6. The Future of a Verse and Concluding Thoughts

The Thomist 70 (2006): 155-201 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS: RHONHEIMER, PINCKAERS, McALEER MATTHEW LEVERING Ave Maria University Naples, Florida THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS of natural inclinations looms large in any Thomistic account of the natural law. Aquinas's presentation of the content of the natural law depends significantly upon his understanding of natural inclinations. Inclination, he observes, arises out of the convertibility of being and good. As he states, "Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good."1 Whether the practical reason discerns or constitutes the natural law hinges, first and foremost, on the nature of this dynamism toward the good that belongs to the created teleology of the never-neutral creature. Aquinas defines this dynamism toward the good as "the first principle in the practical reason," from which follows "the first precept of law, that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided."2 He unfolds this natural inclination toward the good by specifying four further natural inclinations, arranged in an ontological hierarchy, each of which expresses an aspect of the natural inclination toward the human good. These hierarchically ordered natural inclinations are the teleologies inscribed by 1 STh I-II, q. 94, a. 2. 2 Ibid. 155 156 MATTHEW LEVERING creation in human nature. They compass the vegetative, animal, and spiritual components of the one human soul. The precepts of the natural law, that is to say, what reason "naturally apprehends as man's good,"3 are all based in this created teleological structure of natural inclinations toward ends. As Aquinas puts it, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence ... all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of the natural law.4 Natural inclinations and reason's apprehension of the precepts of natural law belong to the same teleological ordering of the human being as created. If this is so, certain questions arise. How does the natural law arise in the human person? How do freedom and the natural inclinations relate? How should the rational character of natural law be described? Is natural law discerned by human reason as a normative order inscribed in nature? Or is natural law constituted by the judgments of practical reason, which transform and elevate (humanize) inclinations found in nature by reorienting these inclinations to the personal ends known by spiritual creatures? In pondering these questions, I will survey three recent accounts of natural law and natural inclinations, by Martin Rhonheimer , Servais Pinckaers, and Graham McAleer respectively. Each of these authors treats Aquinas's discussion in some detail. Examination of the three approaches will illumine how differently Catholic thinkers have approached the relationship of natural law and natural inclinations. Rhonheimer emphasizes the independence or freedom of practical reason in constituting the natural law from the data provided by the natural inclinations. He desires to affirm the fully personal and free activity of human beings in working out their own salvation through practical reason and 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL INCLINATIONS 157 moral action. Pinckaers argues that a nominalist understanding of "nature" places nature in conflict with reason and thereby undercuts Aquinas's theology of the natural law. For this reason Pinckaers devotes significant effort to retrieving a positive account of the natural inclinations. Lastly, McAleer begins with the metaphysical and teleological structure of human bodiliness, so as to locate the natural law within an ecstatic framework adequate to the human person's participation in God. With its emphasis on the constitutive role of practical reason, Rhonheimer's approach to natural law and natural inclinations possesses similarities to that of the "new natural law theory" proposed by Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Robert George, and others.5 Pinckaers, for...

