Abstract
AbstractWhat is the role of emotions in akratic action? Proposing that emotions are non‐conceptual perceptions of values, the author argues that such states have the capacity not just to cause but also to render intelligible actions that are contrary to one's better judgement. Akratic actions prompted by an emotion may even be more rational than following one's evaluative judgement, for the perception might enable the agent to better track the reasons she has, compared to the judgement. By contrast, akratic actions in which no emotion is involved (cases of ‘cool’ akrasia) are genuinely puzzling and of dubious intelligibility.
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