Abstract
In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration.
Highlights
Religion and ConscienceBefore examining whether religion should be tolerated qua religion, Leiter attempts to explain what the expressions ‘religion as such’ and ‘religion qua religion’ could mean
In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well
We want to ask Leiter two questions, slightly different from the one he asks in the title of his book, Why Tolerate religion? First, Leiter maintains that while there is nothing special about religion, conscience should be the object of toleration
Summary
Before examining whether religion should be tolerated qua religion, Leiter attempts to explain what the expressions ‘religion as such’ and ‘religion qua religion’ could mean. Someone holding that religion is insulated from reasons and evidence could argue that the two senses of insulation nicely support one another On this view, religion combines the two epistemic features: it is characterized by a subjective attitude of faith in ideas which cannot objectively be validated or refuted in the light of reasons and evidence. When trying to distinguish religion from any form of fanatical belief, Leiter relies on the second interpretation of ‘insulation from reasons and evidence’, namely, the view that religious beliefs themselves, when properly understood, are indifferent to reasons and evidence This is the notion of religion’s epistemic insulation which underlies the claim that religious beliefs are metaphysical in nature They are not insulated from empirical evidence and standards of rational justification as these are understood in the natural sciences
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