Reviewed by: Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts by Steven J. Jensen Stephen L. Brock Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts. By Steven J. Jensen. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015. Pp. ix + 238. $34.95 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8132-2733-7. This important book is an account of how we know the natural law. It aims to be substantially Thomistic. This means, first and foremost, that it bases the knowledge of natural law on a knowledge of nature. Of course, many secular ethicists find no value in nature (as they conceive it) and reject the very idea of natural law. But for a while now, some Catholic moralists have been trying to save natural law by denaturing it, that is, by disengaging the knowledge of it from knowledge of nature. Jensen finds the upshot partly mystifying, partly just confused. His main target is the New Natural Law theory (hereafter NNL) of Germain Grisez and John Finnis, with its hard is-ought dichotomy, its wide disconnect between practical and speculative reason, and its flat denial of a single final human end. Jensen also works to forestall the charges of physicalism that Martin Rhonheimer might raise. Jensen lays out his argument in ten very logically structured chapters, and he executes it with his typical blend of clarity, pedagogical skill, and gentle irony. He is very deft at dealing with the side issues that emerge along the way without losing or entangling the main thread. Besides Aquinas and a few Thomists, he draws a good deal on Peter Geach and even more on Phillipa Foot. It is a handsome volume. I have one small editorial gripe: views are sometimes ascribed to authors without documentation. To me, the utility of such documentation would have offset the extra bits of clutter. Chapter 1 presents the issues. Chapter 2 studies the relevant lines of Thomas's famous natural-law text Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Jensen finds that it makes knowledge of goods a function of knowledge of natural inclinations. He also gathers from it various ways in which one piece of knowledge can be a function of, or directly derive from, another. Syllogistic derivation is only one way. So even if, as NNL theorists insist, conclusions containing ought cannot derive from premises lacking it, ought-judgments may still derive, quite rationally, from is-judgments. The rest of the book is about how we move from inclinations to goods, from goods to oughts, and from oughts to actions. Jensen frames it all, very effectively, in terms of the four types of knowledge that Thomas distinguishes in STh I, q. 14, a. 16: purely speculative, practical in matter but speculative in mode (Jensen calls this materially practical), practical also in mode but not in end (virtually practical), and practical also in end (fully practical). So, first, Jensen works to identify a purely speculative knowledge underlying the knowledge of natural-law precepts. It is some sort of knowledge of some sort of natural inclinations. Thomas is not too explicit about either sort, and Jensen is cautious, devoting three chapters to the matter. Eventually he centers [End Page 130] on a text that seems to tie at least some knowledge of human good to a grasp of the intellect's intrinsic, nonconscious inclination toward truth. His own thesis is that the knowledge of the human good as a whole, upon which rests the knowledge of natural law as a whole, derives from knowledge of the nonconscious inclinations of our whole set of vital powers. This starts from perception of the powers' spontaneous workings. Knowledge of the human good is at least materially practical. Against NNL theory, Jensen argues forcefully, with some help from Geach and Foot, that such knowledge is nonetheless descriptive. It is simply knowledge of human teleology. The true good of a natural being is nothing other than the perfection of its nature, seen as an object to which it is naturally inclined. Jensen uses the appeal to nonconscious inclinations and their objects to rebut Finnis's argument that we know human nature only in light...

