S. Callahan is considered to be correct in maintaining (Hastings Center Report, August 1977) that there is a distinction between one's moral position on abortion and the legal status of abortion, but by acquiescing in the discriminatory effects of the U.S. Supreme Court's June 20 decision the force of her objection to this apparent discrimination is diluted by introducing the ethical "red herring" of the ideal observer. If it is assumed that a given group of economically poor women have made it clearly known that they feel subjectively coerced and deprived of options concerning the procurement of an abortion and that they believe they are so deprived primarily because of their economic situation, it is at this point that the ideal observer enters. Presumably this concept is introduced as a way of saying that there might be another interpretation of the situation of these women. If these women could appraise their situation impartially, freely, calmly, and fully informed, they might rather see themselves as being saved from a potentially harmful situation, i.e., a situation where abortion would be effecitvely available to them and a situation where they would avail themselves of the opportunity. Although this writer does not deny that the women can be mistaken in their assessment of what might be in their own best interest, the discussion is obscured and the force of Callahan's earlier comments is diluted by her final statement of regret in that an ideal observer is lacking. Her statement, in this context, is tantamount to saying that there continues to be an ethical and moral disagreement over abortion. Appeal to an ideal observer functions here as a reiteration of the recurring hope for a demonstration of a unique set of standards which are objective and universally binding and, in terms of which, an adjudication of all moral issues would be achieved.