Zehn Jahre „Frühwarnsystem“ in der Europäischen Union: Ein wirksames Instrument der Subsidiaritätskontrolle?

Abstract

After having played a minor role in European politics for a long time, national parliaments were empowered to “guardians of subsidiarity” under the Lisbon Treaty. This article scrutinizes whether they have succeeded in influencing European Union legislation with reasoned opinions over the past ten years. A statistical analysis of all opinions up to 2020 shows that the Commission recalls draft legislative acts significantly more often after receiving at least one reprimand. A comparison of the parliamentary chambers suggests that these withdrawal decisions were not driven by strategic considerations such as a member state's voting weight in the Council. Both indicate that the “Early Warning System” works better in practice than previously assumed. This result should encourage members of national parliaments to make more active use of this instrument of subsidiarity control.