Abstract

Abstract In this paper we study the existence of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in finitely repeated n-player games. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a linear relation to be enforceable by a ZD strategy in finitely repeated n-player social dilemmas. The finite number of repetitions is modeled by a so-called discount factor (0

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