Abstract

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was formally launched in 2015. From the very outset, skeptics raised doubts about its sustainability and meaningfulness for particularly Pakistani society, economy and the state. Nevertheless, the Sharif government in strategic interaction with its Chinese counterpart ably thwarted such controversies and ensured execution of the CPEC projects in different parts of Pakistan. Though within Pakistan, political opposition and certain nationalist political and social forces voiced their related concerns, for instance, to the “route” alignment, the federal and Punjab government led by the Sharifs held ground and accorded priority to sustain the Corridor by engaging local and provincial stakeholders. However, this was not the case with the Khan government whose commerce advisor doubted the negotiated terms and conditions of the CPEC and, therefore, called for its revision to provide a fair deal to the Pakistani side. Why did the Khan government adopt such a policy? How does such a discourse affect China–Pakistan relation in general and CPEC and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) in particular? What made the Khan government correct its path ultimately? In other words, does change in government impact CPEC negatively? This paper attempts to address these questions empirically.

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