Aristotle and Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism

Abstract

Aristotle’s practical philosophy has recourse at various points to the idea of human nature and to conditions allegedly given in nature. Philosophers such as Julia Annas, Martha C. Nussbaum and John McDowell sought to counteract the impression that human nature served the function for Aristotle of grounding moral philosophy or moral thought upon some extra-ethical fact. Working against the tendency to banish nature or human nature from moral philosophy, these same authors looked to ancient works on moral philosophy for signs of a “rich” conception of nature, simultaneously descriptive and normative, or for a sense of nature conceived internally, i.e. from the perspective of the morally deliberating agent. In a broader sense this attempt can be seen as a neo-Aristotelian rediscovery of nature-based arguments in moral philosophy and in this regard as “neo-Aristotelian naturalism”. This is to be distinguished from some philosophers’ defence of Aristotle’s emphasis on human nature in his moral philosophy which focuses on a quite specific use of this topic and an immediate connection between virtues and vices on the one hand and human nature on the other: namely making virtues and vices directly dependent on the good specific to the human form of life and viewing a lack of virtues in humans analogously to natural defect among animals (such as a woodpecker’s inability to peck). This approach is represented above all by Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and Rosalind Hursthouse, along with a growing number of followers. It is this constellation in particular that has been grouped under the heading “Aristotelian naturalism” in recent years.