본 논문은 현대 자연법론의 중요한 과제인 자연법 개념의 구체화를 법률적 자연법을 중심으로 해명하고 이를 통해 실정법의 정당성 문제를 극복하려는 것이다. 현대 자연법론이 자연법론과 법실증주의의 대립과 순환의 역사를 극복하고 주관적 자의와 획일적 실증주의로 인한 자아 상실로부터 주체성과 인격성을 회복하기 위해서는, 자연법의 성격을 객관적 정당성으로 파악하고 이를 자연법의 실질성을 통해 확보하여야 한다. 이를 위해 현대 자연법론은 객관적으로 정당할 뿐만 아니라 실질성을 구비한 자연법, 즉 실정법과 별개의 법체계로서 실정법에 외재하는 자연법이 아니라 실정법에 내재함으로써 법의 정당성과 실정성을 동시에 확보하여야 한다. 이는 자연법이 절대적인 것이 아니라 시간과 공간에 따라 변화하는 가변적이며 상대적인 것이라는 인식을 출발점으로 하여, 시대와 국가를 초월한 영구적이고 보편적인 자연법이 아니라 역사적으로 제약되고 동시에 실정법에 내재한 자연법을 추구하는 것이다. 현대 자연법론은 자연법과 실정법의 긴장을 어떻게 해소하고 이 둘의 연결을 어떻게 확보하느냐가 중요한 과제로 되는 것이다. 인간은 사회적 존재이므로 사회가 역사의 발전에 따라 변화할 때 인간도 사회와 함께 변화하며, 더 나아가 인간 자신이 이 변화의 주체라고 할 수도 있다. 따라서 인간의 행위를 추상적인 형이상학적 본성에 근거하여 판단하는 것은 구체적인 상황에서의 법 결정으로는 부족하다. 따라서 인간의 행위를 판단하는 기준은 변화를 전제로 하는 인간의 본성에 근거하여 확립되어야 한다. 그러므로 인간의 본성에 입각하여 본질을 파악할 수 있다는 자연법도 그 자체 역사적 과정이라고 할 수 있다. 이렇게 볼 때 인간의 본성과 자연법에 대한 새로운 선험적 방법에 의한 연구가 요청되는 것이다. 이를 위해 우선 자연법의 성격 규정을 절대적ㆍ정지적인 계기로부터 상대적ㆍ역동적인 계기로 그 비중을 옮겨야 한다. 그리고 자연법론과 법실증주의의 관계를 대립이 아니라 비판적 수용과 상호 보완, 즉 자연법론과 법실증주의의 융합이라는 방향으로 나아가야 한다. 또한 방법론에서도 자연법의 관념적 구축에 그치는 것이 아니라 역사학, 사회학, 문화인류학 등 실증적ㆍ경험과학적 분석 방법과 성과를 적극적으로 흡수하여 그것들과의 융합을 시도하여야 할 것이다. 이러한 자연법 개념의 구체화는 전통적 자연법론의 한계를 극복하는 동시에 실정법의 정당성을 확보할 수 있는 중요한 단서가 될 수 있을 것이다.Thisstudy aims to clarify the materialization of the natural laws which is one of the core issue in the field of modern law of nature and to overcome thelegitimacy of the law focusing the natural law. In order to get over confrontation between the natural law and the legal positivism and its repetition and to recover independence and personality from the loss of ego by subjective free will and standardized positivism, the modern natural law should construe its principle nature as the objective justification and emphasize the inherence, historicality and substantiality of natural law at the same time. To this end, the modern law of nature should not only be rightfully justified objectively, but also uphold the legitimacy and substantiality of law not by the external natural law but by the embodied natural law into positive law. This means pursuing natural law that are not permanent and universal transcending ages and countries. Therefore, in the modern natural law it is important subject to how to ease the tension of both natural and substantive laws and how to secure their connections. On account that Human beings and social beings, when society changes itself with historical development, Human changes itself with socienty, and furthermore humans themselves are the subject of this change. Therefore, judging human behavior by the abstract metaphysics nature is insufficient in concrete situation. The criteria for determining human behavior should be established based on human nature assuming change. Natural law which could be identified based on human nature is also said to the historical process as itself. In this regard, the study is requested by a new method of researching human nature and a new way of doing things. For this reason, formation of character of natural law must shift from absolute and static trigger to a relative and dynamic trigger. Furthermore the relationship between natural laws and legal positivism should go forward to the direction which is not conflict with confrontation, but rather the combination of criticism and mutual supplementary, namely the fusion of natural laws and legal positivism. In addition, it should actively absorb positive and empirical scientific analysis method and results, such as historical science, sociology and cultural anthropology, and try to integrate them. In conclusion, the materialization of natural laws can be an base clue to sur- mounting the limitations of traditional natural laws and ensuring the legitimacy of the laws.

The order of the precepts of the natural law corresponds to the order of our natural inclinations. For there is in man a natural and initial inclination to good which he has in common with all substances; in so far as every substance seeks its own preservation according to its own nature. Corresponding to this inclination, the natural law contains all that makes for the preservation of human life, and all that is opposed to its dissolution. Secondly, there is to be found in man a further inclination to certain more specific ends, according to the nature which man shares with other animals. In virtue of this inclination there pertains to the natural law all those instincts ‘which nature has taught all animals’ [Ulpian], such as sexual relationship, the rearing of offspring, and the like. (Aquinas, Summa Qu. 94. Art. 2) Aquinas’ apparently unproblematical words on the ‘naturalness’ of sexual relationship open up a thorny area for the Renaissance and conceal yawning gulfs and treacherous debates within Natural Law theory. Indeed, the difference of degree between Aquinas and Calvin over the issue of the inwardness or otherwise of Natural Law becomes a fundamental one, which was to exercise Milton in particular, when it is focused on sexuality, with its negative and positive concomitants, shame, companionship, and procreation.

O JUNE 25,1980, Lutherans throughout the world celebrate the 450th anniversary of the Confessio Augustana (CA). In the course of time the Augsburg Confession has become the principal confessional document of the Lutheran Church, although that was not its original intention. It was composed and presented to the Emperor, Charles V, in order to bring about unity among Christians. Only when this irenical intention was thwarted by the Emperor's rejection did the CA become the confessional document of the Lutheran-Evangelical Church. The CA has always been important for the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue. Its significance has not been limited to that particular dialogue: e.g., the CA greatly influenced the Anglican Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith and the Homilies. It also has ecumenical relevance in regard to the Reformed Church, inasmuch as Calvin signed the CA in its original form (the invariata) during his Strasbourg period (1538-41). In this essay I shall report on the current discussion concerning RC of the CA. This essay has four functions, some of which overlap. I shall (1) situate the CA within its historical context, (2) point out two sets of questions concerned with RC of the CA, (3) ask what the term recognition really implies, and (4) offer some reflections from the perspective of systematic theology.

