Abductive Argument Research Articles

An Intuitive, Abductive Argument for a Right against Mental Interference

AbstractSeveral authors have recently claimed that we each possess a right against interference with our minds. However, it remains unclear how this claim is to be justified. I offer a novel argument in defence of it. The argument is intuitive—appealing centrally to intuitions regarding cases—and abductive—taking the form of an inference to the best explanation; I offer a series of cases involving intuitively wrongful interventions, argue that five somewhat promising attempts to account for the wrongfulness of these interventions leave some of this wrongfulness unexplained, and show that my proposed alternative explanation, which invokes a right against mental interference, can account for this residual wrongfulness.

AWE AT NATURAL BEAUTY AS A RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

In this paper, we discuss an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God’s creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument’s tenability, we assess the merits of the two main theocentric frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty: (1) taking the experience of natural beauty as resulting from God’s design intentions and (2) conceiving experiences of natural beauty as religious experiences in themselves. We argue that the presence of phenomenological content the fine-grainedness of which exceeds our descriptive and conceptual capacities is better accounted for by the latter hypothesis: experiencing natural beauty amounts to experiencing divine attributes. We conclude that the argument’s theological premise is tenable and, having previously argued for the empirical premise (Porcher & De Luca-Noronha, 2021), we conclude that awe at natural beauty is best explained by the existence of God.
 Keywords: Awe. Natural Beauty. Religious Experience. Divine Beauty. God.

Developing Novel Hypotheses Based on Unexpected Research Results -- A Review of Data Analysis in Qualitative Research: Theorizing with Abductive Analysis

I found Stefan Timmermans and Iddo Tavory’s 2022 book, entitled Data Analysis in Qualitative Research: Theorizing with Abductive Analysis, to be an illustrative, to-the-point guide for qualitative researchers to analyze their studies promptly. In each section, the book brought illustrative examples to make the readers grasp the very idea of the book easily. Moreover, the book’s compilation of abductive arguments of data analysis other than the familiar ways of argument (i.e., deductive and inductive) made it interesting.

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Nursing science as the study of how to reconcile behavioral messiness with clinical norms and ideals

There is no settled definition of nursing science that describes how this field of scientific research is unique. This paper attempts to correct this problem. It uses a combination of historical analysis and abductive argument to support the thesis that nursing science is a sui generis social science that studies how to reconcile clinical ideals or norms that are applicable to practice in nursing with the messiness of human behavior.

Argumentative Scheme for Abduction

Introduction. The paper scrutinizes abduction through the lens of the argumentation theory. Abduction is treated as an argument with a special argumentative scheme. Argumentation schemes are seen as stereotypical patterns of common types of arguments used in everyday discourse. The main issue of this publication is to specify the scheme of abductive argument and supply it with so-called critical questions. Such questions should identify, reconstruct and evaluate abduction in dialogs.Methodology and sources. At first, I analyze D. Walton and S. Yu & F. Zenker’s patterns of abductive argument, scrutiny their advantages and disadvantages. Then, based on the results of relatively new logical and philosophical investigations, I systemize the peculiarities of abduction. The role of D. Gabbay and J. Wood’s model is especially emphasized.Results and discussion. Both approaches (D. Walton and S. Yu & F. Zenker) are not free of problems. However, several recent logico-epistemological specifications of abduction can reduce them. I mean the position that abduction preserves ignorance and presumes J. Wood’s conclusionality relation. This reasoning is weak and cannot be distinguished from other arguments. These proposals and almost unknown (with interrogative conclusion) Ch. S. Peirce’s scheme of abduction produce a core of argumentative scheme.Conclusion. I provide a version of argumentative scheme of abduction with the set of critical questions. Its formal structure is defined as a move from the consequent to antecedent with the investigand mood conclusion while the material side is seen as reasoning from surprise to investigation. Modified D. Gabbay and J. Wood’s model clarifies the controversial aspects of this argumentative scheme. It also specifies critical questions functions since they lose their traditional role of evaluation.

Ought We to Believe the Truth and Nothing But the Truth?

According to the so-called truth norm, we ought to believe that A if and only if A is true. There are many possible interpretations of this norm. What does 'ought‘ in this norm mean? Does 'ought‘ have a wide or a narrow scope, etc.? In this paper, I will investigate one version of this norm and I will discuss two arguments for it. The 'ought‘ in the paper will be interpreted as a kind of 'rational‘ ought that takes wide scope. I will call the first argument for the truth norm 'the extrapolation argument‘ and the second argument 'the abductive argument.‘ According to the extrapolation argument, we 'derive‘ the truth norm from a reflection on what it means to be a perfect believer. According to the abductive argument, the truth norm is supported by the fact that it can be used to deduce many other plausible doxastic norms. If this argument is successful, the truth norm can be conceived as the fundamental norm of (theoretical) rationality (or wisdom).

