Abstract
Abstract This article contains a critical reflection of the neuroscientific research of Benjamin Libet which claims that free will does not exist and that it is your brain and not you that takes decisions. The Libetian style research on free will is characterised by a conceptual reduction of free will, a perpetuation of dualistic thinking and the ontological emaciation of free will as a mechanistic action instead of as a complex process. The underlying philosophical and metaphysical assumptions of Libetian research is critically analysed with the verdict that it is not about free will and that it does not in any way addresses the complex nature of free will in humans. Viewed against an alternative neuroscientific perspective on free will, three astonishing features of these studies are highlighted in conclusion.
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