Background The Historical Tension between Genesis 1:28 and Celibacy in the ChurchHaving made brief allusion to Jovinian in our introductory chapter -and before we encounter particularly the polemics surrounding Genesis 1:28 in subsequent chapters -it will be helpful to provide a brief overview of the historic tension and ambiguity surrounding Genesis 1:28 in the church.To begin with, then, we recall that throughout the church's history »Be fruitful and multiply« has been treated with a certain amount of ambivalence.Whereas Judaism historically has generally understood this verse both as covenantal confirmation and ongoing divine mandate, Christianity has often questioned the nature and ongoing relevance of the words contained therein, namely, »Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth.«According to Jeremy Cohen, this likely relates both to the fact that Genesis 1:28 is not referenced in the New Testament and that early Christianity was more concerned with its formative theological debates to pay too much attention to this verse 1 .Additionally, as ascetic thought and influence gained precedence, such topics as virginity and celibacy were generally of much greater interest to early church fathers than were concerns for fertility 2 .Nevertheless, there remained a certain ambiguity and divergence of opinions surrounding this verse.On the one hand, such second century fathers as Irenaeus of Lyons and Clement of Alexandria used this verse to establish their marital theology over against condemnations of heretical Encratism (with its strong asceticism), Gnosticism, and Marcionism -all of whose tendencies despised the materiality and worldliness of marriage and sexual relations 3 .On the other hand, however, moving into the third century, the sway of Encratism grew.In the West, for example, while continuing their opposition to the previously mentioned heretical teachings, such voices as those of Cyprian and Tertullian spoke out clearly in favor of celibacy and relegated marriage and procreation to a secondary, if not sinful, status 4 .This situation was, however, even more extreme in the East.Here, such teachers as Eusebius of Ceasarea and Origen, with their 1 Cohen, Be Fertile, p. 221. 2 Ibid., p. 231.We might, however, note that the indifference toward Genesis 1:28 may not be as prominent as Cohen suggests.In a recent article,

Securing the Foundations:Karol Wojtyła's Thomistic Personalism in Dialogue with Natural Law Theory Petar Popoviß Introduction Any attempt to exhaustively present the contributions of Karol Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism as elaborated in his pre-pontifical philosophical writings to the theory of natural law is surely not a task that can be easily reduced to a summary overview of Wojtyła's ready-made arguments. In his writings, John Paul II did not, in fact, reflect extensively on the topic of "natural law" as an immediate object of his philosophical enquiries. We can find only a few explicit references to it in his 1969 magnum opus The Acting Person, while a substantial philosophical argumentation on this subject in the immediate textual context of these references is virtually nonexistent. In his only philosophical text explicitly dedicated to the topic of natural law, entitled "The Human Person and Natural Law,"1 also from 1969, a more extensive elaboration on brief references to St. Thomas Aquinas's definitions of natural law is completely absent. Even in his later pontifical documents, John Paul II hardly ever extensively referred to natural law in its classic Thomistic formulation until his 1993 encyclical letter Veritatis Splendor.2 However, such a notable absence of explicit references [End Page 231] to natural law did not discourage Kenneth L. Schmitz, the author of one of the most significant studies of Wojtyła's philosophical project, from repeatedly highlighting the importance of Wojtyła's "personalist approach to natural law" and of his underscoring the "personal dimension within the metaphysics of natural law."3 How can an author who is so reluctant to avail himself of classical natural law discourse be, at the same time, celebrated as an important contributor to its more adequate comprehension? In this paper, we will aim to postulate that Wojtyła enters into an enriching dialogue with the Thomistic theory of natural law, in both its classical and its contemporary formulations, on a specific systematic level that does not directly engage the classic elements of natural law theory (such as natural inclinations, first precepts of natural law, etc.). We will show that Wojtyła, rather, grounds his most important contributions to this theory within the framework of his specific methodology of Thomistic personalism,4 which he held to be essential [End Page 232] to secure more completely the foundations5 that natural law and its adequate understanding offer to the moral and legal normative "grammar" of the humanum. The Personalistic Value of the Human Act as the Immediate Conceptual Context of Wojtyła's Contributions to Natural Law Theory In order to present Karol Wojtyła's contributions to natural law theory, we will first have to delimit the immediate conceptual context of his arguments on the topic. In his writings, he touches upon the topic of natural law in three distinctive ways. First, he sometimes only incidentally refers to some general topics of natural law theory while pursuing his personalistic line of argumentation, only to arrive at the already firmly established conclusions within the theory itself.6 Second, he sometimes, though seldom, explicitly refers to the concept of "natural law" (Polish: prawo naturalne) in order to invoke elements of the classical theory of natural law and to touch upon elements of his philosophical contribution to the theory from the perspective of Thomistic personalism.7 Finally, Wojtyła, at times, and without explicitly invoking the [End Page 233] term, provides arguments that represent his genuine, more developed contributions to the theory of natural law from his own specific philosophical perspective of Thomistic personalism. The first approach to the concept of natural law is not taken into consideration in this paper, while the second has already been thoroughly researched at length by other authors.8 Instead, this paper seeks to present the key elements of Wojtyła's third approach to the understanding of natural law—namely, his arguments on the enriching potential of viewing natural law from the perspective of the analysis of the personalistic value of the human act as the immediate object of philosophical analysis. We have elaborated at greater length on Wojtyła's concept of "the personalistic value of...

