Woos, Mariusz. O Pisudskim, Dmowskim i zamachu majowym. Dyplomacja sowiecka wobec Polski w okresie kryzysu politicznego, 1925–1926 (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 379 varied formal responses; and there is also useful, illuminating discussion of Czech author Hasek’s work, The Good Soldier Švejk, showing the power of an enduring myth: that a work intended satirically is now seen as a genial, indirect celebration of the Monarchy in itself says a lot about the kind of ‘nostalgia’ Kożuchowski examines. Wolfson College, University of Oxford Robert Pyrah Wołos, Mariusz. O Piłsudskim, Dmowskim i zamachu majowym. Dyplomacja sowiecka wobec Polski w okresie kryzysu politicznego, 1925–1926. Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków, 2013. 461 pp. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index of names. Zł 49.90. Our understanding of Soviet foreign policy has expanded over recent decades. Despite the peculiarities of Russian archival policies, sources that are now available tell us a great deal, bringing new questions under the spotlight. Wołos places the interaction of the People’s Commisariat for Foreign Affairs with stationsabroadatthecentreofhisstudyandexamineshowtheSovietsperceived the 1926 Warsaw crisis by employing a number of internal communications, which in turn reveal features of their foreign policy-making in the 1920s. Owing to a recent wave of interest in Soviet foreign policy administration and personnel, Wołos is able to skilfully introduce the personalities in charge of Polish affairs. Beside the Warsaw legation (polpred Vojkov, assassinated in 1927) and the Commissariat (the respective department headed by B. Stomoniakov), he draws attention to the Commissariat’s Department of Diplomatic Information in Berlin. He notes that the German capital, as the Soviet ‘window on the West’, mirrored the Baltic capitals, which looked the other way. Furthermore, Wołos claims that the impact of the Politburo member Feliks Dzerzhinskii, a former comrade of Piłsudski, ‘would be difficult to exaggerate’ (p. 82). Poland’s strategic position meant that the Soviets monitored its affairs closely. Wołos asserts that, along with the social tensions that were bound to start a revolution, the Soviets’ primary concern was the alleged rise of British influence in Poland which they considered a battlefield of global rivalry (pp. 52, 58, 68). Even Piłsudski´s comeback in November 1925 was ascribed to the British (p. 82). While the road to Locarno was threatening to deflect Germany from Rapallo’s politics, Chicherin made approaches in Warsaw. The NEP was to be a prime motor: the possible restoration of pre-Revolutionary ties appealed to Polish business. This helped Vojkov to establish contacts with the rightwing National Democrats (the Endecja) of Roman Dmowski, Piłsudski’s chief SEER, 93, 2, APRIL 2015 380 opponent. The ideological barrier notwithstanding, the Endecja remained the only ‘bourgeois’ Vojkov partner within the Polish politics. Access to Piłsudski, with his anti-Soviet record and the potential to dismantle the radical Left, was sought but never achieved. Soviet diplomats, with limited contacts (or the lack of them, for instance in the army), struggled with the collection of information. Vojkov was soon found to be unreliable and was heavily criticized (p. 141, 148, 166 etc.; the Berlin station fared better, pp. 187–93). The spring of 1926 supplied definite proof. A takeover by Piłsudski was concluded to be ‘a standing threat’, yet discussion of technicalities and potential repercussions revealed little consensus among Soviet observers (pp. 127–39). As important as Polish affairs must have been for Moscow, Wołos illustrates how Vojkov was by-and-large ‘reading in the dark’ (blądzenie po omacku, p. 151), so that the mid-May takeover caught him by surprise (he speculated that ‘it diminished Piłsudski’s authority and, thus, limited British possibilities to wield influence on Polish internal affairs’, p. 185). Moscow feared that Piłsudski, a bonapartist figure (p. 215) fleeing from internal problems, might launch an all-out anti-Soviet policy. In advising Vojkov to minimize contacts with the Endecja, Stomoniakov tried to avert accusations of a Soviet-backed opposition. While initial beliefs about Piłsudski’s short-term rule eroded, mistrust remained. Despite non-interest statements about formerly disputed borderlands and feeble information, the polpred focused on the military build-up of the new regime. Vojkov and the Commissariat (but not S. J. Rajewski in Berlin) counted on a takeover that never came to pass which diverted the Soviets towards international politics — the...