the antimonopoly authorities of Russia and a number of foreign countries are similar on the issue of abuse of the right of legal monopolies for trademarks: a legal monopoly for trademarks should not be a basis for abuse of the right by the right holder and restriction of the possibility of free movement of goods and services marked with trademarks. According to the authors, it is advisable to use the experience of foreign countries when qualifying violations in the field of parallel imports to Russia.

Abuse of dominant position when unaccounted for consumption of electrical energy is detected

The problem of abuse of use of a dominant position by the subjects of retail electricity markets — grid organizations, guaranteeing suppliers when conducting checks of subscriber metering devices, drawing up acts on unmetered electricity consumption, drawing up invoices for payment of the volume of identified unmetered consumption was studied.The concept of unaccounted consumption of electric energy is given, frequent violations by professional participants in the wholesale electricity markets are identified when unaccounted consumption of electric energy is detected. The Review of Judicial Practice on Disputes on Payment for Unaccounted Consumption of Water, Heat and Electricity Supplied via the Connected Grid, approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on December 22, 2021, was analyzed, namely, the possibility of its application by antimonopoly authorities as part of the consideration of cases of abuse of position, an analysis of the practice of applying this review at the present time was carried out. At the end, it was concluded that this review partly determined the necessary changes to the legislation on the electric power industry.

ROLE OF COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA IN PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CONSUMERS

Competition Act is a breed of anti-trust laws which are globally prevalent to protect the consumers at macro level, instead of micro level and also to protect the small and medium businesses from the abuse of dominant position of large enterprises or entities. Every government works towards protecting and safeguarding their consumers. At micro level, one has easy remedy. In case of any issue one can go to the service center and get the issue rectified if it is pertaining to purchase of a product and further can approach the Tribunal under Consumer Protection Act 2019. This protection or safeguard is at micro level. At macro level, business enterprises go to an extent that in the beginning it is difficult to assess the loss or the damage, but by the time one realizes, the damage is already caused. This is where, the Competition Act, 2002 comes to the rescue of the consumers by protecting them at macro level from the monopoly of big business enterprises, thereby favouring competition. The main aim of Competition Policy is to promote consumer welfare, and this can be achieved by setting minimum specifications and standards for safety for both goods as well as services. Moreover, all this can be achieved by establishing mechanisms to redress the grievances of consumers. To administer, implement and enforce the Competition Act, 2002, the Competition Commission of India (CCI)was established. CCI performs advocacy and advisory functionsapart from being a regulator of market in India. Key to consumer welfare is fair competition, which can be achieved through the purposes of the Competition Act, 2020 for protecting and promoting fair competition in the markets in India. The main aim of the research is focused upon the role of CCI and how it deals with the enterprises abusing their dominant position, thereby protecting the interests of the consumers.

Legal Aspect of Applying Price Parity Clauses by Digital Platform Owners

The article contains a legal analysis of the price parity clause. Its types from the point of view of Russian and foreign competition law. A number of decisions of Russian and foreign courts, antimonopoly regulators made on the basis of antimonopoly investigations against owners of digital platforms who used the clause on price parity in entrepreneurial activities were considered. A comparative analysis of these decisions was carried out to identify similarities and differences in approaches to the legal qualification of the actions of the owner of the digital platform on the use of the price parity clause. In particular, in the countries of the European Union, antitrust regulators and courts have qualified the relevant actions of the owner of the digital platform as a violation of the legislative ban on the conclusion of vertical agreements restricting competition. The Russian antimonopoly regulator and the courts qualify the actions of the owner of the digital platform as a violation of the ban on abuse of dominant position in the relevant commodity market.The article also considers the approaches of Russian and foreign competitive departments, courts to determine the boundaries of commodity markets, the participants of which are the owners of the digital platform.

Oligopoly and Collusion in the Colombian Electricity Market

The Wholesale Electricity Market –WEM– in Colombia was created with Laws 142 and 143 of 1994 with the aim of promoting and preserving competition among agents and guaranteeing an efficient energy spot price. However, in practice the market works as an oligopoly in competition; evidence indicates there is market concentration, without reaching abuse of dominant position or price collusion, at least not explicitly. This paper develops a game model with incomplete information, in which there is at least a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with implicit collusion among agents. That is, it is highly likely that, under certain conditions, some generators tacitly follow the price strategies of agents with greater installed generation capacity (pivotal) and hence propose similar bid prices. The empirical analysis shows that scenarios of radical and similar increases in bid prices, for different generators, are a pattern present in the WEM.

Manipulation of psychological health via unequipped data protection laws

The world is growing at a fast pace and interdependence on data is increasing rapidly. The big giants like Facebook and Google are the main holders of data of people with the assurance of protection of it. Privacy of data is the main concern in using it for commercial purposes or other market objectives. In India the right to privacy is a fundamental right. However, we don’t have appropriate laws to protect it. Provisions in the IT Act is the only protection available. If the same comes to competition laws, then there are some problems in using the data for market manipulations. In terms of competition law, the major concern is anticompetitive practices and abuse of dominant position. For competition law the dynamics of protection of data is an entirely different area and forming a threshold to consider the alarming situation is very difficult here. The studies are here effect-based study. As data has become a powerful tool and all the key decisions whether related to economy or social impact are taken through the analysis done from available data.

