Abstract
The paper is concerned with Wittgenstein’s attitudes towards various forms of naturalism. On the one hand, Wittgenstein’s antinaturalism is based on the idea that there is a deep divide between science and philosophy. The paper argues that such a methodological claim cannot be criticized by resorting to Quine’s attack to analyticity, for the Wittgensteinian notion of a grammatical rule is different from the Carnapian notion of an analytical proposition. Though, at the same time, the paper underlines that Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar is the core of the so-called “linguistic doctrine of necessity”, which has been strongly criticized by Kripke. On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s naturalism is based on notions such as “form of life” and “general facts of nature”. The paper shows that such a view is motivated by antifoundationalist and non intellectualistic biases, and is mainly characterized by a peculiar attention to the normative dimension of human behaviour and activities.
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