X—Natural Powers and Human Abilities

Abstract

of the commonest and most legitimate usages of the phrases 'could' and 'could not' is to express a difference, which often really does hold, between two things, neither of which did actually happen... I could have walked a mile in 2o minutes this morning, but I certainly could have run two miles in 5 minutes. I did not, in fact, do either of these two things; but it is pure nonsense to say that the mere fact that I did not, does away with the distinction between them, which I express by saying that the one was within my powers, whereas the other was not (G. E. Moore, Ethics, p. 206). But the stillvexed question is what this sense of 'can' is, how it is to be understood, and especially, whether it can be understood in such a way as to reconcile the apparently conflicting claims of causal determinism and human freedom. One such 'can' is the 'can' which ascribes powers to inaminate objects (This car can do 70mph) or abilities to human agents (This man can swim), for it is clear enough that things can possess powers and agents abilities even when they are actually exercising those powers and abilities. I want to sketch an account of this 'can'-and it will be merely a sketch, a contribution to current discussion, a precise analysis-which will bring out the essential similarity, though also some difference, between powers and abilities, as well as indicating that this is the 'can' crucial to the free will debate. The verbal distinction between 'natural power' and 'human ability' is, of course, mere terminology on my part, and nothing crucial to my argument should turn on it.