Excessive Data Collection as an Abuse of Dominant Position. The Implications of the Digital Data Era on EU Competition Law and Policy

Excessive Data Collection as an Abuse of Dominant Position. The Implications of the Digital Data Era on EU Competition Law and Policy

Addressing Legitimacy Concerns in Antitrust Private Litigation Involving China’s State-Owned Enterprises

China’s Anti-Monopoly Act (AML) incorporated key antitrust provisions inspired by EU antitrust concepts into China’s law in 2007. By analysing leading post-2007 antitrust cases heard before China’s courts taken by private parties challenging State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) anti-competitive activities, the authors argue in this significant and original contribution that, despite the AML's enactment, China’s Judiciary has not accepted antitrust Legitimacy. Leading antitrust cases challenging SOEs anti-competitive activities, taken by either consumers or enterprises are analysed, highlighting the contrast with how EU antitrust jurisprudence deals with similar matters. The analysis illustrates how China’s courts have applied key antitrust concepts (such as abuse of dominant position, prohibition of market-sharing; price-fixing; etc.) in a questionable manner. Given that the understanding of such concepts are accepted in over 125 jurisdictions, this raises major questions about the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of antitrust principles in the legal system of the world’s most dynamic economy. That there is an antitrust Legitimacy and Effectiveness problem to be addressed has been recently partially recognized by the State in China, with the putting forward of reform proposals by its antitrust regulator (the State Administration of Markets Regulator (SAMR)) in 2020 in an effort to get major State agencies to recognize the primacy of antitrust. However, these reform proposals omitted reference to the Judiciary’s role in antitrust enforcement against SOEs, even though they play a large role in the economy. The article demonstrates how the reform proposals, which appeared in October 2021 in the AML Amendment Bill 2021, will not solve the private antitrust enforcement Legitimacy problems identified by the authors in cases involving SOEs. Several suggestions to overcome judicial deference to SOEs’ overly robust anti-competitive practices are proposed by the authors, including soft measures that in the long run may be more effective than legislative change. The article also discusses the need for the AML to incorporate a single economic entity test and a collective dominance test in order to give the courts dealing with allegations of SOE anti-competitive behaviour a more comprehensive conceptual toolbox to assist the courts make findings of dominance. Without movement also on the judicial side, the authors conclude that the Legitimacy of antitrust principles will continue to be in question inside China’s legal framework, and consequently the Effectiveness of private antitrust remedies will continue to be weak in one of the world’s largest economies. * Anti-Monopoly Act 2007, Competition Law, China Antitrust, Abuse of Dominance, Price-Fixing, SAMR, SOEs, private antitrust enforcement, Court of Justice, Anti-Monopoly Amendment Bill

Enforcing Telecoms SEPs as Abuse of Dominant Position

Telecommunications industry uses extensive standardisation to ensure interoperability between the devices of competing manufacturers. SEPs, or patents incorporated in related technical standards, are of extraordinary importance in the industry. Hence seeking legal remedies for SEP infringements may compromise effective competition in the internal market and may thus fall within the scope of Article 102 TFEU on abuse of dominant position. In this paper I review, on which conditions the SEP holder is allowed to seek legal remedies for SEP infringement without being restrained by Article 102 TFEU. I conclude that a dominant position is established nearly always through mere SEP ownership, and this dominant position is abused by bringing an SEP infringement suit if the sought remedy has a direct effect on the market access of the SEP implementer and the SEP holder does not have an objective justification to seek such remedies.

Curbing Big Tech's IoT dominance

ABSTRACT The use of IoT products is increasingly becoming part of the everyday life of citizens in the EU. With the consumer IoT sector braced for rapid growth, the European Commission is concerned that it will be concentrated in a small number of companies. The Commission is particularly wary that Big Tech may leverage their large shares on the voice assistants market to harm developing competitors and consumers. The preliminary report of its inquiry into the consumer IoT sector published in June 2021 shows that many respondents share the Commission’s competition concerns. If, after analyzing the results of the inquiry, the Commission turns up evidence of anti-competitive practices by tech giants, it could initiate investigations against those companies to ensure compliance with EU rules on abuse of dominant position. Nevertheless, some experts doubt whether a crackdown on Big Tech would lead to a more competitive and innovative IoT market.

Review of judicial cases involving the competition authority

Analysis of the legal positions of arbitration courts in cases of violation of antitrust laws in terms of consideration of issues: exceptions to the patent monopoly, approaches to proving anticompetitive agreements, establishing the fact of being under the control of a foreign investor, abuse of dominant position, bringing to administrative responsibility in the absence of representatives of the person involved. Target: developing uniform approaches in law enforcement practice in cases of violation of antitrust laws.