Abstract

ABSTRACT Although some influential officials saw value in it during peacetime, 1950s British governments decided to allow the national register and identity card wartime scheme to lapse without replacement. Scholars have not satisfactorily explained why they did so. This article argues that neither the surveillance imperatives for tracking citizens nor ‘joined-up government’ aspirations for service integration nor the limits of analogue systems were the decisive considerations. The article draws upon a very extensive study of the full range of files from all the departments of state involved in the decision-making process in Whitehall in the post-war years, to reconstruct in much greater detail than has been attempted before, just what the main considerations were and how the inter-departmental battles were fought over them, which resulted in the discontinuation of the wartime scheme and the decision to reject subsequent proposals to introduce a fresh one. In particular, it traces the crucial role of financial as well as of organisational imperatives, which are neglected in the standard surveillance, welfare improvement and technological explanations.

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