Introduction 1. Life and Times: Childhood - Civil War - Education - Historical context - Influences - Patrons and friends - Works 2. Method: Definition - Experience - Experimentation - Game Theoretic Interpretations - Geometry - Logic - Observation - Reasoning - Resolutive-compositive method 3. Language: Absurdity - Definitions - Indexicals - Meaning - Names and Universals - Ratiocination - Rhetoric - Uses and abuses 4. Political Philosophy: Absolutism - Authorization and Alienation - Commonwealth - Duties of soverseigns and subjects - Equality - Laws of nature - Interest - Liberty - Monarchy and other forms of government - Obligation - Parental authority lies naturally in the mother - Private judgment - Power - Resistance and non-resistance - Rights - Social Contract - Sovereign - State of nature - Subjects - War and Peace 5. Moral Philosophy: Appetite and Aversion - Deliberation - Desire - Duty - Egoism - Equality - Fear - Folly - Good and evil - Human nature - Law of nature - Manners - Prudence - Obligation - Right of nature - Right and wrong - Self-preservation - Small morals, distinguished - Virtue - Wisdom 6. Religion: Anglicanism - Ecclesiology - Episcopacy - Erastianism - God - Hell - Heresy - Independency - Kingdom of Darkness - Miracles - Mohametans - Natural Religion - Presbyterianism - Puritanism - Revelation - Roman Catholicism - Salvation - Scripture - Superstition - Things Indifferent - Toleration - Trinity - Worship / 7. Law: Adjudication - Casuistry - Civil law - Divine law - Educative function of law - Equity - Good laws, defined - International law/ international relations - Judgment - Legislation - Natural law - Positive law - Revenge - Sin and Law - Crime and Punishment 8. Science and Philosophy: Body - Cause - Liberty - Materialism - Motion - Necessity and Contingency - Optics - Passions - Plenism - Reasoning, instrumental - Space and Time - Squaring the circle 9. Epistemology: Belief - History and historical knowledge - Knowledge - Opinion - Sensation and perception / 10. Lessons and Unsolved Mysteries: Hobbes's legacy - Hobbes and liberalism - Right to revolution - Does Hobbes's philosophy presuppose atheism? - What political forms can count as sovereign? - Is Hobbesian sovereignty obsolete in a world of global independence? Bibliography Index

