Why sentiments can be logical

Abstract

[The dialogue took place online on the channel @TIDDigital youtube.com/watch?v=sPijMys2qYg, on September 25, 2020].
 Today we are having our fourth and last encounter with the philosopher and Peirce scholar Vincent Colapietro in a series of dialogues on cognitive semiotics. The first was our “Dialogue on cognitive semiotics: Minds and machines” (TECCOGS 21).The second was on the question “What is the semiotic self?” (TECCOGS 22) and the third on “How can we change habits?” (TECCOGS 23). This time, we want to discuss whether or why sentiments may be logical. “Logical Emotions” sounds like a contradiction in terms, a contradictio in adjecto. When we address this topic, we continue our first dialogue of this series, which was on cognition in general. For many scholars, emotion and rationality are separate. We are so used to thinking that logic admits no feeling, but Charles Sanders Peirce had some not so well-known ideas on how both are intimately connected. Peirce had a cognitive theory of emotion, which means that feeling and cognition are not be separated a priori. Of course, we know that the elaboration of a logical argument can bring about a feeling of satisfaction when we finally succeed in coming to a conclusion or a feeling of frustration in case we fail, but the details are still enigmatic. This is why we are awaiting, with feelings of curiosity, what professor Colapietro has to say about the logic of sentiments.