‘There can be only one’: A response to Joseph C. Schmid

AbstractRecently, in response to an article of mine, Joseph C. Schmid has argued that some traditional theistic arguments for God's unicity are problematic in that they presuppose a controversial principle and conflict with Trinitarian theology. In this article, I answer Schmid's concerns. I defend one of the original arguments while advancing new ones, and I vindicate my abductive argument for theism over naturalism.

A beautiful strategy – bridging the gap between the (aesthetic) perception and (strategic) realization of the organizations purpose

Purpose Recent literature in the field of knowledge management (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 2021) asks for new, future-oriented approaches to strategy that allow us to deal with an increasingly complex world. Thus, this paper aims to build an approach to exploit aesthetics (human’s sensory perceptions and their felt meanings) to sense an organizations purpose and realize it by means of organizational strategy. Design/methodology/approach Conceptual paper, providing a new perspective on the perception of Organizational Purpose. The abductive argument follows Weick’s notion of Disciplined Imagination (Weick, 1989). Findings The main argument of this paper is that aesthetics contribute to the identification of organizational purpose. Thus, aesthetic perceptions can inform strategy to implement a stakeholders’ sense of purpose into strategy. Research limitations/implications The argument presented is grounded in recent literature on the concepts of purpose and aesthetics and abductive in nature. Thus, empirical research to validate the argument would be beneficial and worthwhile to be undertaken. Practical implications The paper presents the idea to integrate the sense of organizational purpose into a corporate strategy to address stakeholders’ value expectations and build more sustainable organizations. By emphasizing aesthetics, the study takes a stand for the inclusion of nonrational knowledge in organizational decision-making. Originality/value As far as the author’s knowledge goes, the concepts of aesthetics and organizational purpose have not theoretically been connected to each other. However, due to the implicit nature of purpose, aesthetics may serve as the matching knowledge tool to work with organizational purpose.

Is Philosophy Exceptional? A Corpus-Based, Quantitative Study

ABSTRACT Drawing on the epistemology of logic literature on anti-exceptionalism about logic, we set out to investigate the following metaphilosophical questions empirically: Is philosophy special? Are its methods (dis)continuous with science? More specifically, we test the following metaphilosophical hypotheses empirically: philosophical deductivism, philosophical inductivism, and philosophical abductivism. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we searched through a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (N = 435,703) to find patterns of argumentation. The results of our quantitative, corpus-based study suggest that deductive arguments are significantly more common than abductive arguments and inductive arguments in philosophical texts overall, but they are gradually and steadily giving way to non-deductive (i.e. inductive and abductive) arguments in academic philosophy.

Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God

Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds, posited by David K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. This assessment will be carried out within the (modified) explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne, which will lead to the conclusion that the existence of God provides a true fundamental explanation for these specific entities. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we have another good abductive argument for God’s existence and grounds for affirming a weaker form of the principle of methodological naturalism in our metaphysical theorising.

The loving state

ABSTRACT I explore the idea that the state should love its citizens. It should not be indifferent towards them. Nor should it merely respect them. It should love them. I begin by looking at the bases of this idea. First, it can be grounded by a concern with state subordination. The state has enormous power over its citizens. This threatens them with subordination. Love ameliorates this threat. Second, it can be grounded by the state’s lack of moral status. We all have reason to love everyone. But we beings with moral status have an excuse for not loving everyone: we have our own lives to lead. The state has no such excuse. So, the state should love everyone. I then explore the nature of the loving state. I argue that the loving state is a liberal state. It won’t interfere in its citizens’ personal spheres. It is a democratic state. It will adopt its citizens’ ends as its own. It is a welfare state. It will be devoted to its citizens’ well-being. And it is an egalitarian state. It will treat all its citizens equally. This constitutes a powerful third argument, an abductive argument, for the ideal of the loving state.

Philosophical reasoning about science: a quantitative, digital study

In this paper, we set out to investigate the following question: if science relies heavily on induction, does philosophy of science rely heavily on induction as well? Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 14,199) in order to answer this question empirically. If philosophy of science relies heavily on induction, just as science supposedly does, then we would expect to find significantly more inductive arguments than deductive arguments and abductive arguments in the published works of philosophers of science. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we search through our corpus to find patterns of argumentation. Overall, the results of our study suggest that philosophers of science do rely on inductive inference. But induction may not be as foundational to philosophy of science as it is thought to be for science, given that philosophers of science make significantly more deductive arguments than inductive arguments. Interestingly, our results also suggest that philosophers of science do not rely on abductive arguments all that much, even though philosophers of science consider abduction to be a cornerstone of scientific methodology.

