Will the central land inspection affect the intensity of local environmental protection? Evidence from China

Abstract

Observing the impact and alienation of local government implementation of central policies is helpful for a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of central policy execution and the systematic formulation of central-local management policies. This paper takes the influence of land inspections on local government environmental behavior as the research object, based on the land inspection system initiated by the central government in 2006. It uses panel data from 30 provinces in China and a difference-in-differences method to assess the environmental protection crowding-out effect of land inspections for the first time and conducts an in-depth exploration of its mechanisms and heterogeneity. The study findings are as follows: (1) In a long-term sample spanning from 1997 to 2020, the establishment of land inspection bureaus did not significantly increase the level of environmental pollution in the host regions. (2) In a short-term sample spanning from 2000 to 2015, the establishment of land inspection bureaus significantly increased the level of environmental pollution in the host regions. (3) The environmental protection crowding-out effect of land inspections is mainly due to the restraint on local government fiscal revenue. (4) The larger the economic scale, the more significant the positive effect of land inspections on the level of environmental pollution in the host regions.