Why Revise? Presenting a New Dataset on Renegotiations in the International Trade Regime

Abstract

International agreements are usually understood to help governments make credible commitments to future policy by limiting their ability to renege on their promises. Renegotiations of agreements, like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are therefore viewed as a threat to the stability of international regimes, since renegotiations call past commitments into question. But we know very little about the frequency or nature of treaty renegotiations. When are international agreements renegotiated, and what effect does renegotiation have on international cooperation? Do most renegotiations aim to backtrack on past commitments, or to deepen them? Using the topical context of the trade regime, I collect new data on international treaty revisions, covering preferential trade agreements signed since the year 2000. Around 40% of these agreements have been amended in some form, and most amendments result not in scaled back agreements, but in deeper commitments. Survival analysis shows that wealthy countries that are likely to be 'likeminded' (jointly democratic, cultural affinities, and membership in the OECD) are most likely to revise their commitments. An error-correction model shows revisions are generally associated with a long-run increase in export volumes, but that 'limiting' revisions aimed at backtracking on commitments act as a brake on exports. Renegotiations are not breakdowns in international relations, but opportunities for governments to renew their commitment to cooperation.