Abstract

One can identify two central theses that underlie Why Tolerate Religion? Firstly, religious claims of conscience are not more important, from a moral point of view, than non-religious claims of conscience. Deontological, utilitarian and epistemic reasons do not make religion morally distinctive or special. Religious and secular conscience deserve equal legal treatment. Secondly, the legislators and courts shouldn’t allow exemptions to general laws with neutral purposes for all conscientious objectors. The legal accommodation of religious and non-religious claims of conscience is morally acceptable only provided that shifting burdens onto other citizens is not involved. At the core of the above mentioned theses stands the anticipated concept of religion. Leiter points out three features that all and only religions have. Religions formulate categorical demands on action that must be satisfied no matter what. Some religious beliefs in each religion are based on faith, i.e. they are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification. Finally, religious beliefs provide existential consolation in regard to essential issues of human life, such as suffering and death. Leiter’s definition of religion is unconvincing, specifically his shallow, taken for granted rejection of religion’s rationality. The incorrect characterization of religion puts into question the reviewed book’s conclusions.

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