Philosophy’s gender gap and argumentative arena: an empirical study

While the empirical evidence pointing to a gender gap in professional, academic philosophy in the English-speaking world is widely accepted, explanations of this gap are less so. In this paper, we aim to make a modest contribution to the literature on the gender gap in academic philosophy by taking a quantitative, corpus-based empirical approach. Since some philosophers have suggested that it may be the argumentative, “logic-chopping,” and “paradox-mongering” nature of academic philosophy that explains the underrepresentation of women in the discipline, our research questions are the following: Do men and women philosophers make different types of arguments in their published works? If so, which ones and with what frequency? Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database in order to answer these questions empirically. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we search through our corpus to find patterns of argumentation. Overall, the results of our empirical study suggest that women philosophers make deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments in their published works just as much as male philosophers do, with no statistically significant differences in the proportions of those arguments relative to each philosopher’s body of work.

From a Necessary Being to a Perfect Being: A Reply to Byerly

Cosmological arguments for God typically have two stages. The first stage argues for a first cause or a necessary being, and the second stage argues from there to God. T. Ryan Byerly offers a simple, abductive argument for the second stage where the best explanation for why the being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. The reasoning behind this argument is that universal generalizations explain observations of their instances; for example, the universal generalization that all ravens are black explains why some particular raven is observed to be black. Similarly, the fact that a being has all perfections explains why we find the being to have necessary existence. I distinguish between two readings of Byerly’s proposed theistic explanation, and conclude that his explanation does not offer an advantage to the theist in either case.

A Nominalist Alternative to Reference by Abstraction.

In his recent book Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo (2018) argues for the existence of a hierarchy of abstract objects, sufficient to model ZFC, via a novel and highly interesting argument that relies on a process called dynamic abstraction. This paper presents a way for a nominalist, someone opposed to the existence of abstract objects, to avoid Linnebo's conclusion by rejecting his claim that certain abstraction principles are sufficient for reference (RBA). Section 1 of the paper explains Linnebo's argument for RBA. It offers a reading of Linnebo's work upon which he has two arguments for RBA: one deductive and one abductive, and argues that whilst the deductive argument is unsound the abductive one is prima facie plausible. The nominalist must therefore find a way to respond to the abductive argument. Section 2 outlines just such a response, by offering an alternative explanation of the cases Linnebo wishes to argue from. Most interestingly, it shows that abstraction in Linnebo's most difficult case (the "reference to ordinary bodies" case) can be achieved using mereological means, rather than relying on RBA.

AWE AT NATURAL BEAUTY AS DEFEASIBLE EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD,

In this paper, we present an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God’s creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main naturalistic frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty, Wilson's biophilia hypothesis, and Keltner and Haidt's prototype approach to awe. We show shortcomings of both accounts in explaining the relevant experiences and argue that the reliance of these accounts on an adaptationist reading of our aesthetic appreciation of nature entails a commitment to questionable hidden premises: that affordances themselves can figure in the subject's perceptual experience, and that experiences of awe have adaptive value. We maintain that the argument's “empirical” premise is tenable and conclude with directions for future research regarding the argument's “theological” premise.

The Territories of Human Reason: Science and Theology in an Age of Multiple Rationalities

The Territories of Human Reason: Science and Theology in an Age of Multiple Rationalities

Deductive and abductive argumentation based on information graphs

In this paper, we propose an argumentation formalism that allows for both deductive and abductive argumentation, where ‘deduction’ is used as an umbrella term for both defeasible and strict ‘forward’ inference. Our formalism is based on an extended version of our previously proposed information graph (IG) formalism, which provides a precise account of the interplay between deductive and abductive inference and causal and evidential information. In the current version, we consider additional types of information such as abstractions which allow domain experts to be more expressive in stating their knowledge, where we identify and impose constraints on the types of inferences that may be performed with the different types of information. A new notion of attack is defined that captures a crucial aspect of abductive reasoning, namely that of competition between abductively inferred alternative explanations. Our argumentation formalism generates an abstract argumentation framework and thus allows arguments to be formally evaluated. We prove that instantiations of our argumentation formalism satisfy key rationality postulates.

Methodological Naturalism and Reflexivity Requirement

Methodological naturalists regard scientific method as the only effective way of acquiring knowledge. Quite the contrary, traditional analytic philosophers reject employing scientific method in philosophy as illegitimate unless it is justified by the traditional methods. One of their attacks on methodological naturalism is the objection that it is either incoherent or viciously circular: any argument that may be offered for methodological naturalism either employs a priori methods or involves a vicious circle that ensues from employing the very method that the argument is aimed to show its credentials. The charge of circularity has also been brought against the naturalistic arguments for specific scientific methods; like the inductive argument for induction and the abductive argument for the inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I respond to the charge of circularity using a meta-methodological rule that I call ‘reflexivity requirement.’ Giving two examples of philosophical works, I illustrate how the requirement has already been considered to be necessary for self-referential theories. At the end, I put forward a meta-philosophical explanation of the naturalism-traditionalism debate over the legitimate method of philosophy.