Abstract
My goal is to address one of the most common objections to a view called neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism (henceforth: “Aristotelian naturalism”). G. E. M. Anscombe (1981) is sometimes seen as the spearhead of this view in contemporary Anglophone philosophy, but it was developed into its currently recognizable form primarily by Philippa Foot (especially 2001, 2004), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999, 2012) and Michael Thompson (1995, 2004, 2008). As neo-Aristotelians, they hold that ethics is aimed at human flourishing, and that human flourishing involves living virtuously. As ethical naturalists, they hold that the traditional table of moral virtues are natural excellences, where what counts as a natural excellence is determined by facts about human nature. I will simplify this roughly as the claim that ethical goodness is a kind of natural goodness. I will call this the core thesis.
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