Wittgenstein's Critique of Set Theory

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The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 38, Issue 2 p. 281-319 Wittgenstein's Critique of Set Theory Victor Rodych, Victor Rodych University of Lethbridge Victor Rodych is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at The University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta. His most recent publications include “Wittgenstein's Inversion of Gödel's Theorem” Erkenntnis (1999), “Wittgenstein on Irrationals and Algorithmic Decidability,” Synthese (1999); “Wittgenstein on Mathematical Meaningfulness, Decidability, and Application,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (1997). His areas of interest include Philosophy of Science and the Philosophy of Psychology.Search for more papers by this author Victor Rodych, Victor Rodych University of Lethbridge Victor Rodych is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at The University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta. His most recent publications include “Wittgenstein's Inversion of Gödel's Theorem” Erkenntnis (1999), “Wittgenstein on Irrationals and Algorithmic Decidability,” Synthese (1999); “Wittgenstein on Mathematical Meaningfulness, Decidability, and Application,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (1997). His areas of interest include Philosophy of Science and the Philosophy of Psychology.Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00902.xCitations: 9 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume38, Issue2Summer 2000Pages 281-319 RelatedInformation