Reviewed by: Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth Century Ethics Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung Thomas M. Osborne, Jr. Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth Century Ethics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 325. Paper $30.00. Thomas Osborne's study is doubly successful—first, as a careful account of the historical sources and multiple layers of concerns shaping thirteenth-century debates about whether God can be naturally loved more than oneself. Second, it is also an excellent articulation of the metaphysical and conceptual gaps between ancient and medieval eudaimonistic ethical theories and contemporary morality. Both thirteenth-century thinkers and contemporary thinkers have to wrestle with the ethical value of self-love. However, Osborne builds a convincing case that ancient and medieval teleological accounts of human nature and natural inclination (for the medievals, the will as inclination to the good) are untranslatable into contemporary ethical frameworks. These problems greatly overshadow the difficulties faced by medievals trying to reconcile Greek philosophical eudaimonism with a Christian theological ethic, which requires loving God above all else, including oneself. Osborne's detailed and nuanced history shows how medieval conceptions of the natural inclination to the good (called 'love') are impacted by differences in metaphysics, moral psychology, and theology—such as the acceptance (or not) of participation as characterizing God's relation to creatures, varying understandings of the will's object, interpretations of Aristotle on friendship and the relation of political to contemplative virtue, and the impact of sin and grace on human nature. Osborne carefully delineates several meanings of 'natural' prevalent in medieval debates: 'natural' is opposed to 'rational' in some cases, and to [End Page 329] 'gratuitous' in others. This helps him sort through different positions on, for example, the relation of natural inclination to will, or natural love to charity, with admirable clarity. The upshot of all the history is to show that Aquinas and Scotus agree not only on the Augustinian assumption that "one loves oneself more by loving God even more than oneself"(10), but also, and more importantly, on a teleological view of human nature and the natural inclination of the will to the good. They thus stand in contrast to later medievals, like Ockham, and to modern deontologists and utilitarians, who use a libertarian account of freedom (God's or ours) or self-interest to explain moral action and obligation, rather than the natural inclination of the will to the good. Osborne's most original contributions are his claim that the medieval debate turns on different conceptions of natural inclinations to love, and his argument that Aquinas believes natural inclination tends foremost to the common good—including the common good of the entire universe, God. Aquinas concludes that God is naturally loved more than the individual's good, even though the individual's good is always contained in the common good. Scotus, by contrast, bases love for God over self in the will's natural object—goodness per se—which is God, absent any relation to creatures, including the agent. But the agent loves herself, by virtue of a natural inclination to her own good, since nature seeks its own perfection most of all. These two natural inclinations give rise to the two affections, one for justice and one for advantage. Although Scotus does not hold that these two loves come apart in fact, the seeds of later views in which they do have been planted. The reader may be surprised to find Aquinas's position a more strained interpretation of Aristotle than Scotus's, due to Aquinas's Augustinianism, which, in Osborne's treatment, is more apparent and thoroughgoing than Scotus's, as Scotus rejects participation and deemphasizes the impact of sin on natural inclination. With admirable clarity, the book's historical analysis traces debates about self-love and natural inclination from its Augustinian background (chapter 1), through early medieval discussions of the will (chapter 2), to Aquinas's synthesis of Neo-Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Christianity (chapter 3), through late thirteenth-century disagreements (chapter 4), and finally to Scotus's position (chapter 5). It is to Osborne's credit that, while his own interpretation favors Aquinas, the treatment...

