BRIEF REPORTFunctional and dysfunctional feelings in Ellis' cognitive theory of emotion: An empirical analysis

Abstract

This study is to our knowledge the first to investigate how rational and irrational beliefs (RBs and IBs) generate qualitatively different feelings/emotions based on the same physiological arousal when the immediate environment is devoid of relevant cues. Participants in this study (N = 120) were evaluated for and primed with rational or irrational beliefs. Next, they exercised or sat still, and either immediately or after a delay, rated their emotional state. Consistent with the bifactorial theory of emotion and with Ellis' cognitive theory of emotion, participants in the exercise delayed‐rating condition, who lacked an obvious explanation for their residual arousal, interpreted their arousal in terms of primed beliefs. RBs were associated with positive emotions, while IBs were associated with dysfunctional negative emotions and their corresponding functional negative emotions (e.g., both depressed and sad). Participants in the exercise immediate‐rating condition and those in the no‐exercise condition were not influenced by their primed beliefs. Implications for Ellis' cognitive theory of emotion are discussed.