Value and truth in the legal theory of Ronald Dworkin

Abstract

Brian Leiter observes that Dworkin creates problems for his legal theorizing in maintaining on the one hand that moral values figure in the truth of propositions of law, at least in ‘hard cases’, but on the other had that there are right answers to be found for those ‘hard cases’. Moreover, Leiter stresses that while Dworkin was aware of these concerns, his responses ‘have attracted little attention from philosophers or jurisprudents over the years’. Yet, Dworkin’s approach to the objectivity of moral (and, therefore, legal) truth is critical to drawing a distinction between his work and that of other constructive interpretive theorists. It is the very aspect that sets his work apart from many other philosophers who might be sympathetic to his interpretive views. It is the aim of this thesis to clarify and contextualize this important aspect of Dworkin’s theoretical outlook. I propose that it is helpful to understanding Dworkin’s approach to objectivity and truth, and his theory as a whole, to situate his work within the canonical theories of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, but also I consider that it is equally helpful to situate Dworkin’s thinking on these matters, particularly his later thought, within the later theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Although Dworkin’s work is spattered with references to Wittgenstein, and although philosophers have noted the potential ‘quietism’ in Dworkin’s approach to metaphysics, few philosophers consider his work from a non-skeptical, Wittgensteinian perspective. This may be, in part, due to the general lack of enthusiasm in some philosophical circles for the work of Wittgenstein. However, Dworkin’s not infrequent references to Wittgenstein, as noted, would seem to indicate that Dworkin found inspiration from Wittgenstein’s texts. This thesis pursues the connections between Dworkin and Wittgenstein to illuminate the nature of Dworkin’s constructivist theory of truth. This thesis also draws on Wittgenstein to explore the question of whether Dworkin’s theory is properly viewed as a form of naturalism. It might be argued that, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin outlines a form of constructive interpretation that lends itself to being understood as a naturalist methodological approach to legal theory. But, even if this is the case, an epistemological naturalism does not necessarily presuppose a commitment by Dworkin to a metaphysical naturalism. A number of authors, including Leiter and Michael Moore, have characterized Dworkin’s theory as a form of metaphysical non-naturalism. An alternative to this approach would be to consider that Dworkin’s theory is a form of ‘quietism’ (that is, that it prescinds from or remains agnostic on metaphysical issues), an accusation that he responds to himself. I propose instead, that if Dworkin’s theory of truth, read in its best light and in conjunction with his theory of law as a matter of interpretation, can be considered in a Wittgensteinian context, and if metaphysical naturalism can be divorced from a strict scientific approach to it, there is an argument available for Dworkin’s theory to be considered as a form of metaphysical naturalism. That form of naturalism would take as its foundation the very context of ‘humanity’ as a particular and complicated ‘form of life’.