Abstract
AbstractIt is an undoubted fact that neuroscientific models of explanation play a crucial role in the realms of science and public life. Besides some noteworthy theoretical problems (unserious experimental set-ups, mis- or overinterpretation, illegitimate analogies, etc.) there are also practical problems concerning the neuroscientific explanation monopoly. To bring those problems to light, it is reasonable to concentrate on a specific and currently prominent version of modelling – namely that undertaken by so-called biological psychiatry. In this article, it will be shown that the controversy concerning biological psychiatry is often guided by several misunderstandings and wrong-headed accusations. The article starts by giving a minimal definition of biological psychiatry which can be used as a common ground for further argumentation. It differentiates three subprojects of biological psychiatry and examines their risks and potentials in more detail. In sum, the article argues for a nuanced attitude towards biological psychiatry: If we are concerned with diagnostic practices and biological underpinnings of mental illnesses we are well-informed by the methods of biological psychiatry. However, if we want to know something about the nature of mental illnesses, we should imagine other projects which are theoretically much better equipped to answer ontological questions.
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