Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide

Abstract

Abstract This paper defends the idea that there might be vagueness or indeterminacy in the world itself-as opposed to merely in our representations of the world-against the charges of incoherence and unintelligibility. First we consider the idea that the world might contain vague propertiesand relations; we show that this idea is already implied by certain well-understood views concerning the semantics of vague predicates (most notably the fuzzy view). Next we consider the idea that the world might contain vague objects; we argue that an object is indeterminate in a certain respect (colour, size, etc.) just in case it is a borderline case of a maximally specific colour (size, etc.) property. Finally we consider the idea that the world as a wholemight be indeterminate; we argue that the world is indeterminate just in case it lacks a determinate division into determinate objects. There is a widespread suspicion that indeterminacy and vagueness can only be features of claims or representations, and hence that it makes no more sense to ask whether the world is indeterminate than it does to ask whether the world rhymes or whether it’s written in English. On this view, it is not a genuine possibility that the world itself-as opposed to our representations of it-might be unsettled or inchoate in some way: the world must be a fully determinate array of facts or things. >Our aim in this paper is to make clear sense of the idea that the world itself might be vague or indeterminate in some respect. We shall not be arguing that the world isindeterminate. We shall not even be arguing that worldly indeterminacy is a genuine metaphysical possibility. Our aim is the more basic one of showing that contrary to the widespread suspicion just mentioned, the idea cannot be ruled out on grounds of incoherence or unintelligibility.