Abstract
This article explores the problem of moral and criminal responsibility through an examination of Aristotle's account in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics of the relation between practical reason and moral unrestraint (akrasia). The author seeks to explain Aristotle's surprising agreement with the Socratic thesis that no one does wrong knowingly. Though what generally passes for practical wisdom seems, in Aristotle's account, to be independent of philosophic wisdom, Aristotle nonetheless understands practical wisdom to be inseparable from philosophy. An understanding of Aristotle's treatment of moral unrestraint, the author concludes, helps to clarify the relation between philosophy and politics and also the limitations of reason as an instrument of governance.
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