Abstract
Vague predicates have borderline cases. A certain shortish, thin and scraggly fir tree might only beaborderline case of “suitable as a Christmas tree” for example. A number of theorists of vagueness would regard this as equivalent to a claim that they would express using a “definitely” operator: the tree is neither definitely suitable nor definitely unsuitable. Standard versions of supervaluation semantics for vague predicates yield the surprising result that every sentence entails its definitization: if it is true that Firby the fir tree is suitable, then it is true that Firby is definitely suitable.1 The truth of the claim that Firby is suitable guarantees the truth of the claim that Firby is definitely suitable. Let us call the entailment principle in question D-introduction.
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