Abstract
In Ebbs 1996 and 2001 I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support scepticism about self-knowledge is actually incoherent, or self-undermining. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premisses of my explanation are true, the sceptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the sceptical argument is self-undermining, it can still serve as a reductio ad absurdum of the assumption that we have selfknowledge. My goal here is to explain why I think neither of these responses is successful.
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