Willing and not being able: Nietzsche on akratic action

Abstract

ABSTRACT Nietzsche claims that weakness of will is a pervasive feature of modernity: ‘Nothing is as timely [zeitgemass] as weakness of will’ (BGE 212). In this paper I explore a textual puzzle regarding the phenomenon traditionally identified with weakness of will, akrasia. Specifically, I draw attention to an apparent inconsistency between Nietzsche’s views regarding the origins of action and evaluative judgment, on the one hand, and his commitment to the possibility of akratic action, on the other. Nietzsche appears to account for both action and ‘conscience’ – which functions like what philosophers today would call ‘better judgment’—by appealing to the strength of the drives. Thus, it is not immediately clear how action could ever diverge from conscience in the manner required for akratic action. As I argue, however, Nietzsche’s theoretical commitments regarding action and conscience are ultimately consistent with the possibility of akratic action. After motivating the interpretive tension, I offer a closer examination of Nietzsche’s remarks regarding the sources of action and conscience, respectively. I then demonstrate, drawing on his description of the relations between drives and his distinction between conscious and unconscious thought, that Nietzsche conceives of akratic action as a kind of ‘willing and not being able.’