Wishful Thinking

Abstract

Since the Mulroney government oriented Canada decisively toward the Americas by joining the Organization of American States in 1990, democracy promotion in the region has been an important activity, at least rhetorically, of both Conservative and Liberal governments.' This has never been more so than with the present Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who signaled early on that democracy support would be both a key priority for its foreign policy and, more specifically, for Canada's reengagement with the Americas.Various scholars have observed that, historically, Canada's performance has been inconsistent in the advancement of democracy in the Americas and in policy toward the region in general.2 In the broader terms of Canadian hemispheric policy, after a flurry of government activity in areas such as trade, democracy promotion, human rights, and human security during the 1990s, Canada seemed to enter a period of relative disengagement with the Americas during the new millennium, especially following the collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations at the Mar del Plata summit of the Americas in 2005.Despite great fanfare to the contrary, inconsistency has been the case yet again with the Harper government. Although good work is being done on the ground by dedicated Canadian officials, Canadian engagement is a far cry from the grandiose promises made in 2007 and 2008 to create a new democracy foundation, make democracy promotion a distinct and pivotal area of policy and programming across government, and make the Americas one of the government's top foreign policy priorities. Why is there a persistent pattern of Canadian underperformance on the democracy promotion front, in particular in the western hemisphere? Through an evaluation of the Harper government record, in this article I suggest that there is something wrong with the social construction of this issue area as a national interest. I argue that poor agency and policy framing have wrongly rendered democracy promotion and its Americas context soft foreign policy interests.The following analysis is divided into four parts. First, I review the various explanations given in the academic literature for Canada's uneven policy performance on democracy promotion and on the Americas in general. I emphasize the potential usefulness of an analytical approach that emphasizes the social construction of democracy promotion in Latin America and the Caribbean as a national interest. In a second section 1 evaluate the rhetoric, versus the reality, of democracy promotion in the western hemisphere under the Harper government. Third, I attribute the Harper government's weak policy performance to difficulties in framing the Canadian advancement of democracy in the region as a national priority. In a concluding section I stress the need for a revisionist exercise to attune Canadian policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean to Canada's national interests.ADVANCING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS: IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?Various authors have noted that Canada has an inconsistent record when it comes to both democracy promotion and a broader commitment to the Americas. George MacLean observes that despite rhetoric, Canada's involvement in the western hemisphere has historically been fickle and characterized more by fits and starts than any coherent and sustained policy approach.3 Jean Daudelin speaks of the volatility of Canada's policy in the Americas and reminds us that roughly every twenty years, Canada rediscovers the Americas.4 A review of the pertinent literature suggests that the ups and downs of Canada's democracy promotion and Americas policy framework are linked to limits in its hemispheric interests, including challenges to its trade-driven agenda, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and a lack of region-wide security concerns. As Daudelin and MacLean argue, despite all the hype to the contrary, Canada still does not have strong vested interests in the region, and accordingly, there are not any significant repercussions to reneging on its policy commitments. …