HUMAN NATURE AND VALUE THEORY T HE CONCEPTION OF VALUE that I wish to propose in this essay has both classical rootage and contemporary awareness. The classical roots are to be found in Plato, Aristotle, and what came to be called natural law theory. I have not been accustomed to using the term' natural law' for my views because of the ambiguous interpretations which the term seems to invite. To some, of course, it inevitably suggests scientific laws, to others fixed orders of creation, and to others perhaps even papal encyclicals. Since none of these is to the point, it seems easier simply to state what one believes without wrestling with a complicated label. Besides, I would not want to be committed automatically to everything that has been put under the heading of natural law. The only point of relevance for the present purpose is the belief that an adequate understanding of value can be based on an adequate understanding of human nature. Still, within this framework, I claim that in what follows there is a modest contribution to natural law thinking, and this is the contemporary awareness I mentioned. On the whole natural law is probably thought of by most people as a system of ethical principles rather than as value theory. To be sure, the good is a central notion in natural law theory, so that values can hardly be ignored. But the paramount focus is ethical principles . Yet it seems possible, and worthwhile, to single out values as such, in the spirit of contemporary value theory, and try to show that they can be interpreted through an understanding of human nature, that is, the "laws " of our nature. This is the contribution I propose. I would go further and suggest the speculation that natural law theory may be more fruitfully considered as a basis for value theory than as a source for particular moral precepts. An analogous assessment has been made by ~78 HUMAN NATURE AND VALUE THEORY 279 others regarding normative ethics vs. metaethics, with natural law being held to be more applicable to the latter than to the former. Without disagreeing with that assessment, the present account focuses strictly on the nature of value. Four theses need to be established in order to make good on this project. They are: (1) There is such a thing as human nature. (2) This nature inclines us, barring interferences, in certain definite directions of activity. (3) The satisfaction we call value experience is found in the fulfillment of these very inclinations. (4) Values are thus perfections of our nature, as measured by the good of all-round perfection or, as John Cooper puts it, interpreting Aristotle in Reason and Human Good in Aristotle , "human flourishing." To underscore that these theses are not just truisms, I add the following: (1) The first thesis is a kind of essentialist principle and is opposed to any nominalism, existentialism, or positivism that would deny an essence of man. (2) The second thesis is a teleological principle and is opposed to any naturalism, mechanism, or pragmatism that would deny natural purposes or ends. (3) The third thesis is similar to what John Rawls has called the Aristotelian principle and is opposed to any hedonistic or interest theory of value which ignores the role in value experience of human nature and its inclinations. (4) The fourth thesis is a perfectivist principle and is opposed to any empirical or descriptive account of values which ignores the role of excellence or normative fulfillment in value experience. Human Nature To believe that there is a human nature is to believe that there is an essence of man. An essence in this sense comprises 280 DONALD W ALHOUT traits or characteristics or properties or capacities possessed by all human beings whatsoever. This essence is the general essence , in contrast with what some modal logicians call the individual essence, the latter being a property possessed necessarily , or in all possible worlds, by an individual. The rejection of a general human essence is sometimes based, I suspect, on a confusion of questions. The question about essence is this: Are there characteristics necessary to man such that any being without them...

Preface - Note on References - Human Nature - The State of Nature and Natural Law - The Laws of Nature and Morality - Morality as Reciprocity - The Social Contract and the Golden Rule in Practice - Morality and Objectivity - The Nature of Hobbesian Morality - Hobbes and Kant - Contract Theory Today - Reason and Moral Relativity - Contract and the Commonwealth - Sovereign and Subject - Democracy and the Right of Revolution - The Nature of Sovereignty - Sovereignty and Constitutional Rights - Notes - Index

Cameralism, one of the most important currents of economic thought in German-speaking countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, assumes a systematic and comprehensive form in the works of Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771). Justi tried to ground cameralism philosophically by way of what he termed ‘political metaphysics’. This theory essentially deals with the following topics: human nature, the state, and natural law. The aim of the present paper is to analyse the key concepts of Justi's political metaphysics as well as the line of reasoning adopted by him. It thereby sheds new light on cameralism as political metaphysics.

What is Natural Law Like?

The central text of western natural law is that of the Summa Theologiae , of Thomas Aquinas I-II, q. 94. a.2, in which the Aquinate refers to three types of realities: human nature, natural inclinations and human goods. In general, one of these types has been prioritized when studying the ways of knowing Natural Law, throwing other authors into the corner of errors, inaccuracies and even evil. This work supports the hypothesis that the study of nature, inclinations and goods as sources of natural regulations is not necessarily exclusive, and that a careful and dispassionate analysis leads to the conclusion that these are diverse but complementary ways, and that a study from the synergy of these sources of knowledge leads to richer and more explanatory solutions than those achieved by those who see them as exclusive alternatives.

Hobbes shows human as negative aspect, where human instinc tend to conflict, and war. So, sovereignty has to give state leader absolutely in order the state become strong and every state has to coperate with other in commonwealt paradigm. Hobbes discusses the concept of civil society starting with the concept of human being as human nature, particularly the concept of self, individu, and society. Hobbes looks at that human nature is a creature that affected by irrational, anachy, jelious, and hate, so the human become rude, and bad. This situations are called as primitive civil society. Meanwhile, Hobbes depicts modern civil society as a contradiction with human nature and natural law. Hobbes explains that state is created by individu who want create a piece from human nature, so human being has to make a social contract among individu.